Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
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Entry
Reference
Dialectic Plato
 
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Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. ---
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Definition "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
---
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
---
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.

Enlightenment Ancient Philosophy
 
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Taureck I 35
Enlightenment/Taureck: Question. Can we compare the modern features of Sophists with the Enlightenment? E.g. Nomos/Sophists: "Laws of the Gods" are no longer enough to explain the social binding forces.
Enlightenment/Taureck: 18th century; Main representatives are d'Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire. They were not strongly interested in the Sophists.
Encyclopédie 1765.
---
I 36
Enlightenment/Taureck: today one can see 5 characteristics of the Enlightenment: 1. Nature-legal justification of political and legal norms. Non-factual traditional norms, but natural determinations of people who demand freedom, equality and fraternity. (Rousseau, however, is against the abolition of social institutions, which means only the replacement of corruption by brigandage (gangsterism)).
At that time the absolute monarchy was the most common form of government almost everywhere in Europe.
---
I 37
Sophists/Taureck: sophists were in a situation where they were looking for foundations for the practice of a "direct" democracy that was lived in Athens and other cities without being bound to universal value judgments, because these did not exist. The physis could obviously be understood (according to Plato's Callicles) as a legal title for an empowerment of the strong against the community.
Enlightenment/Taureck:
2. Characteristic: Definition Deism: deism is a natural religion, which includes rationality and tolerance of religions: God as the creator of nature, reason enables human beings to fulfill the moral prescriptions of the creator.
---
I 39
Enlightenment/Taureck: 3. Characteristic: Replacement of metaphysics by epistemology.
Definition Metaphysics/Encyclopedie: "Science about the reasons of things".
Because all painters, musicians, surveyors, poets need reasons, everyone has their own metaphysics. This leads to an empty and "contemptuous" science.
---
I 39
Metaphysics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the concept which was later developed by Plato and Aristotle. In any case, they were more oriented towards epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck:
4. Characteristic: Reorientation of the natural sciences.
---
I 40
Newton, GalileoVsAristotle: Movement is no longer to be understood as a goal-directed phenomenon, but by causality. Mechanics/Physics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the teleology of Aristotle.
Enlightenment/Taureck:
5. Characteristic: Aesthetic theory, according to which beauty is to be judged independent of social standards.


Tau I
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995
Essence Kuhn
 
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I 116
Essence/NewtonVsAristotle/Kuhn: it's not about the nature of the stone. - The stone simply falls. - At the same time: VoltaireVs: - vis dormitiva. - After that emergence of corpuscular theory: Form of opium particles. ---
I 117
Important point: The contact of the corpuscles. - VsLong-distance effect. - So Newton's theory is the reason for the rejection. - (Because of the assumed long-distance effect).

Ku I
Th. Kuhn
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Explanation Davidson
 
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 99 ff
Explaining means re-describing Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events.
Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself.
---
Glüer II 112f
Explanation of action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (climber-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. ---
Glüer II 114
Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable." Weak will/acrasia/Davidson. irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention.
---
Glüer II 115
"All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings. ---
Glüer II 138
Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible - not strict laws for the prediction of actions - (anomal monism). ---
Horwich I 456
Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) a phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true) - also the existence of truth needs no explanation - wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong" - right: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---. Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something - explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances - "truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual schema") idle wheel. - Putnam dito.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Future Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
VI 127f
Future/QuineVsAristotle: E.g. "tomorrow’s sea battle": tomorrow’s sea battle does not exist. Therefore, no statements about it. Not even the statement that "it is not true now".. -assumes 1) omniscient God - 2) determinism - incompatible with our freedom of action - Freedom/Quine: we do what we decide to do - whether decisions are determined is not the issue - Sentence of the excluded third: is definitely valid - is at most, incomplete - ambiguous propositions are not true, but the corresponding propositions - Completion: does not lie in the future, though - (s) but lies in information - truth value: can be left open, but not the meaning of the sentence. ---
VI 129
Pro three-valued logic: truth value, and not whether the sentence makes sense, would depend on the existence of the unicorn - as it should be - Vs: problem: too many truth-function combinations.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Logos Aristotle
 
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Bubner I 190
Logos/Aristotle: it surpasses the elementary natural conditionality. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, there is no contract conclusion, which leads out of nature (natural right). Logos: to be understood in Aristotle as language and not as reason, which emerges from the comparison with animals.
       Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange.
The good as leading design of action is indeed controversial, so that it must be debated.
The Logos is such a means to discover, but not a set goal and not content in itself.
It is only thanks to the insinuation of common interests that the dialogue is set in motion.
Without polis no function of the logos and no logos, no politics.
The growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristotle recognizes this.

Mathematics Bigelow
 
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I VII
Mathematics/BigelowVsField: can be understood realistically when viewed as a study of universals, properties and relations, of patterns and structures of things that can be in different places at the same time. ---
I 346
Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Pro Realism of Mathematics. ((s) The thesis that numbers exist as objects. And thus also sets, and all possible mathematical objects or entities. (FieldVs.)
We agree with the antirealists that there are human creations:
For example, words, ideas, diagrams, images, terms, theories, texts, academic departments, etc.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: of mathematics: is well compatible with modal realism.
Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: no one believes that everything in science is real. There must be (useful) fictions. Therefore, one can in principle be a realist in relation to everyday things and at the same time a mathematical antirealist. For example, Field:
Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: is at the same time a realist regarding space-time, particles and fields.
---
I 347
Realism/Antirealism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there is something wrong with this marriage: mathematics is not a small element of science but a very large one. It is also not easy to isolate. Example: Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: did not know about instantaneous speed yet. For him, speed was simply a course divided by time. A falling object then had an average speed, although Galileo was not aware of this either.
Therefore, he made the following mistake: if two bodies are dropped together and one of them continues to fly, they both have exactly the same speed until the first one stops.
Galileo: but had to assume that this body was slower, because the other body needed less than twice as much for the eventual double distance.
---
I 348
Rate of fall/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the average velocity cannot be proportional to the distance. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if anything is evidence for realism, it is this: an object that falls twice as far does not have twice the average velocity. If you find out, you are a realist in terms of how long it takes for an object to reach a given distance. This makes us realists in terms of velocity, time and distance.
((s) The problem arose from the fact that Galileo was forced to adhere to the definitions he had set up himself, otherwise he would have had to change his theory.).
Average/VsRealism/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that average is only an abstraction.
VsVs: we do not need the average here at all: it is simply true that the object falls faster in the second section, and that simply means that the average velocity cannot be the same.
Velocity/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: he respects that it is physically real. And caused by forces and proportional to these forces, so velocity was causally effective for him.
Velocity/today/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think today that it is the instantaneous speed which is causally effective, never the average velocity.
---
I 349
Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the equations we use to describe the relations between different falling objects are human inventions, but not the relations themselves. Rate of fall/fall law/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: the distance is proportional to the square of the time traveled. How is this abstract law based on concrete physical facts?
Galileo: in the first unit of time the body falls a certain distance, in the second unit not double, but triple of this distance, in the third five units, and so on.
Predecessor/Bigelow/Pargetter: this had already been anticipated in the Middle Ages.
---
I 350
Middle Ages/Thesis: an increment has been added to each section. One, three, five, seven... Now the sum of the first n odd numbers is n².
Then it seems to be based on nothing but rules for the use of symbols that
(1 + 3 +... + (2n - 1) = n².
But this is a mistake:
Numbers/Number/Bigelow/Pargetter: may be abstract, but they are present in an important sense in the physical objects: in a collection of objects that have this number, they are the common thing. For example, a collection of objects which has the number n².
---
I 350
You can just see that the pattern has to go on like this. ---
I 351
And so it is in Galileo's case. Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the differences to physical bodies should not blind us for the similarities. If objects instantiate the same numbers, the same proportions will exist between them. (>Instantiation).
Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): For example, a collection of 3 objects instantiates the number three.
---
I 352
Equation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (e.g. Galileo's fall rate, which was wrong) is a description of real relations between real objects. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: this view can roughly be called Platonist.
Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Platonism, but without the usual Platonic doctrines: we do not assume forms or ideals taken from an earlier existence that we cannot see in our world, and so on.
Realism/Universal Realism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is closer to Aristotle: the universals are here in our world, not in an otherworldly.
BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative versus quantitative characteristics of objects.
---
I 377
Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: (...) ---
I 378
Patterns unfold patterns. The structures of mathematics show up not only in the hardware of physics, but also in the "mathware", through properties and relations in different areas of mathematics. For example, not only objects, but also numbers can be counted. Proportions, for example, stand in proportions to each other. This is the reflexivity within mathematics.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Motion Bigelow
 
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I 63
Movement/change/Bigelow/Pargetter: was always a problem, e.g. movement as a change of location: seems to imply a contradiction. For example, the change of a disk from round to square: seems to imply that it is both round and square. Contradiction.
Solution/Ockham/MA/Bigelow/Pargetter: different points of time. (Doctrine of changing forms, forma fluens).
Problem: what is the difference between
a) an alternating form, and
b) the change of forms? ((s) one or more).
Change: is once the subject itself, once it is the form.
---
I 64
NewtonVsOckham: the counterposition was that a moving body has not only a position at a time, but also a speed. Flux/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: Theory of "fluxus" was Newton's expression for the differential calculus.
Motion/Newton: attributed instantaneous velocities to moving objects: a vector.
Vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the Ockhamists attributed vectors, but in a weaker sense: as a sequence of positions. But this is then an abstraction and does not correspond to any intrinsic property of movement.
Movement/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: is according to him a full-fledged property of an object of the 1st level, according to the Ockhamists a property of 2nd level. And this is independent according to Newton from history and "destiny", but not according to the Ockhamists.
---
I 65
Spheres/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Aristotle, there was nothing beyond the spheres (of the stars), not even empty space, which according to Aristotle was a contradiction in itself. Movement/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: the universe as a whole cannot have any velocity. Then God cannot have given him one.
VsAristotle: to the Church this seemed to be a limitation of God's omnipotence.
>Vectors

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Natural Justice Hobbes
 
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Bubner, I, 193
Natural Justice/Hobbes/Bubner: HobbesVsAristotle: modern natural justice. "Natural state" is a fiction in which the legal foundations of the founding of the state are anchored, while the actual conclusion of treaty overcomes that state through an artificial justice institute.
The natural law of the wise pursuit of the interests of each individual, as well as the impossibility, in principle, of collective enforcement of the interests of the individual increased to the death threat, belong to the characteristics of the natural state.
Both characteristics together result in a dilemma which the collective leaves behind by the task of the rights of all individuals in the conclusion of contract.
Nature acts here as a prerequisite and stimulant of a step beyond nature with regard to securing a lasting order.
Leviathan the contractually legitimate sovereign guarantees the order. He deserves the title of the natural only because of his inevitability.
Actually, he is a machine that imitates the divine creation.

Natural Laws Bigelow
 
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I 113
Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 114
Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 214
Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction.
Atomism: Representative: Lucrez. Little astronomical knowledge yet.
Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos.
---
I 215
Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws.
Instead, here are some examples from biology:
Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions).
---
I 216
It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. ---
I 217
Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws.
Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things:
a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand
b) less than a regularity without exception.
It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it.
Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal.
Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. > Generalization.
---
I 220
Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round.
Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon.
Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth.
N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory!
---
I 221
VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity).
---
I 221
Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1978,1983) Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983, Hacking 1983).
---
I 222
Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.)
Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds.
Natural Law/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity.
Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as
(x)(Fx > Gx).
Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form:
---
I 223
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects.
I.e. in addition to regularity
(x)(Fx > Gx)
it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!)
Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level:
(x) Fx would be > would be Gx)
we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). (see above)
Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend.
LewisVsBigelow: (1979) the theory is circular.
---
I 226
Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws!
Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments.
---
I 227
BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Nature McDowell
 
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I, 123 et seq
Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. ---
I 118
Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws.
The forces are partially part of the second nature.
Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress.
But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature.
---
Rorty VI 212
McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world.
In addition, this gives a rational freedom.
McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Necessity Wiggins
 
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EMD II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/VsEssentialism: not independent of our specification of the objects. ---
II 292
Wiggins: Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde - also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). ---
II 301
Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human" - Wiggins pro second method -> Definition fulfillment for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. ---
II 303
Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human) - de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human).

