Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contradictions | Feyerabend | II 74 Law of Contradiction/Method/Logic: (VsFeyerabend) a method which does not obey the principle of contradiction is not science but chaos. It follows that it is not possible to examine the freedom of contradiction in the same way as the relativistic invariance or the agreement with observations! >Method. FeyerabendVsLogic: The objection assumes that the class of consequences of a scientific proposition is determined independently of the treatment of the proposition, according to the rules of propositional logic. This assumption has never been substantiated. The propositional logic is only one among many logical systems, in there are also intuitionistic logics, without excluded middle. II 75 E.g. Suppose that in the theories a contradiction in fact implies every proposition. Then follows: if one introduces velocities greater than the speed of light into the theory of relativity, then one obtains imaginary velocities and masses. PopperVsHegel/Feyerabend: Popper shows very circumstantially that one gets nonsensical consequences when one combines propositional logic with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: That is about as intelligent as demanding that the theory of relativity should be eliminated because simple computers are not up to it. Hegel + theorem logic gives nonsense. Why should Hegel, of all people, be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: is also incompatible with the older quantum theory or with the differential calculus of Newton's time. Contradiction/Feyerabend: Ex The differential calculus was contradictory and yet led to the greatest discoveries in the sciences. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Definitions | Popper | Mayr I 92 Definition/Popper: Popper was basically against definitions. PopperVsDefinitions I 364 Contrast meaning-truth/Popper: Popper believed that research into meanings does not lead to anything, science had to do with truth alone. MayrVsPopper. >Meaning Theory, >Truth/Science. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Determinism | Popper | McGinn I 135 Freedom/domestication theory/indeterministical/McGinn: Thesis: only an acausal model could meet the freedom modality. If you say the actor was able to act otherwise, one must believe that a repeat would not lead to a decision that would be determined. (Accordingly some are of the opinion, freedom must be rooted in quantum indeterminacy.) E.g. Eccles/Popper: Thesis: Random events at the subatomic level in the brain are responsible. See >Eccles/Popper. McGinnVsEccles/McGinnVsPopper: desperate responses to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is quasi a passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Experience | Gadamer | I 66 Experience/"Erlebnis"Gadamer: The investigation of the appearance of the word in German literature leads to the surprising result that it has first become commonplace in the 1970s of the 19th century. In the 18th century it is still completely missing, but even Schiller and Goethe do not know it. The earliest proof(1) seems to be a letter by Hegel(2). The word appears just as seldom in the fifties and sixties and only in the seventies [of the 19th century] it suddenly appears frequently(3). Its general introduction into common usage seems to be related to its use in biographical literature. Gadamer: to experience means first of all to be "still alive when something happens". From there, the word carries the tone of immediacy with which something real is grasped - in contrast to that of which one also beliefs to know, but for which the authentication by one's own experience is missing, whether it is taken over from others or comes from hearsay (...) Experience is always self-experience. Content: but at the same time the form "the experienced" is used in the sense that I 67 the lasting content of what is experienced is designated by it. Biography/Gadamer: It corresponds to this double direction of the meaning of "experience" that it is the biographical literature through which the word "experience" first becomes naturalized. The essence of biography, especially the biography of artists and poets in the 19th century, is to understand the work from life. Its achievement consists precisely in conveying the two directions of meaning that we differentiate, or in recognizing them as a productive connection. Something becomes an experience, provided that it has not only been experienced, but that its being experienced has had a special emphasis that gives it lasting meaning. >Subjectivity. I 69 Historical development of the terms "life"/"experience"/Gadamer: Schleiermacher's appeal to the living feeling against the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment, Schiller's call for aesthetic freedom against the mechanism of society, Hegel's opposition of life (later: of the spirit) - against these things stands the prelude to a protest against modern industrial society, which at the beginning of our century made the words experience and experiencing rise to watchwords of an almost religious sound. >F. Schleiermacher, >F. Schiller, >Enlightenment, >Rationalism, >Life/Hegel. The revolt of the youth movement against civic education and its way of life was under this sign. The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson also worked in this direction. >Life/Nietzsche, >H. Bergson. In addition an "intellectual movement" such as that around Stefan George and last but not least the seismographic fineness with which Georg Simmel's philosophising reacted to these processes testify the same. Thus the philosophy of life of our days ties in with its romantic predecessors. I 75 Art Experience/Gadamer: The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the very essence of experience. Just as the work of art as such is a world of its own, so the aesthetic experience as an experience is removed from all contexts of reality. It seems to be the very purpose of the work of art to become an aesthetic experience (...). I 76 In the experience of art, a wealth of meaning is present that does not belong to this particular content or object alone, but rather represents the meaning of life as a whole. I 352 Experience/Gadamer: All experience is (...) I 353 only valid as long as it is confirmed. In this respect, its dignity is based on its fundamental repeatability. This means, however, that experience, by its very nature, cancels out its history and thus erases it. This already applies to the experience of everyday life, and even more so to every scientific event of it. In this respect, it is not a coincidental one-sidedness of modern philosophy of science, but rather factually justified that the theory of experience is completely teleologically related to the acquisition of truth that is achieved in it. >Experience/Husserl. I 356 That experience is valid as long as it is not disproved by new experience (ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria) seems to characterize the general nature of experience, whether it is its scientific event in the modern sense or the experience of daily life as it has always been. Thus this characterization corresponds entirely to the analysis of the concept of induction given by Aristotle in the appendix to his second analytics.(4) >Induction/Aristotle. I 358 GadamerVsAristoteles: What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. (>Experience/Aristotle). If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the Gadamer I 359 the actual process of experience is skipped. Gadamer: Because this process is a much more negative one. It cannot be described simply as the seamless formation of typical generalities. Rather, this formation happens by constantly refuting false generalizations through experience, by de-typing what is seen as typically.(5) Negative experience/Gadamer: (...) the actual experience is always a negative one. If we have an experience with an object, it means that we have not seen things properly up to now and now we know better how things are. The negativity of experience therefore has a peculiarly productive meaning. It is not simply a deception that is seen through and thus a correction, but a far-reaching knowledge that is acquired. Dialectical Experience/Gadamer: So it cannot be an arbitrarily picked up object on which one makes an experience, but it must be such that one gains a better knowledge not only about it, but about what one thought to know before, i.e. about something general. The negation by which it achieves this is a certain negation. We call this kind of negation dialectical. >Experience/Hegel. I 361 (...) the application that Hegel makes to history by seeing it conceived in the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy (>Experience/Hegel), [does not do justice to the hermeneutic consciousness (...)]. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The essence of experience is thought here from the outset from that in which experience is transcended. Experience itself can never be science. It stands in an irrevocable contrast to knowledge and to that instruction that flows from theoretical or technical general knowledge. Openness: The truth of experience always contains the reference to new experience. Therefore, the one who is called experienced has not only become one through experience, but is also open to experience. But in this way the concept of experience, which is now at issue, contains a qualitatively new moment. It does not only mean experience in the sense of the instruction it gives about this or that. It means experience as a whole. I 363 The actual experience is the one in which the human becomes aware of his or her finiteness. This is where the ability to do and the self-confidence of his or her planning reason finds its limits. It turns out to be mere appearance that everything can be reversed, that always for everything is time and everything somehow returns. Rather, the person standing and acting in history constantly experiences that nothing returns. Recognition of what is does not mean here: recognition of what is once there, but insight into the limits within which the future is still open to expectation and planning - or, more fundamentally, that all expecting and planning finite beings is a finite and limited one. Actual experience is thus experience of one's own historicity. >Text/Gadamer, >I-You-Relation/Gadamer. I 372 (...) the negativity of experience [implies] logically the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. >Question/Gadamer. I 421 Experience/Gadamer: Experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. >Language and Thought/Gadamer. I 454 Experience/Discovery/Gadamer: The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to anything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world therefore does not mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of cognition and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world. 1. Cf. Konrad Cramer in J. Ritter's „Historischem Wörterbuch der Philosophie“ (Vol. 2, p. 702-711) 2. In the report of a journey Hegel writes "my whole experience" (Letters, ed. Hoffmeister, III 179). One has to keep in mind that this is a letter... 3. In Dilthey's Schleiermacher-Biography (1870), in Justi in the Winckelmann-Biography (1872), in Hermann Grimm's „Goethe“ (1877) and probably more often. 4. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.). 5. This is similarly described by Karl Popper's pair of concepts of trial and error - with the restriction that these concepts start all too much from the voluntary, all too little from the passionate side of human experiential life. GadamerVsPopper: That is justified as far as one has the "logic of research" in mind alone, but certainly not if one means the logic that is effective in the experiential life of humans. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Explanation | Hacking | I 98ff Good explanation/Hacking: a good explanation displays context. However, the same entities can always be explained otherwise. >Additional hypotheses. VsReichenbach/VsSalmon: that we arrive at the same result on various ways, that proves nothing. I 98 The reality is not part of the explanation. >Reality. I 100 It follows: VsConvergence theory: convergence theory is only cumulative. Convergence: is not itself focussed on convergence. >Convergence, cf. >Regularities. I 103 HackingVsPopper: success is no confirmation of a declaration. It shows nothing more than that we reasonably live in a reasonable world (>adequacy, as Aristotle). >Adequacy, >Best Explanation, >Confirmation, >Success, >K. Popper. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Falsification | Chisholm | II 22 RutteVsPopper: who sees empirical basis as merely provisional, puts them on the same level as any theoretical hypothesis and then you can see nothing more than previously established coherence - then why should empiricism ever be preferred? >Verification, >Verificationism, >Justification, >Confirmation. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Falsification | Kuhn | I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, there is no example of falsification by comparison with nature - for those who have committed themselves to Newton's theory, his second law is simply a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. >Science/Kuhn, >Paradigm, >Observation, >Confirmation, >Verification. --- I 157 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences may not be equated with falsifying ones. I believe that the latter do not exist at all - on the one hand there is too much variation - on the other hand: if only major deviations lead to the rejection of a theory, there is no criterion. >Criteria/Kuhn, >Experience/Kuhn. --- I 158 Falsification is always after the event - but then it might as well be called verification of a new paradigm. >Paradigm/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Falsification | Popper | I 122 Falsification/Popper: can always be overridden ad hoc. >Ad hoc hypotheses, >Quine-Duhem Thesis. --- I 123 Empirical scientific method: consists precisely in the exclusion of such procedures. - "Humean contradiction": only experience is allowed, but not conclusive - solution/Popper: not all sentences are fully decidable. - There must be particular empirical sentences as a major premise of falsifying conclusions. >Undecidability. --- I 127 These cannot be protocol sentences, because these are only psychological. >Protocol sentences. --- Stegmüller I 400ff Falsification/Popper: falsification itself must be repeatable - we can reformulate universal statements into "There are-not"-sentences to falsify them, e.g. "there are no non-white swans". Induction/Popper. Schurz I 15 Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: The asymmetry is valid for strict (unexceptional all propositions): they cannot be verified by any finite set of observations but can be falsified by a single counterexample. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never rejected on the basis of a single counterexample, but adapted. >Asymmetry. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Falsification | Feyerabend | I 74 Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to turn Einstein into a naïve falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the matter" above the "verification by small effects". "... if no light deflection or perihelion movement were known at all, the theory would be convincing because it avoids the inertial system." I 236 Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations refuted old ones and thus forced the construction of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" is not based on a single principle. >Progress. --- II 15 Theory/Feyerabend: confirmed theories are not so much refuted by experiments as by contradictory other theories. >Confirmation, >Contradictions. II, 77ff Falsifiability/FeyerabendVsPopper: the criterion loses its meaning in a world in which ideas are firmly connected with the corresponding facts. Here, the stability of the so designated results (in a fixed framework) takes the place of their falsifiability. Cf. >Justification. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Falsification | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 LakatosVsPopper: falsification (ism) ("Man proposes, nature disposes") cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction theory/observation. Incorrect assumptions: 1. that there is a psychological barrier between speculative and observation records 2. that observation sentences could be proved by facts. >Theory, >Observation, >Observation sentence. --- Schurz I 15 Falsification/asymmetry/Popper: falsification applies in strict (universal sentences without exception): they cannot be verified by a finite set of observations, but they can be falsified by a single counter-example. >Universal sentences, >Verification. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never rejected on the basis of a single counter-example, but they are adjusted. >Progress. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| History | Popper | Wright I 34 History/Explanation/Laws/Popper/Wright, G. H.: According to Popper, the reason for the fact that no general laws are mentioned in historical explanations is that the laws are too trivial to deserve an explicit mention. We know them and take them as given. (K. Popper, Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde, 1957/1958 Vol. II, Chapter 15, Section 2. S 327). G. H. von WrightVsPopper: it is remarkable how well the advocates of the Covering Law model of historical explanation succeed in avoiding relevant examples. (Popper cites the example of Poland's first division in 1772). >Covering Laws. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| History | Dray | Wright I 34 History/Explanation/Laws/Dray/Wright, G. H.: William Dray (W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957) Dray pursues a completely different explanation than Popper and Hempel. DrayVsHempel/DrayVsPopper/Dray: The reason why historical explanations do not normally contain a reference to laws is not that the laws are so complex and unknown that we have to be satisfied with a mere sketch, not even that they are too trivial, but that historical explanations are not based at all on general laws. For example, the statement that Louis XIV. was unpopular at the end of his life because he pursued a policy that was detrimental to France's national interests. I 35 Historical Laws/Dray: The conditions for the equality of prerequisites would have to be specified. Only then would we have a real law. But the only case that falls under this law would be the one it is supposed to "explain". A recourse to this law would therefore only result in a renewed assertion of what has already been established. >Historiography, >Philosophy of history, >Laws. |
Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Induction | Popper | I 110 Induction principle: trying to delete it from the science, would not be different from taking out the decision about truth and falsehood of the theories of science. The induction principle can only be a general proposition. If you try to regard it as an "empirically valid" proposition, so the same questions immediately occur again, which leaded to its introduction. We would have to use inductive reasoning to justify it: regress. --- I 115 Induction: We reject them because there is no suitable criterion of demarcation. No indicator of empirical, non-metaphysical character of a theoretical system. Demarcation criterion: it will be a proposal for a fixing. Solely responsibility of the decision. To be justified only by analyzing its logical consequences: fertility, >explanatory power, etc. --- Schurz I 15f Induction/PopperVsInduction/Schurz: Popper thesis: science can get along entirely without induction - many VsPopper - theoretical term (Popper: Problem: because observation statements are theory-laden, the border between >observation terms and >theoretical terms is not sharp). |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Induction | Genz | II 303 Uniformity/Hume: we assume a uniformity of past and future. >Regularity, >David Hume. Physics/theory/explanation/Genz: but we assume more than mere uniformity when we explain why. >Why-questions. Physics also hopes for a certain outcome of experiments that have never been conducted before. Merely uniformity is not enough. Expectation/Genz: expection is justified by an understanding of the past. It is better than regularity. Therefore, there is no "problem of induction". >Predictions. II 304 Induction/GenzVsPopper: there is no "problem of induction". Understanding is the solution rather than the acceptance of regularities. >Induction/Goodman. Principle/Genz: the disguised reality of the laws of nature is such that we can understand it by principles. >Natural laws, >Laws, >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Induction | Mayr | I 78 Induction/Francis Bacon/Mayr: large rehabilitation (and actually the first introduction) of induction. For two centuries decisive. >F. Bacon. Justus von LiebigVsBacon: Liebig 1863(1) first rejection of Bacon. "Induction alone cannot produce new theories". Biology: for them, practically none of the universal laws of physics apply. This is why it was largely excluded from science philosophy. >Laws of nature, >Physics. I 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to falsify a useless theory convincingly. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the whole theory falls does not apply to evolutionary biology. >Falsification, >K. Popper, >Theories. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. 1. J. v. Liebig (1863). The natural laws of husbandry. Boston: D. Appleton and company. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Meaning | Quine | Davidson I 143 Quine connects meaning and content to the firing of sensory nerves ("compromise"). This is his naturalized epistemology. (according to Rorty ): concept, meaning: Quine: is only one species of intentions - And all intentions are to be tilted. "Does", "believes" and "wants" have no behavioral equivalents. We do not need "opinion" and "want", neither "concept" and "intuition". Quine I 89f Stimulus meaning is independent - by number of speakers - watching nearby: social: similarity of the stimulus meaning within the community - high stimulus nearness: Colors - low stimulus nearness: "Bachelor". I 92 Stimulus synonymy: for each speaker: "Bachelor" = "unmarried man" - but it is not a stimulus meaning. Gaurisankar: opportunity sentences exclude each other, after the discovery of stimulus meanings fall along. >Stimulus Meaning/Quine. I 92 Meaning of "neutrino" is not language-neutral. It is not translated into a native language. - A theory is forever underdetermined. There are real cultural opposites. Synonymy is indefinable. - Truth of scientific methods is indefinable. (Within the theory). I 317 Laws: in terms of importance. That Socrates only applies to one is not so random - Law of the meaning of the general term - not from circumstances. II 61ff Naming : Name or singular term - Denoting: predicate - both are reference, not meaning. Meaning: something that can have an expression, as something external - demands various homonyms - term expression cannot assume meaning of the term - key: substitutability (in the affirmative, not absolute). "Mean" is intransitive - with the same meaning - not a common thing - but: by assumption of "equal signifying" we can assume a meaning! (> Ontology/Quine). VI 74 Definition Meaning/Quine: a class of all expression meanings is the same as an expression. Can there be a thing as a class of all things equal to a? Can you define the same things? - No, because a dog cannot be equated with the class of dogs. Then this is just the particularity of meaning? VI 75 Meaning/Quine: only testable sentences have empirical content. - Problem: meaning of connectives, etc. - Solution: Substitutivity? - Not possible from language to language. XII 94f Meaning/experience/holism/QuineVsPeirce: if meaning is what makes a difference to the experience, it affects the whole theories, not individual experience sentences - pro: this is then the basis of experience - falsification/QuineVsPopper: it shows only the falsity of one or more statements, but not what is false. >Experience/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Method | Putnam | V 258 Method/science/method fetishism: when there is no way, how can one explain the success of science? Putnam: there are probably methods, but they must presuppose a concept of rationality. V 261f Science/method/Popper: we should allow only the hypotheses that are most easily falsified ((s) due to low probability to refute the others). PutnamVsPopper: this leads to a selection due to arbitrarily assumed predicates (excluding grue etc.)>Grue. There is still narrow rationality. It also excludes a theory of evolution. PopperVsPeirce: VsAbduction, VsBest Explanation >Best Explanation, >Abduction. ((s) A vague method leads to results that are difficult to interpret). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Observation | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions: 1. There is a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences. 2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts. HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial. Lakatos has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos: That could not have been pure seeing. >Method, cf. >Instrumentalism. >Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Plato | Popper | Höffe I 45 Plato/Popper/Höffe: After [Popper's] work The Open Society and its Enemies (1957)(1) Plato appears in the Politeia as an opponent of an open society and advocate of collectivist utilitarianism. Höffe: It is true that Plato's main work contains many highly objectionable elements. For example, he subjects the guardian state to strict rules of reproduction; he allows censorship, even a political lie, i.e. a deception, provided it serves the common good. Euthanasia/Platon: Furthermore he advocates a rigorous euthanasia - not uncommon in antiquity, of course - he allows infanticide and refuses medical help for people who are malignant and incurable according to their soul. Equality/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: But it is also true that Plato opposes the inequality of men and women that prevailed at that time and considers institutional precautions against corruption. HöffeVsPopper: One can hardly blame the philosopher for not being aware of the openness and dynamics of modern societies, even to a limited extent, for not correctly assessing the measure that was already possible back then. More importantly, Plato is concerned with an element that also deprives modernity of openness and dynamism, the basic and framework conditions of the community. Idiopragy/Plato: With Plato, the idiopragy formula is considered unchangeable; in modernity it is democracy in conjunction with fundamental rights and separation of powers. On the other hand, the idiopragy formula allows for openness and dynamism, and accordingly gifted people are open to advancement(2). 2. popperVsPlaton: Popper's second accusation, that Plato subjects the individual to the collective good, can refer to the beginning of Book IV, according to which it does not matter that any group (ethnos: tribe) is particularly happy, but the whole polis (3). Polis/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: A Platonic polis does not sacrifice the welfare of individuals or groups for the common good. Rather, it is set up in such a way that everyone, groups as well as individuals, can become happy. The above-mentioned passage only formulates, in provocative exaggeration of Plato's basic intention, that no one may pursue his interests in an exclusiveness that robs others of the same right to pursue their interests. 1. K.Popper 1945. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. London: Routledge 2. Politeia III 415 b–c 3. 420b |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Popper | Ball | Gaus I 21 Popper/interpretation of Hegel/Ball: It may be instructive to revisit Popper’s Open Society to show how sincerely held present-day concerns can inform – or misinform – our interpretation of ‘classic’ works in political theory. Let us choose from the preceding rogues’ gallery a single example for closer examination: Hegel’s remark in Philosophy of Right that ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’ (1952: 10)(1). >Philosophy of law/Hegel. Popper quotes Hegel’s remark in English translation and then glosses it as follows: ‘Hegel maintain[s] that everything that is reasonable must be real, and everything that is real must be reasonable.’ Thus Hegel holds that ‘everything that is now real or actual exists by necessity, and must be reasonable as well as good. (Particularly good is … the existing Prussian state)’ (Popper(2). The Prussian state of Hegel’s time was an authoritarian police state that practised censorship, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without due process of law. That state was real; therefore, in Hegel’s view, that state was rational or reasonable and thus good. In this way, Popper claims, Hegel gave his philosophical blessing to the Prussian prototype of the modern totalitarian state, and so must himself be accounted a ‘totalitarian’ thinker and apologist. Hegel is, in short, an ‘enemy’ of the ‘open society’. BallVsPopper: But is Hegel guilty as charged? The short answer is no. Let us see why. Here is Hegel’s own statement in the original German: ‘Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.’ The closest English equivalent is: ‘What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.’ Note that wirklich is translated not as ‘real’ but as ‘actual’. In everyday German, as in English, there is Gaus I 22 ordinarily no sharp distinction between ‘real’ and ‘actual’. Popper (whose first language was German) fails to note that Hegel was writing not in ordinary non-technical German but in a technical-philosophical idiom. He draws and maintains a sharp distinction between wirklich (actual) and reell (real). In Hegel’s philosophical nomenclature an acorn (for example) is real; but it is not actual until its potential is fully actualized, that is, when it becomes a full-grown oak. In other words, Hegel uses wirklich to mean ‘fully actualized’; he contrasts ‘actual’, not with unreal, but with ‘potential’. Thus Hegel’s (in)famous statement means something like, ‘What is rational is that which fully actualizes its potential; and that which fully actualizes its potential is rational.’ Hermeneutics/BallVsPopper: There is a larger hermeneutical lesson to be learned from Popper’s (and many others’) misreading of Hegel (and Plato, Rousseau, and other theorists). First, it is important to place statements in their proper context – conceptual-philosophical or otherwise. In this instance that means taking note of how Hegel uses an apparently ordinary term in a non-ordinary or technical way. Second, one should beware of any interpreter who, like Popper, has a preset thesis that he then ‘proves’ by selectively quoting and stitching together statements taken out of their textual and linguistic context – a penchant Popper shares, ironically, with the Marxists he so detests. >G.W.F. Hegel, >K. Popper, >Translation, >Citations, >Indeterminacy, >Marxism, >Ideology, >Totalitarianism, >Misinformation, >Actuality, >Reality. 1. Hegel, G. W. F. (1952 [1820]) Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. . 2. Popper, Karl R. (1963 [1945]) The Open Society and Its Enemies, 4th edn. New York: Harper and Row. II, 41 Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Positivism | Putnam | I (a) 41 PutnamVsPopper/PutnamVsMach: VsPositivismus: positivism is idealistic and does not correspond to reality. I (a) 44 PutnamVsPositivismus: according to positivism truth is not trans-theoretical. It is only a trans-theoretical concept and "leads to successful prediction" >Prediction. Putnam: instead: realism must adhere to the logic of truth transfers. >Realism. I (a) 45 From the fact that two theories lead to successful predictions, it does not follow, that their conjunction leads to that. Reason: the predicate, which plays the role of truth ("leads to prediction") does not have the characteristics of truth. I (a) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the significance. Otherwise the concept of gravity would change if a 10th planet would be discovered. Also, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the scheme of theory and prediction would collapse. I (h) 215 Truth/positivism: which degree of confirmation one accepts, is ultimately conventional and a question of purpose. Putnam: that is relativism. Relativism has no answer to the enemy that says, "in my system P is not rational". >Rationality/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Probability Theory | Schurz | I 110 Probability theory/theorems/Schurz: a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ 1≤i≤n p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ 1≤i≤n p(B I Ai) times p(Ai). (PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110 Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions). >Probability. I 112 Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems: (a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113 Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1. StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115 Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116 Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Rationality | Popper | Black III 26 Rationality/Popper/Black: (Popper, "Utopia and Violence" in: Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1963, pp. 356-57). Def Rationalism/Popper: Thesis: A rationalist is someone who seeks to make decisions through arguments and perhaps also through compromise rather than violence. Rationality/Self-reasoning/ultimate judstification/Popper: my rationalism is not self-contained (not based on itself, not justified by itself) but based on an irrational belief in the attitude of reasonableness. I do not see how one can go beyond that. >Ultimate justification. III 27 Rationality/Popper: Rationality is based among other things on the willingness to compromise instead of violence. - It is based on an irrational belief in the attitude of reasonableness. Rationality/Popper is based, inter alia, on the willingness for a compromise rather than violence - is based on an irrational belief in the attitude of reasonableness. - Popper: "I hate violence". - BlackVsPopper: Popper also provides no grounds against violence. - BlackVsPopper: rationality can be defended quite rationally instead. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Review | Lakatos | Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974(1), 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in case of conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. protective belt": every (physical ) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to make empirical predictions. These are stored like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observable that contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad-hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown confounding factors are postulated. Vs: problem: this does not explain the divergent date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the ad hoc hypothesis is introduced! ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are legitimate at all only if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. Schurz I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: A theory version is falsified only if there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "instant rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. That only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def research program/Lakatos: hard core of theory together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def negative heuristic/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only at the periphery, However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can turn on against the core. Def positive heuristic/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can cope with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Def Falsification/Schurz: A theory version is falsified, gdw. some phenomena deductively following from it were falsified by actual observation sets. (s) Schurz always speaks of propositions instead of observations. 1. Lakatos, I. (1974). "Falsifikation und die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme". In: Lakatos, I. und Musgrave, A., Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Braunschweig: Vieweg. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Science | Hacking | I 149f Science/meaning/Hacking: science is concerned with types of items instead of important species. >Natural kinds. VsPutnam: reference is ultimately not decisive. First, you examine the role: "whatever ..." (similar to Fregean sense). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Progress: if this sense is not the object, then a new baptism is needed. >Proper names, >Causal theory of names. I 265 Science/HackingVsPopper: science does not always mean a refutation of the theory. E.g. the discovery of the background radiation was just something new. >Progress, >Discoveries. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Science | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 284 Lakatos/Feyerabend: his case studies contain: (A) a discussion of certain sociological regularities (B) the proposal of arbitrary standards which have no methodological force (C) the submission that the regularities are not merely in the facts, but are the traits of reason. >Regularities. I 285 Lakatos/Feyerabend: all theories of knowledge start with the question: what is knowledge? The conventional answer contains a definition of knowledge. The answer of Lakatos is a huge improvement. His standards are much closer to science. The methods of revision refer to history. One can now discuss all the rules in a realistic context. >Knowledge, >History/Lakatos, >Progress. I 286 FeyerabendVsLakatos: he has not shown that his standards are those of sciences, and that they lead to important results. He neglects the "external" influences or distorts the history of the sciences by the imputation that the progress of the observed deviations from his standards is not necessary. (sic). --- Hacking I 193 Science/Research programs/Lakatos: 1. Specific plan of problem solving. (general). 2. Lakatos: abstract and historical: sequence of evolving theories over centuries. Definition "Heuristics"/Lakatos/Hacking: heuristics defines the importance of problems. I 198 Lakatos: "hard core" ("negative heuristics": this must remain untouched): the Gravitational law and the three laws of dynamics are irrefutable. I 199 "Protective Belt"/Lakatos: one only encounters a selection of problems with which one deals. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: therefore the verification has still a place! The researchers are choosing a few problems, refutations can be completely uninteresting! I 199 Degenerative/Lakatos: bad research programs: E.g. instead of malnutrition one mistakenly assumed a virus disease of the population. Instead of Beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition by new process of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory was not made before, but only after the observations. I 202 HackingVsLakatos: it does not help to choose new programs without proof of past performance. E.g. Is the attempt to find cancer viruses progressive or degenerate? We'll know that later. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Seeing | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 Seeing/Lakatos/Hacking: He has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope: This could not have been pure seeing. >Method, cf. >Instrumentalism. >Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification. Therefore: Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions: 1. There would be a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences. 2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts. HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Subjective Probability | Schurz | I 99 Def Objective probability/Schurz: the probability of an event type (e.g. Fx) is the relative frequency of its occurrence or the limit value of its relative frequency in the long run. Notation p(-) resp. p(Fx) Def Subjective probability /Schurz: the probability of a certain event or fact (e.g. Fa) is the rational degree of belief in the occurrence of an event by a given subject or all subjects of a rationality type, Notation: w(-) or w(Fa). >Probability/Schurz. I 111 Subjective probability: Pointe: Example coin toss: deviates from the objective probability! If more often number comes, one must assume that the coin is asymmetrical! This assumption is not expressible in the objective probability at all. I 115 Probability theory/Schurz: problems: (b) subjective probability: justification problems. On what grounds should rational degrees of belief satisfy Kolmogorov axioms? What role should degrees of belief play in the goal of finding real truths? Solution/Ramsey/de Finetti: Bet. Bet/Betting Quotient/Ramsey/Schurz: thesis fair betting quotients of a person satisfy Kolmogorov Axioms A1 - A3 exactly if they are coherent, i.e. that there is no system where total loss is possible. VsRamsey/Schurz: A bet is not yet a rational behavior in the sense of a search for truth! They are not truth-seeking, because the definition of the fair betting ratio refers only to the subjective degrees of belief, not to objective probability. The real frequency of success is not touched at all. Ex Suppose a subjectivist enthusiastically accepts a bet, of 1 : 1, that he will roll a six. He is fair if he is also willing to accept the opposite bet, 1 : 1 that he will not roll a six. Problem: he remains coherent and fair even if he has lost his entire fortune. He will only be surprised that no one will accept the counter bets he assumes to be fair. He cannot explain it as long as he is not allowed to consider the objective frequencies. This shows that the axioms A1 - A3 are at best a minimal condition. But this is too weak to exclude irrational behavior. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities, if the objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis: (1980)(1): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. >Probability theory. 1. Lewis, D. (1980). "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance". In: Jeffrey, R.C. (ed.)(1980), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol 2, Berkeley: University of California Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Kuhn | Hacking I 22 Kuhn: Thesis: No sharp distinction between observation and theory - is not deductive, concepts are not precise. >Observation. KuhnVsPopper: context of justification is inseparable from the context of discovery. >Justification, >Discoveries. --- Kuhn I 22 Theory/Fact/Kuhn: scientific fact and scientific theory cannot be separated strictly. I 94 Theory/Proof/Kuhn: Applications are not proof of the validity of a theory. >Proof, >Validity. I 111 New Theory/Special case/Kuhn: arguing that the old theory is a special case of the new, any old theory could be immunized against criticism. - A new theory does not have to include the old. - Can Newton be deduced from Einstein then? Substituting the parameters of Einstein in other equations, they are still Einstein's space, time and mass! - Mass/Newton: remains. - Mass/Einstein: is convertible into energy. Newton's laws are not a special case of Einstein's because the fundamental structural elements change as well. I 116 In order to be considered a special case, the old theory must be transformed. >Theory change, >Paradigms/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theories | Popper | Flor II 476 Theory/Popper: not justifiable, but verifiable. 1. Of any scientific theory one cannot know that it is true. 2. A scientific-empirical theory can contradict empirically observable facts. 3. A rational attitude is characterized by a critical attitude. Theories: decide that there is an inter-subjectively ascertainable fact, which may, however, contradict the theory. Flor II 478/79 One theory has to contain one or more strictly universal statements (laws) - General statement: e.g. "all bodies attract each other". Not a strict general statement: "all items in my drawer are red". Flor II 477 Definition basic statement: E.g. "at a certain time and in a certain place occurs this or that." A basic sentence may be in contradiction to the general statement, but cannot be derived originating. And expresses an intersubjectively observable fact. >Protocol sentences. General statement: a strictly universal statement is falsifiable if there is a possible basic statement, which contradicts it. E.g. "in my kitchen on 11 June 1989, there is a green shrew". basic satement: "A green shrew does not exist". A theory is only empirical scientific, if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty. Flor II 484 It may turn out that basic statements were false, but one can also reject boundary conditions or additional hypotheses. Decisive: the assumption of a basic statement which is inconsistent with the statements contained in the test procedure, forces not to reject the central idea of a theory in general. A new theory has to be able to solve the problems of the old theory. In addition, it must be able to solve the problems that the old could not solve. (New theory contains the old as a subset). QuineVsPopper: this is a misconception: the new theory does not contain the old as a subset, but: E.g. also in everyday life, the theory of Newton is only an approximation. --- I 121 Theory/Popper: new theories have excess content. - But then they should not be adapted ad hoc. - Lakatos: the excess content is created piece by piece, by extending the theories. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Waltz | Brocker I 625 Theory/Politics/Waltz: A theory should explain the emergence of regularities (1). For Waltz, a theory is not a "series of laws concerning a certain behavior or phenomena". Nor do theories have the function of explaining laws. (2) Laws/Waltz: are obtained by observation. Theories: are obtained through speculative processes designed to explain laws. Theories are speculations. Therefore, they are only loosely connected to the real world. N.B.: from this definitional separation of laws and theories it follows that theories cannot be judged by whether they are true. Solution/Waltz: a good theory is characterized by the fact that it is coherent in its structure and other scientists take it seriously. (3) Laws/Waltz: Laws, on the other hand, can be judged according to the criteria "true" and "false". WaltzVsEmpirism: Waltz propagates a sharp separation between theory and reality. But it also applies: WaltzVsRationalism. Brocker I 626 Pragmatism/Waltz/Masala: Waltz has a pragmatic position close to Sellars and Quine. Reality/Waltz: For Waltz, theories construct a reality without anyone ever being able to say that this is reality (4). ((s) However, this position cannot be easily attributed to Quine). See Theories/Quine, Reality/Quine, Laws/Quine, Empiricism/Quine. Criteria/Waltz: for the formation of theories: 1. Criterion: Theories must discriminate. Reality/Realism/Waltz: Thesis: there is a reality independent of language and theories. ((s) contradiction to the thesis above, according to which there should be several "realities"). ((s) This is a position of extreme realism). The proximity to Quine and Sellars mentioned by Masala cannot be fully understood: See Realism/Quine, Reality/Sellars, Theory/Sellars. Method/WaltzVsPopper: Waltz advocates a pluralistic process of falsification and verification. (5) 2. Criterion for theory building: (WaltzVsBehavioralism): WaltzVsInduction: the inductive method of political theories of the 1960s and 1970s is wrong, since it wants to formulate laws from existing correlations. With the method of correlation, each variable can be related to another one in a statistically significant way. Complexity/WaltzVsInduction: the complexity of the real world cannot be explained by theories. For these theories are not descriptions, but instruments to explain parts of the real world. Brocker I 627 Theories/Waltz: should be simpler than reality; they should be "elegant". (6) To achieve this, a theory must ignore certain factors. Terms/Meaning/WaltzVsSocial Sciences: Problem: not only do meanings vary with viewers, this makes every social science theory inherently black. But even the attempt to specify the meaning of a term by operationalizing definitions is no way out, because any term can be operationalized in any discourse context. (7) See also Concepts/Quine. Solution/Waltz: we have to specify causalities. Brocker I 628 Social Sciences/Waltz: if causal connections and the interaction of variables can be explained, hard social science theories are possible. Theories/Waltz: cannot be tested - only the hypotheses derived from them. Therefore, a theory should not be rejected if one of its hypotheses is not confirmed. (8) 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, „Theory of International Relations“, in: Fred Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby (Hg.) International Politics: Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mas. 1975, p. 4 2. Ibid. p. 3. 3. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Assaying Theories: Reflections on Imre Lakatos”, in: Colin Elman/Miriam Fendius Elman (Ed.) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Mass.2003, S. xii. 4. Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 9. 5. Kernneth N. Waltz “Response to my Critics” in: Robert O. Keohane (Ed.) Neorealism and its Critics, New York 1986, p. 336. 6. Waltz 1975, p. 9. 7. Ibid. p. 11 8. Ibid. p. 13. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ultimate Justification | Feyerabend | II 82 Explanation/Popper/FeyerabendVsPopper/Feyerabend: Popper goes even further: he explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds described by further theories." The doctrine of a final reality collapses. FeyerabendVsPopper: but it does only because it does not correspond with his favorite methodology. However, if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have a "final reality. >Reality, >Explanation, >Justification. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bohr, N. | Popper Vs Bohr, N. | Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 30/31 PopperVsBohr: referred inadmissibly to a theory (the General Theory of Relativity) which could not be refuted by the arguments based on Special Relativity. GenzVsPopper: confuses mention and use of thought experiments. >Mention/>Use. Also, it must not be prohibited to consult contradictions in some sub-areas by arguments from other areas of physics if they serve the unity of physics. E.g. in black holes occur contradictions between thermodynamics and the General Theory of Relativity which can be solved with quantum mechanics. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Determinism | Eccles Vs Determinism | Pauen I 51 Bewusstsein/Popper/Pauen: nicht Substanz, sondern Prozeß. VsPopper/Pauen: da es sich ausschließlich um ein nicht physisches Phänomen handelt, kommt es zum Konflikt mit dem Prinzip der kausalen Geschlossenheit. Tatsächlich besteht Popper auf der Offenheit der physischen Welt. Eccles/Popper: (1989): Lösung: psychophysische Interaktion wird als Steuerung aufgefaßt. Damit scheint gemeint zu sein, dass der Geist nicht das Ausmaß der Aktivität bestimmt, aber die Richtung. (Energieerhaltungssatz). Eccles/PopperVsDeterminismus: die Quantenmechanik verletzt ihn, und also die ganze Welt. (Vs: man muss die Unterscheidung Mikro/Makro aufrechterhalten). |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Induction | Popper Vs Induction | Schurz I 50 Induction/Schurz: 1) methodological induction: from observations. PopperVsInduction: induction is the central method of extraction of hypotheses and theories. Confusion of discovery and context of justification. How hypotheses are derived, perhaps even through guessing, is quite irrelevant for the context of justification. Therefore, methodical induction is dispensable. 