Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Axiom: principle or rule for linking elements of a theory that is not proven within the theory. It is assumed that axioms are true and evident. Adding or eliminating axioms turns a system into another system. Accordingly, more or less statements can be constructed or derived in the new system. > System.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 220
Axiom/Field: a required law can easily be proven by adding it as an axiom - Vs: but then you need for each pair of distinct predicates an axiom that says that the first one and the second does not, e.g. "The distance between x and y is r times that between z and w". - Everything that substantivalism or heavy-duty Platonism may introduce as derived theorems, Relationism must introduce as axioms ("no empty space"). - That leads to no correct theory. - Problem of quantities. - The axioms used would precisely be connectable if also non-moderate characterizations are possible. - The modal circumstances are adequate precisely then when they are not needed.
~ I 249
Axiom/Mathematics/Necessity/Field: axioms are not logically necessary, otherwise we would only need logic and no mathematics.
I 275
Axioms/Field: we then only accept those that have disquotationally true modal translations. - (Because of conservativism). - Conservatism: is a holistic property, not property of the individual axioms. - Acceptability: of the axioms: depends on the context. - Another theory (with the same Axiom) might not be conservative. - Disquotational truth: can be better explained for individual axioms, though.
I 276
E.g. set theory plus continuum hypothesis (CH) and ST without CH can each be true for their representatives. - They can attribute different truth conditions. - This is only non-objective for Platonism. - The two representatives can reinterpret the opposing view, so that it follows from their own view. (>Gödel: relative consistency).
II 142
Axiom/(s): not part of the object language (OL) - Scheme formula: can be part of the OL. - Field: captures the notion of truth better.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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> Counter arguments in relation to Axioms

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23