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Ontology Aristotle
 
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Bubner I 118
Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality, from which the sciences apodictically infer. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of the reasons of evidence remains indeterminate, placeless, and thus does not adequately cover the need to determine the empirical domain of apodeixis.

Order Bigelow
 
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I 42
Order/Universals/Antisymmetry/Bigelow/Pargetter: the antisymmetry can then establish an order (hierarchy) between infinitely many different universals. Order/Hierarchy:
1. individuals: Definition individual/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is not instantiated by anything.
2. rule: the rest is obtained by the following rule:
If t1, t2,.... tn are types, then also (t1, t2... tn) is a type...
((s) that is, summaries of types are also types).
Definition type/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then a set of universals, which can consist of one to infinitely many.
Domain/Bigelow/Pargetter: the union of all types, each type is a subset of the domain. There may also be empty subsets.
---
I 362
Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions as a theory of real numbers was developed by Dedekind and others at the end of the 19th century. Order/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: for this theory we need to extend the natural order created by relatios.
Geometry: shows proportions that cannot be displayed in whole numbers.
Proportion/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: we call proportions ratios that cannot be expressed in whole numbers.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pleads for the assumption that there are objects with the proportions of the golden section rather than claiming there is no golden section.
Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Assuming that there is no golden section, would there be no real numbers?
---
I 363
Is the existence of real numbers contingent on the existence of quantities? Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: demands that every quantity must be instantiated to exist
VsAristotle: this seems to make mathematical facts dependent on empirical facts.
Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: all quantities exist for him, regardless of whether they are instantiated or not. This guarantees pure mathematics.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Ousia Aristotle
 
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Adorno XII 54
Being/Ousia/Aristotle/Adorno: Aristotle helps himself a little bit by saying that it is ousia the present and the here in the sense of the genesis, but according to the purely mental ontological rank the ousia is the first in the sense of the idea. AdornoVsAristotle: this is a somewhat violent separation of genesis and validity. It returns in Max Scheler's strange theory of ideas. (See Ideas/Scheler).


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Practical Syllogism Aristotle
 
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Wright I 36
Practical Syllogism/Aristoteles/Wright, G. H.: The idea goes back to Aristotle. (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1147a 25-30). Wright: the conclusions to a correct interpretation is not easy to find. Aristotle himself deals with the subject very unsystematically and his examples are often confusing. One possibility of reconstruction is: the starting point or supremacy of syllogism mentions a desired object or an objective of action; the subordinate relates a certain action to this object as a means to an end, and
the conclusio is ultimately the use of this means to achieve that purpose. Just as in a theoretical conclusion the assertion of the premises necessarily leads to the concluding statement of the conclusion, so in a practical conclusion from the affirmation of the premises follows the corresponding action.
Anscombe: the practical conclusion is not a form of proof, but a form of justification which is of a different kind than evidence syllogism.
WrightVsAristotle: however, the peculiarities of practical syllogism and its relationship to theoretical justifications are complex and remain unclear.


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Progress Hobbes
 
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Adorno XIII 251
Progress/HobbesVsLocke/HobbesVsAristotle/Hobbes/Adorno: unlike Aristotle and Locke, Hobbes did not make the progress dependent on any positive, original qualities of the human's nature, but of the necessity and the contradiction directly justified by the incompatibility of competing individual interests... ---
XIII 252
...of individuals by a bourgeois primacy principle. > Freedom/Kant.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Reason Minsky
 
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Marvin Minsky Eine Rahmenstruktur für die Wissensrepräsentation 1981 in Dieter Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

I 125
Everyday reason/everyday problems/MinskyVsAristotle: rather logical approaches do not work. Syllogisms cannot deal with everyday complexity when solving problems. Axioms: "One does not go undressed out of the house", etc.
Since logicians are not concerned with systems that can be extended later, they must design axioms that allow only permitted conclusions.
This is different with intelligence.

