Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless. (>de re/de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers ".
Wright: Truth/Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVs equating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
 E.g. idealization: not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
---
VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. PutnamVsRorty et al.: ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
---
Putnam I 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn. if you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. ---
I 141
Truth/Assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from his truth-definition also follows assertibility - the probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. ---
I 246
Truth/Justified Assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement - PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Assertions Dewey
 
Books on Amazon
Putnam II 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture - norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: independent of majority, but not transcendent reality but property of the concept of justification. - PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim that they can stand inside and outside of language at the same time.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Attribution Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 641f
Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor - Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution - WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues - DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities.
Strawson I 127
StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution - ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed - ((s) Strawson: perhaps only theoretical possibility that has to be presumed.)
I 141
Attribution/Gap/Strawson: no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears - solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others - I 142 Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Conjunction Fraassen
 
Books on Amazon
I 83
"Conjunction-objection" / PutnamVsFraassen: a conjunction of theories must transfer truth, but not empirical adequacy. - PutnamVspositivism / therefore there is no positivist substitute for the concept of truth. - PutnamVsacceptability - PutnamVsRorty - PutnamVsPeirce? - Two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate in itself. - Problem: the conjunction of two theories need not be believed. - Example: one is a correction of the other.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Incorrigibility Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 637
Incorrigibility / DavidsonVsRorty: our claims about our own propositional attitudes are not incorrigible - it is possible that our self-judgments be overturned by clues and evidence that are available to others -
I 644
I. / Shoemaker: not a kind of knowledge, but a class of utterances (not propositions as meanings) - DavidsonVs: that is not enough: the speaker must know that it is this particular class of sentences he used - problem: if only the speaker himself can decide that, then there is absolutely no basis.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Interpretation McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 180
Radical interpretation/Davidson/McDowell: ultimately, the field linguist picks up norms from the inner perspective (language, coherence, not ratio stimulus/world). ---
I 181
McDowellVsRorty: if he forbids a normative view for the field linguist (and thus proposes an external perspective of a purely causal nature), then he deprives us of the importance of the transition from the initial predicament to the achieved interpretation. ---
I 182
McDowellVsRorty: ultimately represents a dualism of nature and reason. Therefore, as a pragmatist, he can only be successful in some cases. He himself does not see this as a dualism. He speaks of it (Rorty): "patiently explaining that norms are something different than descriptions."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Metaphors Habermas
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty III 117
Metaphor/HabermasVsRorty: considers Rorty's aestheticizing speech of metaphor, concept renewal and self-discovery as an unfortunate fascination of the idea of the "world-developing function of language", which, in contrast to the "problem-solving" function of language steps into "inner-worldly practice". ---
III 118
Habermas/Kuhn/Rorty: Habermas is ready to accept from Kuhn that "the languages of science and technology, law and morality, economics and politics live on the luminosity of metaphorical speeches." ---
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a 'romantic upheaval' like Hitler and Mao have shown it before than of a suffocating effect that the encrusted societies can have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault called the "bio-power" of the experts. ---
III 120
Rorty VsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of a "universal validity" (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if one is convinced of the "contingency of language".

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Norms McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 179
Norms/standards/McDowellVsRorty: it is veiled, that it is precisely the standards that are up for debate. There are normative because the disquotation is the norm of their results. (McDowell: normative, not descriptive).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Phenomenology Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
NagelVsRorty, NagelVsSubjectivism: seeks a phenomenological reduction of thoughts, to get out of them - can not succeed - conceptual schemes fail for the same reason: I can not say "p, but I do not know if it s true" - > conceptual scheme / NagelVsQuine -

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Philosophy Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 408
Philosophy/AyersVsRorty: the following theses are generally represented by the same people 1. Realism/antirealism is an important distinction
2. Dummett is right: these antirealism/realsim conflicts have been the most decisive in the history of philosophy.
---
VI 409
3. Wilson is right when it expresses doubts about the contingency of the problems. 4. Ayers is right, one must not allow one's own metaphysical and epistemic theories to be influenced by one's own politics and morality.
5. Color: the problem of "the nature of color" is not solvable. The same is true of the body-soul problem.
6. Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical.
7. Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the sensory organs merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: Revival of Empiricism.
8. Identity with oneself is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, nonrelational features. Some terms are rigid.
9. Recognition of the unspeakable is praiseworthy intellectual modesty.
10. Locke's "Essay concern human understandig" is not a signpost, but a work still to be explored that contains not yet articulated truths.
RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I have diametrically opposed views.
---
VI 410
Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the ten theses. ---
VI 411
"Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: conflict term of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot has to be already in the language before a plausible appeal to the taste of onions is possible at all.
---
VI 412
This also includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". This also includes the notion of "consciousness" (as a notion of the 17th century).


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Relativism Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 9ff
Relativism/subjectivism/Nagel: the relativism is first, self-contradictory, because it is claimed, nothing is the case, second, meaningless, because everything arbitrary is the case, what we say or believe. ---
I 31 ff
E.g. Rorty (subjectivist): We cannot identify a hook which draws us out of mere coherence to something like the correspondence with the "per se subsistent reality". NagelVsRorty et.al.: is convincing at first glance, but: if you take these authors seriously, they are just contrary to that consensus on which, according to them the objectivity "is based": people who develop scientific or mathematical beliefs , are in agreement that these things are absolutely true, regardless of if we agree on them. > (realism).
---
I 136
Relativism/NagelVsRelativism/Nagel: the attempt to reinterpret the orderly world image as a projection of our mind, fails due to the need, to find a place for ourselves in the so-ordered world. ---
I 134
If we consider the phenomena always as merely "for us", we need to show that they have no systematic relationship with observed regularities.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Relativism Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Horwich I 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. ---
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. ---
I 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 309
Concept of Truth/Truth/Putnam/Rorty: the concept of truth has certain properties. Putnam: if a statement is true, then its logical consequences are also true, when two statements are true, then their conjunction is also true. If a statement is now true, then it is always. ---
Horwich I 394
Truth: ... has to do with speaker-use (success), not with what is going on "in the head" - (> verification degrees, confirmation degrees). - Meaning/Putnam: is also a function of the reference (not only in the head). - Reference/Putnam: is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms. ---
Horwich I 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist (= reductionist) or cultural relativist. ---
Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if it was not a property, the truth conditions were everything you could know about them - (((s) Putnam pro truth as a property -> PutnamVsField?) - Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts. ---
Putnam III 96f
Truth/Deconstructivism/PutnamVsDerrida: (Derrida: "The concept of truth itself is inconsistent but indispensable") - PutnamVs: the failure of a large number of contradictory statements is something else than a failure of the concept of truth itself - Truth/Putnam. Not "what I would believe if I continue researching". - Putnam: the philosophy of language got only troubled because they believed that they could clear out the normative. ---
II 204f
Truth/PutnamVsRorty: when some ideas "pay out", then there is the question of the nature of this accuracy.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
World/Thinking McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 179
World/thinking/McDowellVsRorty: the idea of ​​standards consists precisely in the fact that our opportunities to think correctly about the world increase, if we follow them. If it does not increase, we will have to modify the standards. ---
I 53
World/control/McDowell: the control comes from outside the mind, it does not need to come from outside the conceivable content. ---
Rorty VI 179 ff
Perception/experience/McDowell: Although conceptually structured, nevertheless it is something other than the belief that may result from it.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
World/Thinking Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 88
Sentence/World/Meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. We assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least if it is true). (MillikanVsRorty). Mathematical equation: here it is perhaps different.
Truth/Millikan: Let us assume that it has to do with some mapping relation or mapping rule.
N.B.: this cannot be a natural status (status within the natural world).
e.g. wrong sentence: does not map anything, but still has meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So not something in the natural world.
N.B.: then that what a true sentence means, cannot be something in the actual world.
Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation that is not itself in the world. This relation is the meaning.
Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true sentence and what is in the world. Therefore, this relation is not causal.
Truthmaker/Millikan: Cannot be found in false sentences. And we do not understand false sentences by merely saying that it is not true.
Meaning/Millikan: meaning must be something that is common to true and false sentences.
Image/Meaning/Millikan: Meaning also seems to be irrelevant for actual mapping relations.
Solution/Millikan: our terms "Eigen ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "are supposed to correspond" with facts in the world in accordance with certain mapping rules. This can be explained with the terms of normality and eigenfunction.
---
I 89
