Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Author Item Summary Meta data
Gadamer I 321
Self-Knowledge/Techne/Aristotle/Gadamer: It is obvious that the human does not dispose of him- or herself in the same way as the craftsman disposes of the material with which he or she works. The human obviously cannot make him- or herself in the same way as he or she can make something else. So it must also be a different knowledge that he or she has of him- or herself in the own moral being, a knowledge that can be distinguished from such knowledge with which one leads a production.
Knowing oneself (German: "Sich-Wissen"): Aristotle formulates this difference in a bold, even unique, way, calling this knowledge a knowing-oneself, i.e. a knowledge-for-itself.(1) Thus the knowing-oneself of the moral consciousness is set off (...) against the theoretical knowledge (...). But the demarcation against technical knowledge also lies in it, and it is precisely in order to formulate the demarcation on both sides that Aristotle dares to make the peculiar expression of knowing-oneself. The demarcation against technical knowledge is the more difficult task, if one, like Aristotle, determines the "object" of this knowledge ontologically not as something general, which is always as it is, but as something individual, which can also be different (...). >Generality/Aristotle, >Morality/Aristotle, >Laws/Aristotle.
Gadamer I 327
The knowing of oneself, of which Aristotle speaks, is (...) determined by the fact that it contains the completed application and in the immediacy of the given situation operates its knowledge. It is thus a knowledge of the respective that first completes moral knowledge, a knowledge that is not, however, sensual vision. Even if one must look at a situation and see what it demands of one, this seeing does not mean that one perceives what is visible in this situation as such, but that one learns to see it as the situation of action and thus in the light of what is right.
Gadamer I 328
Moral knowledge is really a knowledge of its own kind. It embraces means and ends in a peculiar way and is thus different from technical knowledge. For this very reason there is no point in distinguishing here between knowledge and experience, as is the case with technical knowledge. For moral knowledge itself contains a kind of experience in itself (...).
Understanding/understand: Understanding is introduced as a modification of the virtue of moral knowledge, except when it concerns myself, who must act. Then "synesis" clearly means the ability of moral judgment.

1. Eth. Nic. Z 8, 1.141 1033, 1142 a30; Eth. Eud. 92, 1246 1036. (In my opinion, one misses the
essential methodological unity of Aristotle's ethics and politics, if one does not include the politiki phronesis with Gauthier (see his new introduction to the 2nd edition of his commentary on Nicomachean ethics, Louvain 1970). Cf. also my review, which is reprinted again in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 304-306).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Aristotle

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-08-08
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration