Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anti-Realism Fraassen I 18
Anti-Realism/VsAnti-Realism: what he believes about the world depends on what kind of world he believes to be in - Fraassen VsVs: (pro anti-realism): this would presuppose that epistemology provided the same results, regardless of the span of evidence available to us - that would presuppose skepticism. Solution/Fraassen: empirical adequacy: a theory should correctly describe phenomena ("preserve") - then observability depends on our community.
I 31
Anti-Realism/Science/Fraassen: for him, it is all about increase in knowledge about the observable - Fraassen pro - possibly another correlation is assumed between smoking and cancer: lung irritation, etc.
I 219
FraassenVsAnti-Realism: cannot claim that successful theories are simply those that survive without claiming that they are true.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Anti-Realism Rorty Horwich I 462
Anti-Realism/Dummett/RortyVsDummett: rather refers to values - realism rather to chairs.
Rorty I 305
Anti-Realism/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam does not understand antique and our modern theories as two roughly correct descriptions of a fixed set, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is just our theory, then we might as well ask the Neanderthals instead.
PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for antirealism truth only makes sense as a subordinate concept to theories.
But extension is indissolubly linked to truth: x belongs to the extension of a predicate F precisely when " x is an F" is true.
((s) Anti-realism is understood differently here than with Dummett).

Problem: changing extension is senseless. - justified assertibility can change - PutnamVs equating truth with justified assertibility.

VI 406
per distinction realism/anti-realism: Dummett, Nagel (vsGadamer, VsDavidson) Vs distinction realism/anti-realism: Rorty, Davidson.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Anti-Realism Boyd Horwich I 495
Anti-Realism/Boyd (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two kinds: a) empiricist thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically. - b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community.

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Excluded Middle Quine XIII 55
Sentence of the Excluded Middle/SaD/excluded middle/Quine: Thesis: each sentence is either true or false. You can say a lot about that, pro and contra. Set theory/Quine: 1. Much in it does not satisfy most standards of intuitionism, i.e. it is assumed that it is neither true nor false (without truth value). This leads from classical logic to intuitionism.
QuineVsDummett/QuineVsAnti-Realism: the requirement that there must be direct evidence for or against an assertion, but it also obscures the clarity and simplicity of the sciences.
QuineVsIntuitionism: is obscure, especially when extended to mathematics.
Bivalence/Logic/Quine: the bivalence with the Sentence of the Excluded Middle is the minimal, most streamlined thing that logic has to offer. It comes from the number two, the smallest and simplest number rising from the ground.
Assertiveness/Truth/QuineVsIntuitionism: assertiveness is one thing, truth another.
XIII 56
Realism/Quine: pro: some truths can be found out, others not. N.B.: then we are also free to call the rest of the (undetectable) sentences false.
Future/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Bivalence/Quine: 3. The Sentence of the Excluded Middle has also come under fire from another side: Thesis: Contingents of predictions are neither true nor false. (See future/Quine).
VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: further objection: non-designating terms such as e.g. Pegasus: sentences containing such terms are neither true nor false.
Empty singular terms/Quine: we can accept this for everyday language, but not in science or logic. (See singular terms).
Vagueness/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Sorites/Quine: 4. Objection: vague expressions: here again I would plead for a double standard: in logic we simply want to proceed in such a way that we assume that all expressions are precise.
Determination/Quine: we can even introduce an additional convention.
XIII 57
Sorites/Quine: we save the mathematical (complete) induction by setting exact limits for what a heap is. Even if we do not specify where it goes! Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: pro: the first two objections are ignored, the other two are overcome by a double standard.
Proposition/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: some authors resort to propositions to explain. Thesis: The lack would concern sentences, but not the corresponding propositions.
QuineVsPropositions: this is an empty game with words (see >truth).
Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: is not a fact of life, but a norm that governs efficient logical regimentation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Method Boyd Fraassen I 77
Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is needed for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. This is to explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. ---
I 78
BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other.
BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is stated there, and it cannot be improved either.
Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a completely different definition of empirical equivalence than he has.
2. Principle: (according to Boyd accepted by all philosophers): Suppose a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of epistemology to explain the reliability of this principle.

Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree with that. It is itself a principle about principles.

Boyd/Fraassen: they have a special example in mind:

(P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it is most likely to fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all.
Fraassen: this is harmless as it is stated there.
---
I 79
Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he "understands" here "knowledge" as "light", i.e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms that are based on previously accepted theories. Boyd: e.g. Suppose,
M: chemical mechanism
A: Antibiotic
C: Bacterial type
L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, the dosage of A and the time.
Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment?
1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls, but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L which is to be prooved, which does not work in this alternative way.
Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval).
2. E.g. one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that mutates the cell walls. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here.
In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments.

Knowledge/Fraassen: we must understand knowledge here as "implied by a previously accepted theory".

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991


Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Realism Putnam Rorty I 305ff
Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct description of a solid inventory, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals - PutnamVsAnti-realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. - Internal realism. (according to Rorty): position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment"(Putnam): - By means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. PutnamVsRealismus/PutnamVsRelativismus/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language. ---
Putnam VI 389
Realism/Putnam: explains why theories tend to convergence. - Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world.
VI 395 f
Realism/fact/Putnam: E.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points - that is, into smaller and smaller segments - then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments - Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. - "Hard core" -Realism: would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions.
VI 398
Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - that says Quine in ontological relativity. ---
Putnam VI 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) He has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention. ---
Putnam I (c) 78
Realism/Putnam: he must left it inexplicable that E.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. - What has prediction to do with truth then?
I (c) 95
Realism: realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory.
I (g) 175f
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: faces infinitely many correspondences - endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. - Problem: to choose the right, without a metaphysical access. ((s)> Loewenheim).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Realism Boyd Horwich I 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: ---
Horw I 493
Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner".
N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation.
Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism.
Ad. 3. Vs:
---
Horw I 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism.
Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth.
---
Horw I 494
Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true.
M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically.
---
Horw I 495
Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically
b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community

M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today.
Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism.
Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths.

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Antirealism Field Vs Antirealism Field I 64
Indispensability: if it is true that mathematics does not only facilitate inferences, it would be theoretically indispensable. How can indispensability be represented in terms of conservatism? Quine-Putnam Argument/VsAnti-Realism: (see above): only through truth! We must assume the truth of mathematics for its usefulness in the non-mathematical realm.
FieldVs: that is certainly an exaggeration. Part of the benefit may also be explained by conservatism (but not only).
I 65
Ultimately, I try to show that mathematics is not indispensable after all.
Field I 66
Realism/Mathematics/Gödel: ("What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?", 1947) (Per Quine-Putnam argument VsField, GödelVsAnti-Realism): even with a very narrow definition of the concept of "mathematical data" (only equations of the theory of numbers ) we can justify very abstract parts by explanation success: Gödel: even without assuming the need for a new axiom, and even if it has no intrinsic necessity, a decision about its truth is possible by studying its "explanation success" with induction. The fruitfulness of its consequences, in particular the "verifiable" ones, i.e. those that are demonstrable without the new axiom, but which are easier to prove with the new Axiom. Or if this allows us to combine several proofs into one.
E.g. axioms about the real numbers, which are rejected by the intuitionists.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Antirealism Fraassen Vs Antirealism I 18
Realism/Fraassen: this shows that he defines realism quite differently than I do. Realism/Fraassen: I defined it in terms of objectives of science and epistemic attitudes.
Accept/Fraassen: Question: Do I have to regard a theory as a whole as true? No: we only consider it to be empirically adequate.
VsFraassen/VsAnti-Realism: here it can be argued that what the anti-realist believes about the world depends on what he believes his world to be. Problem: his race might mutate. Then he had to accept conditions like
If the epistemic community changes in the way Y, then my beliefs about the world will change in the way Z.
Fraassen: if this is supposed to be VsAnti-Realism, you have to assume that our epistemology should provide the same results, regardless of the scope of evidence that is available to us.
FraassenVsVs: this is not convincing.
I 19
It could only be maintained if we presuppose consistent skepticism. Solution/Fraassen: instead empirical adequacy: i.e. a theory whose models preserve the observed phenomena. And what can be observed, is a function of what is the epistemic community. ("observable-for-us").

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Antirealism Quine Vs Antirealism Field I 64
Infinite/Anti-Realism/Field: the Anti-R can only assume an infinite number of entities if there is an infinite number of physical entities. (E.g. infinitely many parts of a light beam). But it would be inappropriate to want to test the adequacy of the number theory by assumptions about the physical world. Truth/Ontology/Field: sure, the truth of the number theory would require infinitely many objects for the quantifiers, but its conservatism would not! And conservatism is all we need! Physics: How about atypical applications such as differential equations, etc.? Here the existence of many entities such as real numbers, functions, differential operators, etc. seems to be called for. How should nominalistic inferences become easier here? Where ever are the nominalistic premises? We would only have them if we were able to somehow represent the theory of electromagnetism nominalistically, and that seems hardly possible. Indispensability: if it is true that mathematics does not only facilitate inferences, it would theoretically be indispensable. How can indispensability be represented in terms of conservatism? Quine Putnam Argument/VsAnti-Realism: (see above): only by truth! We must assume the truth of mathematics for its usefulness in the extra-mathematical realm. FieldVs: this is certainly an exaggeration. Parts of the usefulness may also be explained by conservatism (but not only). I 65 In the end, I try to show that thesis: mathematics is not just indispensable.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Antirealism Boyd Vs Antirealism Fractions I 77
Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is necessary for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. To explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. ---
I 78
BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other.
BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is written down like this, and it cannot be improved either.
Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a quite different definition of empirical equivalence than he does.
2. Principle: (accepted by all philosophers according to Boyd): Suppose, a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of knowledge theory (epistemology) to explain the reliability of this principle.
Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree to that. It is itself a principle of principles.
Boyd/Fraassen: has a special example in mind:
(P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it will most likely fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all.
Fraassen: this is harmless as it is written down like this.
---
79
Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he understands "knowledge" here "light", i. e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms, which are based on previously accepted theories.
Boyd: E.g. Suppose,
M: chemical mechanism
A: Antibiotic
C: Bacterial type
L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of the bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, dosage of A and time.
Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment?
1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L to be tested, which does not work in this alternative way.
Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval).
2. For example, one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that allows the cell walls to mutate. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here.
In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments.

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991
Correspondence Theory Fraassen Vs Correspondence Theory I 39
Science/Fraassen: Thesis: is a biological phenomenon: an activity of a type of organisms that facilitates their interaction with the environment. And that leads me to the fact that we need a completely different kind of explanation here. E.g. Augustinus: explains the fleeing of mouse before the cat by the fact that the mouse perceives the enemy.
VsAugustinus/VsKCorrespondence Theory/Animal: Problem: then it is again about the appropriateness ("adequacy") of ​​the mouse’s thoughts about the order of nature.
Why-Questions/DarwinismVsWhy-Question: instead: the mice with the right strategies survive without justifying the reasons.
I 40
Science/Success/Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: Similarly, I believe that the successful theories are those that survive. I.e. we do not need to explain why a theory is successful. It’s just not surprising.
I 219
Of course, you can also explain the survival of the mouse by the structure of its brain and its environment. Theories/Survival/Balmer/Fraassen: he would say the line spectrum of hydrogen survived as a successful hypothesis.
RealismVsAnti-Realism: it cannot assert either without admitting that both underlying theories are true.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Construktivism Boyd, R. Horwich I 495
Antirealism / Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-realism / BoydVsDummett): two ways:   a) empiricist thesis that theories need to be reinterpreted in a instrumentalist manner.
  I 495
  b) "constructivist" theory (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community.   M. Williams: if this means that objects are not simply "given", then today virtually everyone is a constructivist.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994