Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Roderick Chisholm on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments

I 9
Ontology/Chisholm: only: "Ens": a) contingent: states (events), individuals (borders, substances) b) necessary: abstractions, substance - only 5 basic concepts: 1. "x exemplifies y", 2. "x is necessary so that it is F ", 3" x is a condition of y ", 4" x is part of y ", 5" x thinks that there is something that is F "- ontology/Chisholm : platonic, accepted eternal things - VsNon-Platonic Entities: E.g. "property to be identical with that thing", "living vis-a-vis " ("purified ontology") - we do not accept that, in addition to the matters still there are events - existence: non-obtaining things (situations) can exist.
I 10
Individuals/Chisholm: contingent things that are not states
states/Chisholm: things that are the being of other things
thing/Chisholm: not a state of something
limits/Chisholm: no entia per se, no substances
substratum/Chisholm: if "x is F", then "x" is the substrate and being F is the content.
, >Events, >Individuals, >Substances, >Abstractions, >Contingency, >Necessity.
I 175
Ontology/Chisholm: undefined basic concepts: thinking [conceiving] existence [obtaining], exemplify, relation, possibility de re, direct attribution.

- - -
I 27
Eternal objects/e.o./Chisholm: are present if x has necessarily the property H and H cannot possess anything else, and there is a fact which implies H and necessarily consists.
I 60
Object/Chisholm: e.g. the thing that is believed to be wise.
Content/Chisholm: the property to be wise. >Content.
Chisholm: but we do not need to accept a third thing that involves the thing as well as the property because attribution is not an acceptance of propositions. >Attribution.
Self-attribution/Chisholm: needs no identification. >Identification
I 62
Otherwise false mixing of direct and indirect attribution.
I 63
Eternal objects/Chisholm: relations, properties, facts.
Properties: one has an opinion about a property, if one assigns to the property a further property - i.e. as a thing to which one is in a relation e.g., contrast, uniqueness, frequency.
Individuation: properties are individuated by properties.
>Individuation, >Relations, >Properties, >Facts.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

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