Minsk I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1988

Minsk II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

Science Heidegger
 
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Rorty II 65
Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality - Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. ---
Figal I 107f
Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hei I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Science Aristotle
 
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Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively.
I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..."
Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries.
Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively.
I 147
Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization.
The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge.

Syllogisms Mill
 
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Prior I 121
Syllogism/MillVsAristotle: E.g. A dragon breathes fire, a dragon is a serpent, Summary: some or all snakes breathe fire - which is valid according to Aristotle - RussellVsAristotle: this is simply invalid because the premises are false: a dragon does not exist - Russell: either the premises mean: "Dragon is a word that means a thing breathing fire"- or "The idea (idea) of a dragon is the idea of a thing, breathing fire" .

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Teleology Epicurus
 
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Adorno XIII
Teleology/Purpose/EpicurusVsAristotle/Epicurus/Democritus/Adorno: Epicurus is even stronger opposing the placement of purposes into the natural things than Democritus. However, every relationship to gods, who had exercised their spooky nature in things, should be eliminated by criticising the thought of purpose.

Truth Geach
 
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I 15
Truth / GeachVsAristotle: confused two pairs of concepts: 1 sentences: w / f - 2 predication: "true-of" - Tarski: "true-of" basic, satisfaction
I 76
Truth / Tarski: satisfaction ("true-of"): can not be applied to components, but only on whole sentences - even complex sentences correspond to a propositional function - semantic truth definition: relevant relation: predicate to the thing of which it is predicated true : sentence but not a fact
I 258
Truth / Oxford: only for few allegations - GeachVs: then "p v q" would not be truth-functional!

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Verification Hempel
 
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I 99
Verification/Natural laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. - Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements - therefore there is never a final verification. - Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. ---
Bubner I 125
Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: Relationship of logical inclusion of sentences. This avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences.
Formal rules of derivation
Rehabilitation of deduction.
With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: deductive nomological explanation: scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under Explanas (explanation reasons). The Explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr)
---
I 127
Deduction schema/Hempel:
C1, C2,... Ck
L1, L2,... Lr
E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle
 
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I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Aristotle Black Vs Aristotle
 
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III 99
Humaneness/humanity/Morals/Ethics/Black: what is a behavior that is adequate for dealing with other human beings?.
III 100
Adequacy/Black: is mostly understood in terms of a particular function, such as doctor, judge, etc. We are concerned here but human beings as such, the human "qua human." Human/Aristotle: Thesis: has its own function qua human.
BlackVsAristotle: his only argument for this is that craftsmen also have a function. And it would be strange if the human had none. But in the absence of religious belief, it is not plausible that humans would be teleological entities with a particular purpose.
III 101
In particular, no such entities like an organ such as the heart. Otherwise we would have to consider humans as parts of a supra-individual being. Humanity/Black: without religious implications: what is the correct behavior of a human towards other humans? E.g. representatives of several religions in a lifeboat: what obligations do they have towards one another, even if they are not related or of the same nationality?.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Aristotle Bubner Vs Aristotle
 
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I 118
Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality from which the sciences infer apodictically. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of arguments remains undetermined, placeless, and therefore does not satisfactorily cover the need to determine the empirical scope of apodeixis.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Aristotle Derrida Vs Aristotle
 
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II 327
Habermas I 221
DerridaVsAristotle: no longer priority of logic over rhetoric, but vice versa. However, he does not put his projects in the history of philosophy: otherwise, he would have had to relativize the significance of his own project based on the tradition from Dante to Vico, via Hamann, Humboldt, Dilthey to Gadamer.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Aristotle Descartes Vs Aristotle
 
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Esfeld I 209
DescartesVsAristotle: 1) VsTeleology, 2) VsEssentialism. No hierarchical order of forms that culminates in God.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Aristotle Fraassen Vs Aristotle
 
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I 130
Asymmetry/Explanation: is solved by our other result: contextual relevance. The interest of the questioner will play a role.
I 131
Aristotle: (FN 35) ("Posterior Analytics" I, 13): develops a typology of 4 explanation factors, the "four causes". Fraassen: then there may be two (relative to the background information) equivalent propositions A and B that describe the factors of various types. Then it is possible that A, but not B, contains the relevant factor or vice versa.
Lantern E.g./Aristotle: (PA II, 11) shows that he already knew the problem. E.g. a father asks his son: "Why is this yard light on?" Then there are two possible answers:
a) because the circuit was closed by my turning the switch and..." Background: the house is being re-electrified.
b) because I’m still expecting a visit." Other background.
FraassenVsAristotle: his division into four is certainly oversimplified.
Asymmetry/Explanation/(s): consists in that the event actually provides all the information, but the explanation requires only a certain piece of information.
I 132
Asymmetry/Fraassen: Solution: it must at least sometimes be possible to reverse it by a change of context. Thus, the salient factors become clear.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Aristotle Frege Vs Aristotle
 
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Berka I 92
Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.
Stepanians I 9
Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths.
I 55
Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11",
Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both
may be replaced with characters.
Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence.
Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z....
Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56
Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused.
I 58
Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Aristotle Locke Vs Aristotle
 
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II 182
Essence/Properties/LockeVsAristotle: the qualities of natural things or "substances" cannot be derived conceptually from their essence, as the Aristotelian scholastic tradition thought it possible.
II 195
Knowledge/Rationalism/Aristotle/Descartes/Leibniz: assumption of innate knowledge, substantial forms and "entities" as defined and applied to knowledge. Empiricism/LockeVsAristotle: the objectivity of what is to be known and the unity of the consciousness content occurring in a general idea must be justified by the means of knowing itself.
II 198
Genus/Species/LockeVsAristotle: purely artificial product is erroneously regarded as order of laws of nature. However, we can hardly escape the view that they are images of something that really exists.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Aristotle Luhmann Vs Aristotle
 
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AU Kass 10
LuhmannVsAristotle: he does something, whatever happens to me: to use space and time at the same time together. One imagines that the simultaneous is also spatially together.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Aristotle Nozick Vs Aristotle
 
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II 145
Relation/Law/Incident/Language/Interpretation/Nozick: Wittgenstein needed people to teach the language with its instances. Nozick: but it cannot be people who teach a natural law with its instances. Causal laws also apply for people, inter alia, and were valid before people existed. The consent of people to something depends on causality and cannot determine causality itself. (FN 22). Law/Nozick: therefore seems to have no own ontological status, because it cannot reach for incidents itself. Nevertheless, if a natural law only determines a pattern, it is merely descriptive. Without ontological status it cannot support counterfactual conditionals beyond actual events and how could laws then be used to explain something? Explanation/Nozick: how does a higher level pattern explain a lower level one? Is every explanation implicitly only a repetition? Explanation/Law/NozickVsAristotle: explanatory laws need not be necessary truths, but do they need to be anything at all? If events proceed according to laws, what is the connection between the event and the law? It can of course not be causal. ((s) recourse). But even any logical connection must be interpreted in turn. Can a lawlike statement interpret itself? I.e. can a law give instructions for the interpretation?
Problem: these instructions would have to be interpreted again II 146 If the interpretation was to be fixed, the law would have to include something analogous to reflexive self-reference. This itself is mysterious. Hence, we must not treat laws as related to statements. Gödel: there is no formal system in which all the truths of number theory can be proved. Nozick: that is bad luck for a picture of all the facts from which the statements of fact can be completely derived. Determinism/Nozick: should therefore not rely on derivability from causal laws! (FN 23). NozickVsDeterminism: claims: if the initial state was repeated, the later states would also repeat themselves. Problem: in a re-collapsing universe other laws could apply for another big bang. I.e. the subjunctivist conditional, (subjunction = counterfactual conditional, unlike implication (metalinguistical)) on which determinism is based would be wrong.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Aristotle Putnam Vs Aristotle
 