False/False sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as e.g. a chameleon, which does not adapt to the color of its environment. ((s)> mistake, error, disturbance). Meaning/Millikan: 2. Sounds become sentences with meaning when they are interpreted.
Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore a dependent (on interpretation) intentionality . ((s)> derived intentionality).
Sentence/subject/world/Millikan: without the intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object.
Thought/Thinking/Intentionality/Millikan: N.B.: then the intentionality of thoughts cannot be interpreted as that of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress.
Representation/Millikan: those who think sentences are internal representations forget that sentences and images are only intentionally derived.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Rorty Vs Armstrong, D.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Frank I 583
Incorrigibility/RortyVsArmstrong: no epistemic notion of truth: that not to say "implies its own truth". Instead: conventional standards of the respective culture!Later: RortyVsRorty: should science produce a disagreement Ex retinal images with the reports of a person: as in hallucination the representation may then indeed be false, without rendering the report of the hallucinating subject wrong!
Rorty: "There are no recognized methods to resolve doubts about p if p fits into a pattern of sincere reports of the subject S, even if p does not fit into a general theory".
I 584
Rorty adjusts to the "ontology of the man on the street", who would have a hard time without mental entities in the foreseeable future. Rorty thesis: before we give up incorrigibility, we may one day abandon the mentalist speech.
I 589
mental state/Armstrong: This term refers to what is being caused by certain stimuli and causes certain reactions - whatever that may be.
I 590
RortyVsArmstrong: if that were true, we could never understand the contrast between a) materialism and dualism or b) the mental and the physical or c) materialism and behaviorism.
I 591
mental state/Armstrong: Ex a specific condition of the liver can cause ill-tempered behavior. Problem: What characterizes mental states compared to others? Complexity?
I 592
Problem: if the complexity of the cause to achieve complex effects is missing. Sufficiently complex processes occur only when the causal chain has reached the brain.
Solution/Armstrong: our notion of a mental state is the notion of a "cause, the complexity which reflects the complexity of the behavior that it is capable of producing".
RortyVs: confuses the degree of complexity of physical and mental states.
RortyVsArmstrong: presupposes already, it were part of our concept of the mental state that it must be identified with one or another physiological process.
I 595
Identity theory/Rorty: its significance lies in the statement that the entities of which one has always thought that they could not be physical, now turn out to be physical. If materialism is made a truth a priori this pointe is missing.
VsArmstrong: when in his "ontologically neutral" analysis the mental is a mere deputy (and nothing in itself), then one side of the distinction is missing. There is nothing that could turn out to be identical to physical particles!
RortyVsArmstrong/RortyVsRyle: mental entities that yby their nature can not be physical must be maintained, because otherwise no identity could be adopted.
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: unlike the realist, the phenomenalist cannot explain dispositions. ((s) otherwise circular because dispositions can also only be described).
He can not explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
I 607
The Mental/RortyVsArmstrong: whether an entity is mental does not determine whether it explains behavior, and whether a property is mental, can not determine whether it is the property of a physical entity or not. Only feature: incorrigibility.
Incorrigibility/Armstrong: A believes that p logically implies (p).
Fra I 608
RortyVsArmstrong: I want to avoid necessities. 1. because of Quine's doubts about "natural" necessities).
2. Otherwise we would conclude that the meaning of the terms "thinking" and "thought" made it impossible to have false opinions, what one believes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Brandom, R. Rorty Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 195
De re/objective/subjective/Brandom: (according to Rorty): with de re attributions he wants to re-introduce the old distinction subjective / objective. Ex Mary thinks of a cow that it is a deer.
VI 196
RortyVsBrandom: instead: distinction between better and worse tools. Not "real properties". Progress/Brandom: more and more true assertions about the outside world.
Progress/RortyVsBrandom: ever better tools for ever better purposes. Brandom does secretly fancy a "bird's eye view", that he himself had declared impossible.
Norm/RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsKant: as Kant, Brandom endeavors too much to reach a compromise where none is tolerated! So he ends up between two chairs. When he says:
VI 197
"In our standards, the interest to represent things right is invested from the outset", then he is being interpreted differently by aggressive realists like Searle than by well-meaning pragmatists. Truth/Brandom: what corresponds to non-persons.
SearleVsBrandom: would ask him how he knew what these non-persons expect and deserve.
VI 198
Def fact/Brandom: "something claimable" (neologism of Brandom). There is the act of claiming, and there is "the alleged". Facts are not the "true alleged" but the claimable. Facts make assertions true. However, inferential!
VI 198/199
RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsInferentialism: that's like when I call Molière Ex "soporific power" (vis dormitiva) inferential, to make it seem beyond any suspicion. But that tells us nothing more than with the combination of two clauses: If something has soporific force, it will put people to sleep. "The claimable" is of no use to us, not even inferentially!
Reality/knowledge/world/BrandomVsRorty: it has paradoxical consequences, if one denies that there were truths regarding photons before the appearance of the word "photon". Ex chain of reason:
1. five million years ago there were photons.
2. It was then the case that there were photons.
3. It is true that it was then the case that there were photons.
4. It was then true that there were photons.
Rorty: of course, there is nothing to criticize about that, yet there were philosophers who did!
Heidegger:
Truth/person/reality/world/knowledge/existence/natural laws/NG/Heidegger/Rorty: "before Newton, Newton's laws were neither true nor false". (sic).
Rorty: Heidegger might have said: "Because the truth is a property of sentences, and since vocabularies are created by people, the same applies to truths."
Truth/Rorty: property of sentences!
RortyVsBrandom: Heidegger and I according to Brandom: paradoxical assertion, but perhaps it is just as paradoxical if Brandom denies dogs and toddlers convictions (unless in the "secondary meaning").

