# Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Attribute (philosophy): word for an ascribed property (i.e. habitually associated with an object). Not identical with the property.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
VII (d) 75ff
Attribute/Quine: an attribute may eventually be introduced in a second step: e.g. "squareness" according to geometrical definition, but then the name also requires substitutability, i.e. an abstract entity > Universals.
X 7ff
Attribute/Quine: an attribute corresponds to properties, predicates are not the same as attributes.
>Predicates/Quine.
IX 178ff
Attribute/(s): an attribute corresponds to the quantity of those x for which a particular condition applies: {x: x ε a} all objects that are mortal. Predicate: "x is mortal", is not a quantity, but a propositional function. The denomination forms refer "φx", "φ(x,y)" to the attribution.
>Propositional Function/Quine.
XII 38
Attributary Attitude/Quine: E.g. hunting, needing, catching, fearing, missing. Important to note here is that e.g. "lion hunt" does not require lions as individuals but as a species - > Introduction of properties.
IX 177
Attributes/Ontology/Russell: for Russell, the universe consisted of individuals, attributes and relations of them, attributes and relations of such attributes and relations, etc.
IX 178f
Extensionality/Quine: extensionality is what distinguishes attributes and classes. >Extensionality/Quine
So Russell has more to do with attributes than with classes.
Two attributes can be of different order and are therefore certainly different, and yet the things that each have one or the other attribute are the same.
For example the attribute "φ(φ^x <> φy) where "φ" has the order 1, an attribute only from y.
For example the attribute ∀χ(χ^x <> χy), where "χ" has order 2, again one attribute only from y, but one attribute has order 2, the other has order 3.
(> Classes/ >Quantities/ >Properties).
XIII 22
Class/set/property/Quine: whatever you say about a thing seems to attribute a property to it.
Property/Attribute/Tradition/Quine: in earlier times one used to say that an attribute is only called a property if it is specific to that thing. (a peculiarity of this object is...).
New: today these two expressions (attribute, property) are interchangeable.
"Attribute"/Quine: I do not use this term. Instead I use "property".
Identity/equality/difference/properties/Quine: if it makes sense to speak of properties, then it also makes sense to speak of their equality or difference.
Problem: but it does not make sense! Problem: if everything that has this one property, also has the other. Shall we say that it is simply the same quality? Very well. But people do not talk like that. For example to have a heart/kidney: is not the same, even if it also applies to the same living beings.
Coextensivity/Quine: two properties are not sufficient for their identity.
Identity/properties/possible solution: is there a necessary coextensiveness? >Coextensive/Quine
Vs: Necessity is too unclear as a term.
Properties/Quine: We only get along so well with the term property because identity is not so important for their identification or differentiation.
XIII 23
Solution/Quine: we are talking about classes instead of properties, then we have also solved the problem e.g. heart/kidneys.
Classes/Quine: are defined by their elements. That is the way of saying it, but unwisely, because the misunderstanding might arise that the elements cause the classes in a different way than objects cause their.
Def Singleton/Singleton/Single Class: class with only one element.
Def Class/Quine: (in useful use of the word): is simply a property in the everyday sense, without distinguishing coextensive cases.
XIII 24
Class/Russell/Quine: it struck like a bomb when Russell discovered the platitude that each containment condition (condition of containment, element relationship) establishes a class. (see paradoxes, see impredictiveness).
Russell's Paradox/Quine: applies to classes as well as to properties. It also shatters the platitude that anything said about a thing attributes a property.
Properties/Classes/Quine: all restrictions we impose on classes to avoid paradoxes must also be imposed on properties.
Property/Quine: we have to tolerate the term in everyday language.
Mathematics: here we can talk about classes instead, because coextensiveness is not the problem. (see Definition, > Numbers).
Properties/Science/Quine: in the sciences we do not talk about properties.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Attributes ...

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28