2) Logical Induction/Carnap: not of the discovery but of the justification: method of determination of the degree of confirmation. II 51 PopperVs: one theory may prove to be closer to the truth than another, but that does not show that there is no third theory that is even closer to the truth. I.e. there is no claim to absoluteness for theories. Verisimilitude = probability. There is no limited space of linguistic possibility containing all possible alternative theories. This only applies for logical hypotheses! Empirical hypotheses: here it is possible to establish a finite list of all possible alternative hypotheses. Popper: competing theories can only be evaluated comparatively. I 52 3) Epistemic Induction/Musgrave/Schurz: if a theory was more successful so far, it is likely that it will be more successful in the future. This is not about object hypotheses, but about an epistemic meta-hypothesis on the degree of corroboration. The epistemic induction is indispensable. Without it, the Popperian method of practical tests would be meaningless. Past success would be irrelevant for future action. I 14/15 Criterion of Demarcation/Schurz: for metaphysics. Problem: principles which considered separately have no empirical consequences, can have new empirical consequences together with other theoretical propositions. I 15 Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: applies with strict (unexceptional all-sentences): they cannot be verified by any finite set of observations, but falsified by a single counter-example. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never discarded because of a single counter-example, but adapted. PopperVsInduction/Anti-Inductivism/Popper: Thesis: science can dispense with induction altogether. >Induction/Popper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Küng, H. | Mackie Vs Küng, H. | Stegmüller IV 507 Religion/Küng: (Existiert Gott?, Küng, H. 1978): Küng tends to classify arguments as "modern" or "unmodern". MackieVsKüng: enormous erudition, at the same time confused. Too strong an emphasis on "modernity". IV 508 So it only depends on whether an argument is right or wrong. Küng: Thesis: "...after the difficult walk through the history of modern times, a clear, convinced "yes" answered by critical reason can be given as an answer to the question "Does God exist?" But the question is, what does this "yes" refer to? To the God of traditional theism, or to a substitute God? Küng: Thesis: both the naively anthropomorphic and the enlightened-deistic conception of God are obsolete. God is neither a supernatural being in the clouds, nor an extraterrestrial being in the metaphysical sky. Rather he is in this world and this world is God. God is the infinite in the finite, the absolute in the relative. That which works constantly, that which has the possibility as an absolute of becoming history. Küng seems to agree with the tradition of a negative theology: God is not to be understood by any concept, even the concept of being does not override him, because he is not an existing being. The God of the Bible is not a person like a human, but a God who establishes personality, so he cannot be apersonal. Thus one can also accept the God of the Bible as a God with a human face. IV 509 MackieVsKüng: 1. He obviously takes advantage of the fact that he tries to have everything at the same time: this can be seen in his remarks about miracles: these are all that the human is "surprised" about. Mackie: 2. If this was all, miracles would in no way support any kind of supernaturalism or theism! 3. Retreat to such an indefinite and unclear concept of God that it no longer provides any starting point at all to critically discuss the question of existence. God/Existence/Proof of God/Küng: Thesis: Argument for the existence of God: the danger of nihilism. The question is not whether we can infer from our knowledge about the world, consciousness and morality further specific theistic conclusions. Rather, modern thought is threatened by nihilism. Nihilism/Küng: (classical representative: Nietzsche): Vs three classical transcendentals: there is 1. no unity 2. no truth 3. no goodness. IV 510 Küng: admits that nihilism is not only possible, but irrefutable. Question: Can it be overcome? Truth/Rationalism/MackieVsKüng: he refers to a wrongly understood concept of critical rationality in Popper (KüngVsPopper). Küng believes that he renounces any critical examination of the foundations of our knowledge. IV 510/511 ad 2: the assumption that there is order in the world, i.e. regularity, which does not necessarily have to be causal determination, makes sense in two ways: 1. as a regulative principle, 2. as a far-reaching hypothesis. (Küng seems to understand above all the latter by it.) ad. 3. no goodness: here (the one quoted by Küng) Mackie has already given sufficient answers before. Values/Küng: after all, we have to assume something like objective value from which standards can be derived. MackieVsKüng: this is clearly wrong: every value is a human and social product. IV 512 Atheism/Küng: also atheists and agnostics can strive for humanity and morality. Belief/God/Küng: but the basic trust in identity, meaningfulness, and value of reality is ultimately only justified if the reality itself, to which the human also belongs, does not remain groundless, unfounded and aimless. MackieVsKüng: no, that is not clearly visible. It is just wrong. The basic trust is reasonable in itself for the reasons mentioned! And exactly the same applies to the development of values. Whereby Küng accepts this indirect proof as the only proof of God at all, i.e. he does not want any demonstrative proof. IV 513 MackieVsKüng: This seems to amount to the assertion that in the execution of belief it proves to be true. Küng constantly fluctuates between a reference to a pleasant and purely subjective security and the reference to the ontological argument explicitly rejected by himself before. Nihilism/Küng: the first appearance of senselessness results from the fact that reality is not God, the second appearance that the human is not God. MackieVsKüng: also in these two respects the God hypothesis is not better than naturalism! IV 514 Explanation/MackieVsKüng: with him everything boils down to God being the one who somehow gives reason, stability and purpose to reality. But this is no explanation at all: one cannot explain a being by what it does. A "somehow acting". Nihilism/MackieVsKüng: ironically, he himself collected the material to show how nihilism can be met on a purely human level (without the God hypothesis). Namely by what Küng calls "basic trust" (>James, see above). Mackie: this trust is already reasonable out of itself. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Lakatos, I. | Hacking Vs Lakatos, I. | I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology". Vs reduction of the history of science to sociology. That leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: contributes nothing to what you should reasonably believe. Is exclusively turned backwards. I 202 Degenerative/Lakatos: poor research programs: E.g. Instead of malnutrition a viral disease of the population was erroneously assumed. Instead of beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition through new methods of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory has not been made before but only after observations (!)!. HackingVsLakatos: does not help to choose new programs without proof of previous performance. E.g. Is the attempt to identify cancer viruses progressive or degenerative? We will know that later. I 205 Objectivity/Knowledge/Lakatos: only with hindsight! The only fixed point is that knowledge increases. His philosophy ignores the representation problem. Lakatos Thesis: regardless of our views on the truth and "reality" we can simply see to it that knowledge grows. HackingVsLakatos: there is nothing that has increased more steadily and strongly over the centuries than the comments on the Talmud. These comments are the most thoroughly thought through texts that we know! They are far better thought out than almost all the texts of the scientific literature. Is that a rational activity by Lakatos?. I 206 Instead of increasing the knowledge he should say: increasing the number of theories!. I 207 External History/Lakatos: marginal conditions of research. Internal History/Lakatos: what people have believed, is inconsequential, story of anonymous and autonomous research programs. (HackingVs). I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: falsificationism cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. HackingVsLakatos: These assumptions have now been ridiculed for 15 years, but Lakatos’ reasoning is superficial. He only has one E.g.: Galilei’s observation of sunspots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos. this could not have been merely seeing. Experiment/Proof/Lakatos: no factual statement can ever be proved by an experiment. Assertions cannot be proved on the basis of experience. That is a