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VSA
V 104
Similarity/PutnamVsAristotle: if, as it seems, the similarity theory has failed, can we not simply postulate an abstract isomorphism that ensures allocation of sensations and concepts? Abstract isomorphism: allows to make all theories compatible.
There are too many relationships; to single out the appropriate ones we would already need to have a reference access to the mind-independent things.
To recognize a privileged reference we would need to have access to the "noumenal" world.
Every physical event can be described in two different ways:
---
V 105
E.g. Remote Effect/Close-up Effect: The different physical theories are metaphysically incompatible. Mathematically, however, they translate into each other! If nothing more is needed than an abstract correspondence, then incompatible theories may be true!
---
V 200
PutnamVsAristotle: if we think differently from Aristotle today, we do it in that we are more pluralistic than he was. Aristotle: seems to have believed that ideally there was a basic constitution everyone should have. Today we think that even be in an ideal world there would be different basic constitutions. The belief in a pluralist ideal is not the same as the belief that every ideal is as good as any other.
---
V 201
If something like moral wrongness did not exist, then it would not be wrong if the government were to prescribe moral choices.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Aristotle Quine Vs Aristotle
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
EMD II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristotle: cannot be considered independently of the way the objects are specified.
NS I 71
Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: Ex bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability is not given salva veritate, although the words are synonymous.
Variant: it must be possible to to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks.
Vs: Ex heart/kidney
Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks. Solution: for Ex heart/kidney, because it was not necessary but contingent that living beings with heart only developed if they also had kidneys.
NS I 72
QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Aristotle Rorty Vs Aristotle
 
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Richard Rorty
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Rorty: It is difficult to explain what it means to say that tables and chairs are incomprehensible, but God is not (or vice versa!). The logical positivism with its formal speech is in saome way a solution. Comprehensibility/Rorty: Problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly trying to define "conditions of intelligibility of a statement ..." although this statement itself does not meet the conditions specified.
Comprehensibility/Aristotle/RortyVsAristotle: does not solve the problem at all, if he demands that the intellect become identical with the object, that renders the term "matter" incomprehensible.
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/thing in itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: in him, the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible, when he says an expression is meaningful if it stands for a mental content which forms a synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the mental).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Aristotle Sellars Vs Aristotle
 
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Rorty VI 181
SellarsVsAristotle/Rorty: misleading description of the relation between objects and knowledge.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Aristotle Verschiedene Vs Aristotle Stegmüller IV 282/283
SidgwickVsAristotle: durch ihn lernt man "nur das Umfeld" der Tugenden kennen: es fehlt ein allgemeines normatives Kriterium der Grenzziehung. Lösung/Mackie: inhaltliche Füllung. Möglichkeiten:
1. Orientierung an Verhaltenskonventionen der jeweiligen Zeit.
2. sich danach zu richten, was man selbst für richtig hält.
3. Orientierung an Hume: die Vernunft kann niemals das Motiv für oder gegen eine Handlung sein! Leidenschaften und Vorlieben sind logisch unabhängig von Schlussfolgerungen.
Dennoch sieht auch Hume, dass es praktisch taktisch vernünftige Präferenzen gibt.
Mackie: auch völlige Leidenschaftslosigkeit erlaubt keine klare Sicht der Dinge.




Aristotle Bigelow Vs Aristotle
 
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I 220
Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: E.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the Earth, but towards the center of the Moon. Therefore, the moon is round.
Aristotle: Thesis: everything (earthy and hydrous) falls to a center and this happens to be the center of the earth.
Important argument: with that he also fulfils the quasi-Copernican theory!
I 221
BigelowVsAristotle: his theory was still wrong. But not because any movement should have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the Earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle said that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity).
I 352
BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative over quantitative properties of objects.
I 362
Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Suppose the golden ratio did not exist, would there be no real numbers?
I 363
Is the existence of real numbers contingent with the existence of quantities? Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: Demands that every quantity must be instantiated in order to exist.
VsAristotle: that seems to make mathematical facts dependent on empirical facts.
Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: for him all quantities exist regardless of whether or not they are instantiated. This guarantees pure mathematics.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Aristotle Bacon Vs Aristotle
 
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Bubner I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (!620): Weariness of scholastic formalism. Turning to empiricism and realism. "Once people have become dependent on the judgment of another, (senators without vote) they no longer enhance science, they confine themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: per induction from concrete sensually given things, Vs futile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
John D. Barrow Die Natur der Natur, Hamburg 1996
I 509
Francis BaconVsAristoteles: gave up on deductive logical reason.
Aristotle Hempel. Vs Aristotle
 
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Bubner I 127
Deduction Scheme/HempelVsAristotle/Hempel: C1,C2,...Ck
L1,L2,....Lr
E (description of the phenomenon) The laws therefore fall under the premises. (The only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: lawlike statements instead of laws! Induction: the "new puzzle of induction" does not affect the confirmation, but the original formation of hypotheses.
Aristotle Simons Vs Aristotle
 
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I 241
Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) Substrate of change (change)
b) Carrier of properties.
VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real.
Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together.
Primordial matter/Simons: may well have its own special characteristics.
Per Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler.
Diversity/tradition/Simons: was explained by combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This is so in the Tractatus.
Foundation stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): are colorless.
Simons: but also the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars: but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal)) or if they are accidentally real.(Tractatus 2.0233)

I 291
Sum/Mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): Ex a body and the events that happen to him: ((s) life story!). SimonsVsFour dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block.
Universal realism/Simons: could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics.
Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary.
Whole/Wholeness/Simons: appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German philosophy between the World Wars)
I 292
Whole/Aristotle/Simons: seems to require inner relations towards a sum. inner relations/whole/Aristotle: E.g. continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter.
This includes species and genera.
SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mentioned the most important relation: causation.
Husserl/Simons: discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name.
Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>foundation/Husserl).
Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD).
Substance/tradition/Simons: is (sort of) ontologically independent.
ontological dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is oD.

I 318
Independence/ontology/Simons: where it is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) as many times in philosophy (rather theology) it is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: is a very weak form of independence:
Def primary: what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it.
SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Aristotle Galilei Vs Aristotle
 
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Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 18
Fallversuche/Gedankenexperiment/GalileiVsAristotle: wenn ein leichter Körper langsamer fällt als ein schwerer, dann müssten zwei unterschiedliche Körper, aneinandergebunden zusammen langsamer fallen, da der leichtere den schnelleren Fall des schwereren bremst. Andererseits müssten beide zusammen aber schneller fallen, da der schwerere den langsameren leichteren beschleunigt.
Drittens müssten sie noch schneller fallen, da die Summe einen noch schwereren Gegenstand ergibt.
Genz: modern gesprochen: das Äquivalenzprinzip, die Gleichheit von schwerer und träger Masse ist hier noch gar nicht impliziert. (Es war Galilei noch nicht bekannt). Es hätte mit diesem GE auch nicht bewiesen werden können!
VIII 29
GenzVsGalilei: das Argument Galileis ist nicht schlüssig: was, wenn schwere und träge Masse nicht additiv wären? Sein Argument ist ziemlich aristotelisch! Es ist zwar physikalisch richtig, aber mit Lücken.
Aus der Verallgemeinerung einer Annahme folgt, dass neu gewonnene Ergebnisse gleichzeitig größer und kleiner sein müssten.
Disposition Theory Kripke Vs Disposition Theory
 
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Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule?
No distinction possible between correct/incorrect.
Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein).
I 103
Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite.
VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition?
Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones!
I 104
Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to.
Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position
I 105
and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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New I 129
Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron.
NS I 68
Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball".
NS I 69
Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic
2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience.
Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined.
Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from
e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried".
Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning.
Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words.
It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.)
NS I 70
Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural soecies). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition:
Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..."
NS I 71
Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle.
Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4).

NS I 74
Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept.
NS I 76
Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008