Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
| |||
Naturalism, philosophy: The view that we must regard the phenomena which meet us, even those which we consider to be our own states, as processes controlled by laws of nature. Their understandability is not guaranteed. See also nature, naturalized epistemology._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Karl Popper on Naturalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 131 Naturalism/Popper: the view according to which the methodology is an empirical science - for example, a study of the actual behavior of scientists, or procedures - can be called naturalistic. PopperVsNaturalist: does not notice that he makes demarcations, where he suspected findings. I 116 Naturalism: Positivism conceives the problem of demarcation "naturalistic": not as a question of a suitable fixing, but as a question of an existing, so to speak, "natural" difference between empirical science and metaphysics. >Positivism/Popper, >demarcation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 |