Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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The concepts appear intensionally in the response to the judgment. Thus they do not make any requirements for the details of their extensions. I 162 ff
Perception/Theory/Wright: 1) Observing equals perceiving, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is conceptually characterized. (McDowell pro). This is now a good basis for the conception that the conceptual features of the subjects are different. 2) Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world goes beyond experience in infinitely many ways. 3) The comprehension of concepts does not merely consist in classifying. They include the possession of beliefs (e.g. that things form a species at all). I 201 ff
EMD II ~ 229
Concept/Predicate/Wright: e.g. concept: color - predicate: red

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-17