Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Attributes | Quine Vs Attributes | III 262 General Terms/Quine: are represented by predicate letters such as "F", "G", etc. (§ 12.22, where they were simply called "Termini"). Universality/Quine: is not ambiguity! Ex ambiguous: is the singular term "Miller"! It can refer to different people in different contexts. Similarly: Singular Term: "the basement", "the President" ((s) >indefinite description). General Term: "basement", "President". Concrete Term: "Cerberus", "Unicorn" Abstract Term: "7", "3 + 4", "piety" terms for numbers, classes, attributes. Concrete General Term: "man", "red house", "house". Abstract General Term/Quine: "prime", "zoological genus", "virtue", because every virtue and every number and every species is an abstract object. ((s) then "piety" is an abstract singular term). Attribute/Quine: I do not care much for them as entities that are supposed to be different from classes. III 263 Attributes: can be considered different, even if they apply to the same things. E.g. "having a heart", "having kindneys". Classes/QuineVsAttributes: classes are easier to identify and to distinguish. If we must distinguish, then: Attribute/Quine: e.g. "human nature": Name of an attribute. Class Name/Name of a Class/Quine: "humanity". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |