|Antirealism: (Michael Dummett) the thesis that it has to be possible to be shown through behavior that alternatives to an assumed fact could make a difference. In the case of undecidable sentences such as the number of geese on the Capitol this is not possible._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Anti-Realism/Field: many forms (which have nothing to do with our purpose) are reductionist: (E.g. reduction of the external world to human experience) or quasi-reductionist (e.g. theories that match in statements about human experiences must be cognitively equivalent. ) - (I.e. have the same understanding of "true").
Truth Definition/Anti-RealismVsTarski/Anti-RealismVsKripke - Anti-RealismVsModel Theory: VsOntology of sets (Anti-Platonism dito). - ((s) Model-theoretic statements for the anti-realism are trivially true, because they have no references.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994