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Counterfactual Conditional Rorty Vs Counterfactual Conditional
 
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Richard Rorty
Putnam III 92
PutnamVsRorty: Ex if I think my kitchen needs new paint and do not talk to anyone about it, I also don't contradict anyone. Is my statement then right according to Rorty? According to most readers of Rorty my culture comrades would agree with me in terms of the kitchen, if they were present. But invoking counterfactual conditionals has been rejected by Rorty himself. One should not rely on "observational ghosts".
RortyVsCounterfactual Conditional.
III 93
Relativism/Counterfactual Conditional/Putnam: since Rorty is too difficult to interpret, let us imagine a typical relativist who uses counterfactual conditionals impartially and says what is true in a culture were determined by what the members of the culture would say. Disagreements then would not belong to the "normal" discourse. Or, a sentence simply had no truth value. The problem lies especially in the impartiality. If the truth about my kitchen painting depends on what my cultural comrades say, the question remains what is relevant for those assertions.
Counterfactual Conditional/Putnam: recent analyses: two factors are decisive:
1. Which possible situations are relevant.
2. what would happen in these possible situations.
III 94
So then it were again about what would be regarded as relevant laws by the comrades. Of course, relativists are likely to deny that we ever need a semantics of counterfactual conditionals.
III 94/95
Relativism/Putnam: the same applies to metaphysical innocence than for all other types of innocence: once she is lost, it is difficult to find it again. Once one has have realized how difficult it is to explain the truth of a counterfactual conditional, then hardly anyone who considers the truth a problematic concept in normal statements that should be abandoned, would portray the counterfactual truth as unproblematic. PutnamVsRelativism: Now, let's assume our typical relativist actually considers the counterfactual truth unproblematic. This leads to the following paradox: it is a fact of our present culture that no philosophical unity prevails in it, because there is no single philosophical theory we all accept and we are certainly not all relativists. If the majority would not agree with my comrades that relativism is true, then relativism is not true, according to its own definition!
That would not be a logical, but an empirical contradiction.
Rorty himself would say that his concept of truth is not supposed to apply to hermeneutic discourse, but only to normal discourse. The assertions of relativism as well as anti-relativism are therefore neither false nor true (as in a normal discourse).

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Davidson, D. Rorty Vs Davidson, D.
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 88
Truth/disquotation/DavidsonVsRorty: had interpreted him wrongly when he depicted him as a representative of disquotation. Rorty had missed the part of the contents of the concept of truth that is detected by truth theories.
VI 89
RortyVsDavidson: no idea why Davidson believes "truth" is more central to the explanation of linguistic behavior than the remaining terms (meaning, belief, affirmation, etc.).

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing SV. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.

Rorty II 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.
II 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"

V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Kant, I. McDowell Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 69
Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito.
McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality.
I 69
Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other.
I 109/110
Second Nature/(S): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education.
I 111
Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
I 122
Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world.
I 123
McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background.
I 126
Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm.
I 127
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
McDowell, J. Rorty Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 111
McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.

VI 201
McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly.
RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory).
VI 203
Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor.
VI 204
"Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all.
RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
VI 208
RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts:
1. "Crass naturalism"
2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom"
Vi 210
Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning."
VI 211
RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"!
Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of ​​law each are sui generis.
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it.
With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes.
VI 212
Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms.
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech!
McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of ​​"memorizing facts".

RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric.
VI 214
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us.
VI 215
      Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one.
VI 217
      "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature".
VI 216
VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons."
VI 219
Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this.
     James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior?

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Pragmatism Verschiedene Vs Pragmatism James I 102
VsFunctionalism VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: James confused truth with justification : it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basic sentence problem, see also Quine).

Rorty VI 112
G. K. ChestertonVsPragmatismus: Z "Beim Pragmatismus geht es um menschliche Bedürfnisse, und zu den ersten menschlichen Bedürfnissen gehört es, mehr zu sein als ein Pragmatist."
Rorty VI 306
VsPragmatismus: bekannter Vorwurf: er verhalte sich eigentlich konservativ und habe Vorurteile zugunsten des Status quo .(z.B. Jonathan Culler).
VI 307
CullerVsRorty: was man tut, muss auf den eigenen Überzeugungen beruhen, da es keine Grundlage außerhalb des Systems der eigenen Überzeugungen gibt, ist das einzige, was einen logisch zur Modifizierung einer Überzeugung veranlassen könnte, etwas, was man bereits glaubt. (Widerspruch). Rorty: da hat er recht, Unrecht hat er aber, wenn er uns nur logische Gründe als respektabel zugesteht! Die meisten moralischen und geistigen Fortschritte sind nicht durch "logische " Überzeugungsänderungen zustande gekommen!





Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Putnam, H. Rorty Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Richard Rorty
McDowell I 175
Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together.
McDowell I 178
RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation.
Rorty I 304
RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning.
I 307
Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism.
3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers".
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness".
I 312
Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory.
I 313
RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end.
2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it.
I 314
In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe.
I 315
Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world.
Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we
a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or
b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.)
I 319
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing.
I 324
Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory.
I 326
Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever.
RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time.
I 327
The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image".
Rorty V 21
Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists.
V 22
Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all?
Rorty VI 75
Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research").
VI 76
Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce!
VI 79
Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image?
VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam).
VI 90
Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric.
Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today).
RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Rorty, R. Davidson Vs Rorty, R.
 
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II 131
The truth of a statement depends only on two things: on what the words mean the way they were used, and on the world.
II 132
VsTranscendentalism: But you cannot separate linguistic competence and world influence. "Negative Transcendentalism". DavidsonVsRorty: this does not have the consequences Rorty wants. He wants to understand Davidson’s rejection of the third dogma as an argument against the possibility of epistemology. But Davidson only narrows the critical path, he does not leave it.

Frank I 26
Def Myth of the Subjective/Davidson/Frank: the superstition that thoughts required "mental objects". Even in the supposed intimacy of the "first person authority" whose principal corrigibility is thus conceded, the social character of language and the external determinants of individuation are not canceled. We can make mistakes about what we believe!
DavidsonVsRorty: authority of the 1st person not inherently contingent, it cannot disappear "like a face in the sand" (Foucault, Rorty pro Foucault).
Davidson, late, pro externalism (pro Burge).
Frank I 624
Mental/Davidson: Thesis: Primary to explain human actions. But only if attribution inter-subjectively verifiable. DavidsonVsRorty: not a purely private realm of mental phenomena, this would rule out any theory of human action a priori.
The criteria for the attribution of mental states must be analyzed within our empirical psychological theory.
I 641/642
Authority/Self-attribution/Rorty: Thesis: Self-attribution was originally carried out on the basis of the same kind of observation or behavior as external attribution! Later it was discovered that self-attribution could be performed without observation. It turned out to be the better behavior out explanations at the end.
Davidson: Of course, this is not meant to be a serious anthropological information.
DavidsonVsRorty: Question: what reason has Rorty presented for self-attribution which is not based on evidence (Wittgenstein) to concern the same conditions and events as the one based on observation?
I 645
DavidsonVsRorty: the fact that the attribution of mental states is a convention, is uninformative and unsubstantiated.
I 654
Incorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty: Does not exist! We can make mistakes in terms of our own internal states and prop. att.s. But such cases are rare and cannot be the norm!
Question: Can we think straight out that we have a belief which we do not have in reality?
Many authors from of recent times: this could even happen quite easily. > Russell: Proposition

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Rorty, R. Dennett Vs Rorty, R.
 
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Rorty II 101
DennettVsRorty: he lacks the "confidence in the truth". A refined commitment to the futility of all evidence and the relativity of every knowledge. At the end all was just talk.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rorty, R. Habermas Vs Rorty, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 242
HabermasVsRorty: in him, the renewing process of linguistic world-disclosure has no longer a counter-hold in the accepting process of innerworldly practice. The yes and no of communicatively acting actuators is so strongly rhetorically overruled by the linguistic contexts that the anomalies appear as nature analogous processes and not as a result of misguided troubleshooting and invalid answers.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Rorty, R. McDowell Vs Rorty, R.
 
Books on Amazon
McDowell I 179
Deletion of quotation/Rorty: in apparent connection with the success or failure of utterances. This question is however regarded as descriptive and not as normative. Norms/McDowellVsRorty: it is veiled that it is precisely the norms that are at stake. They are normative exactly because deletion of quotation is the norm of their results. (McDowell: normative, not descriptive).
Norms/world/thinking/Rorty: "It seems that there is no obvious reason why the further transition of the language game should have anything to do with the nature of the world.
World/thinking/McDowellVsRorty:. The idea of norms is precisely that our chances to think correctly about the world increase, if we follow them. If they do not increase, we'll have to modify the norms.
I 180
Radical Interpretation/Davidson/McDowell: ultimately, the field linguist appropriates norms from the internal perspective (language, coherence, not relation stimulus/world).
I 181
McDowellVsRorty: if he forbids the normative view of the field linguist (and therefore virtually suggests an outside perspective purely causal in nature), then he denies the importance of the transition from an unfortunate starting position to the interpretation reached. McDowellVsRorty: ultimately, dualism of nature and reason. Therefore, he can only be partially successful as a pragmatist. He himself, doesn't perceive that as a dualism, of course. He speaks of (Rorty): "to explain patiently that norms are different from descriptions."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Rorty, R. Nagel Vs Rorty, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Reality/World/Rorty: we believe it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos are real entities or merely useful heuristic fictions. This is what we mean when we say that it is pointless to ask whether the reality is independent from our statements. There certainly were mountains before we started to talk about mountains. The usefulness of these language games is however unrelated to the question of whether the self-existent reality, regardless of the functional way of describing this reality to people, contains mountains. (>Rorty)
I 47/48
NagelVsRorty: he won't get away so easily: his thesis contradicts the categorical statements about which it claims to be: e.g. there are infinitely many primes, racial discrimination is unjust, water is a mixture, Napoleon was less than two meters tall. Although the subjectivist may insist that he does not dispute those platitudes, he is not able to explain them:
1) There are many truths about the world that we will never know ((s) Why then "about"?)
2) Some of our beliefs are wrong, which will never be discovered.
3) If a belief was true, would it even be true if no one believed it.
If Rorty (~) says: "Injustice is nothing more than a violation of the laws of my community.", then he has to add: "Of course, the laws of my community state that not all injustice is a violation of the law."

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Rorty, R. Putnam Vs Rorty, R.
 
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McDowell I 178
Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards.

Putnam I 21
Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate.
PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God.

Putnam I 204/205
PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever.
Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is!

Putnam I 239
Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists.
I 2402.
Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant.
I 242
justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy.
By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case!
RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"".
PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind?
I 242/243
A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language!
Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself.

Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors.
Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement".
I 243/244
As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.)
PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent!
Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not.
Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse.
normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture.
hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements.
I 244/245
PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936).
If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image?
PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it!
Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God.

Rorty VI 79
Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rorty, R. Searle Vs Rorty, R.
 
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John R. Searle
Rorty VI 92
SearleVsRorty/Rorty: Searle considers relativism, which he attributes to Rorty, as a threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the American universities.
Rorty VI 105
World/knowledge/language/human being/reality/SearleVsRorty: this one seems to deny that there were mountains before there were people or before the word "mountain" appeared in the language. RortyVsVs: that is not disputed by anyone. No one believes that there is a causal chain that ensures that mountains become an effect of thoughts or words.
In fact, we believe (Kuhn, Derrida, Rorty): that it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains, or whether it is only appropriate to talk about mountains.
Rorty VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to convince all concerned parties that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding for those that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
Rorty VI 117
SearleVsRorty: "General atmosphere of vague literary frivolity of which the Nietzschian Left is penetrated."
Searle I 168
Incorrigibility: It is often said, we could not be mistaken about the contents of our mind. This is the authority of the 1st person. It has even been argued this incorrigibility was a sure sign that we are dealing with something mental (Rorty). SearleVsRorty: E.g. Sally might discover later that she was simply mistaken when she thought she loved Jimmy.
I 169
By this it only follows that the standard model of error, models whose basis are the distinction between appearance and reality, do not work with the existence or characterization of mental states. We all know from personal experience, how often it occurs that we can judge somebody else better than he can judge himself, if we are for example really jealous or angry, or whether we just seem to us very generous.
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in the 1st person drafted statement on Intellectual were after all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and that the question after any authority was not asked at all. When I cry out in pain, then it raises no question of my authority.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rorty, R. Brendel Vs Rorty, R.
 
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I 136
semantische Wahrheit/pragmatistische/Rorty/BrendelVsRorty/Brendel: These: Rortys Ansatz ist weniger radikal als er selbst behauptet, und auch mit einem semantischen W-Begriff verträglich. W-Def/RortyVsW-Def/Brendel: seine Ablehnung einer W-Def beruht hauptsächlich auf seinem Antiessentialismus.
Definition/BrendelVsRorty: hängt der überholten Vorstellung an, eine Definition müssen das „Wesen“ erfassen. Das ist heutzutage überholt.
Definition/heute/Brendel: moderne Definitionstheorie verlangen nicht das Erfassen eines „Wesens“.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Rorty, R. Millikan Vs Rorty, R.
 
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I 88
Sentence/world/meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. Let's assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least, if it is true). Mathematical equation: here, it is perhaps different.
Truth/Millikan: let's assume it has to do with some projective relation or projective rule.
Pointe: this can not be a natural state (status within the natural world).
Ex false sentence: projects nothing, but still has a meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So, not something in the natural world.
Pointe: then even what a true sentence means cannot be anything that is in the actual world.
Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation which is itself not in the world... This relation is the meaning.
Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true statement and what is in the world. Therefore, this relationship is not causal.
Truthmaker/Millikan: not to be found in the sentences. And we don't understand false sentences by simply saying that ithey are not true.
Meaning/Millikan: must be something that true and false sentences have in common.
Projection/meaning/Millikan: meaning seems to be irrelevant for the actual projective relation.
Solution/Millikan: our concepts of "intrinsic ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "should" ("are supposed to") to correspond to the facts in the world in accordance with specific projective rules. This can be explained with the concepts of normality and the eigenfunction.
I 89
Falsehood/false sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as Ex a chameleon, which does not adopt the color of its surroundings. ((S) defect, error, mistake). Meaning/Millikan: 2. sounds turn into sentences with meaning if they are interpreted.
Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore dependent intentionality (on interpretation). ((S)> derived intentionality).
Sentence/object/world/Millikan: without intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object.
Thought/thinking/intentionality/Millikan: Pointe: then the intentionality of thoughts can not be interpreted as the one of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress.
Representation/Millikan: those who view sentences as internal representations forget that sentences and images are derived intentionally.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Searle, J.R. Rorty Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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VI 109
Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation".
VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
VI 118
Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins.
The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element.
Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle).
      Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility.
RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality.
VI 121
Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of ​​there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities.
VI 140
RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling").
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world.
VI 157
RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity").

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Shoemaker, S. Dawkins Vs Shoemaker, S.
 
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Frank I 644
DavidsonVsIncorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty/DavidsonVsShoemaker: I will ignore the incorrigibility and put something less powerful in its place: something that comes to terms with the authority of the first person. Important Point: Shoemaker does not combine incorrigibility with a kind of knowledge, but with a class of expressions (instead of propositions as meanings).
Explanation/Davidson: this could lead to an explanation of the authority, if the class of the corresponding expressions could be specified purely syntactically ((s) otherwise circle).
DavidsonVsShoemaker: unfortunately it does not work! The speaker must know that he uses the privileged kind of sentence! If he does not, he does not use the language correctly.
Fra I 645
What would be considered as such an abuse of language? Precisely asserting a proposition for which no such authority exists. Perhaps this is true, but this only repeats the uninformative and unfounded assertion that attribution of mental predicates is a language convention.
DavidsonVsShoemaker: from the point of view of the interpreter this means that the interpreter should interpret self-attributions in a way that they come out as true. According to Shoemaker, the point of view of the interpreter is the only one that we can take, and that robs the principle of independent application: our only reason to say that the speaker occasionally enjoys special authority is that we are ready to treat his expressions as a self-attribution! But this was the initial problem.


Da I
R. Dawkins
Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996

Da II
M. St. Dawkins
Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch.
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars pro representation (!!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Self Rorty, R.
 
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Fra I 585
Self / VsRorty: the thesis of the socially constructed self is by no means new.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994