logical principle. HackingVsLakatos: that is shadow-boxing with the word "prove". |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Black Vs Popper, K. | III 26 Rationality/Popper/Black: (Popper, "Utopia and Violence" in Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1963, p. 356 57). Def Rationalism/Popper: Thesis: a rationalist is someone who seeks to obtain decisions through arguments and perhaps also through compromise rather than by force. Rationality/Self-affirmation/Ultimate justification/Popper: my rationalism is not completed (is not based on itself, is not justified by itself), but it is based on an irrational belief in the attitude of reasonableness. I do not see how you can go beyond that. III 27 Popper/Black: refers to "irrational" here in attenuated the sense of "not rational". Rationality/Rationalism/Popper: I cannot prove my rationalism rationally, I chose it because I hate violence. And I do not fool myself to bleieve that I could justify this hatred rationally. PoppervsAnti-Rationalism/RationalismVsVs/Black: Popper’s response to the anti-rationalists might go like this: "Why you should be rational? There is no "should". There are not even reasons here. You have the choice between being rational and exercising violence, if you, like me, hate violence, you will choose reason, if not, you won’t. That’s all. BlackVsPopper: it is worth noting here that Popper gives no reasons against violence either! A terrorist could respond, "Bravo! Just like you, I believe that there are no ultimate reasons for my irrationality. The difference between us is the same as the difference III 28 between Protestants and Catholics. My faith is your heresy and vice versa. Rationality/BlackVsPopper: it may well be defended rationally (see below). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Popper, K. | Feyerabend Vs Popper, K. | I 74 Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to make Einstein a naive falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the thing" above the "verification by small effects". "... If no light deflection or perihelion were known, the theory would be convincing, because it avoids the inertial system. I 236 Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations disproved old ones and thus forced the establishment of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" cannot be traced back to a single principle. I 356 FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper considers science as a problem solution. This overlooks the fact that problems can be formulated incorrectly. II 82 PopperVsHegel: shows very laboriously that nonsensical consequences are obtained if the propositional logic is combined with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: E.g. This is about as smart as calling for the theory of relativity to be eliminated, just because simple computers are no match for it. Hegel + propositional logic are nonsense. Why should precisely Hegel be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: incompatible also with the earlier quantum theory and with the differential calculus at the times of Newton... Explanation/Popper: explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds which are described by other theories." The doctrine of an ultimate reality collapses. II 119 FeyerabendVsPopper: but only because it does not correspond to his favorite methodology. But if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have an "ultimate reality." FeyerabendVsPopper: Vs "third world": it is populated with just as many different (and often incommensurate) entities as there are beliefs in the "Second World". Does not solve the problem of relativism, but conceals it. II 201 FeyerabendVsPopper: "mere propagandist." (His former teacher). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Popper, K. | Hacking Vs Popper, K. | I 209 HackingVsPopper: I prefer the texts in which he called the "Third World" the world of libraries stored in books and magazines - the tables, data and computer memories. These are non-platonically real. Hacking: Not independent of the grading by experts. Not autonomous. I 265 HackingVsPopper: E.g. Davy: if he had said: "Aha, so that s oxygen", it would have been an interpretation, but he did not say it! E.g. the discovery of the background radiation was made while they sought something else (or nothing specific). Penzias and Wilson have not refuted a different theory, but simply explored the universe! |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Kuhn Vs Popper, K. | Hacking I 400 Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out. Kuhn I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. I 157 KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification". I 158 KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn). However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Lakatos Vs Popper, K. | Feyerabend I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational. Hacking I 199 "Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting! Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences 2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts. Schurz I 196 Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core. Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Popper, K. | Maturana Vs Popper, K. | I 340 MaturanaVsPopper: falsification would only apply to the validation, if knowledge were a cognitive area which reveals directly or indirectly by denotation or connotation a transcendental, independent reality (without brackets). |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Popper, K. | Mayr Vs Popper, K. | V 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly falsify an unusable theory. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the entire theory is falsified does not apply to evolutionary biology. V 363 MayrVsPopper: Confusion of terms: early: "Do not let yourself be tempted to take problems seriously that are about words and their meaning. Later he contrasts meaning and truth. He claims that research on meaning leads to nothing and that science is only about approaching the truth. (>NaessVs: Knowledge/Naess). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Popper, K. | Nagel Vs Popper, K. | I 25 Truth/Test/Nagel: it is advisable to raise the question whether a general assertion about truth or meaning is true when applied to itself. Thus, for example, >logical positivism can be excluded without major circumstances. NagelVsPopper. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Popper, K. | Putnam Vs Popper, K. | V 146 Popper/Putnam: predictions are confronted with "basis sentences" that are publicly accepted. VsPopper: one has criticized, he used a "conventionalist" language, as if the acceptance of a basic sentence would be a convention. >Protocol sentence. Putnam: in reality it is simply recognizing the fact of institutionalization. V 257/258 Method/Popper has suggested that one should accept the most falsifiable hypotheses of the alternative ones. PutnamVsPopper: but it turns out that the falsification varies, depending on which undefined predicates the language choses as a basis. Method/Science: it follows that there is still a necessity, (or the acceptance of a Bayesian "prior"), for a non-formal element that equals a Goodman-decision on the projectability. Here one may ask, how should we explain the success of science, if there is no method? It cannot be denied that science has been remarkably successful. Answer: there is probably a scientific method, but it assumes that you already have a concept of rationality. --- V 258/259 Rationality/Science/Putnam: It cannot be that a newly created method serves only to define what rationality actually is. --- V 260 Popper/Putnam: Claims, that there are rationality terms that are broader than the scientific rationality, and also valid for ethical decisions. PutnamVsPopper: it is not possible to test all theories with high falsifiability. --- V 261 Even his method involves such a thing as a previous selection. Also his calculations of falsfiability levels is not independet from what predicates that are chosen as a basis. >Method/Putnam. Popper/Putnam: could it not be that the Popperian method (as vague and non-formal as it may be) covers not only the concept of scientific rationality exhaustively but the entire concept of knowledge-based rationality? PutnamVsPopper: such a rationality view is even too narrow for science. E.g. it would exclude a theory that belongs to the most successful: the evolution. (Popper would accept this). Evolution: is not high-falsifiable, and it does not imply any predictions. --- V 263 PutnamVsPopper: he even exaggerates the degree of falsifiability of theories of classical physics. >Falsification. Method/Science/Putnam: danger, to dilute the method more and more: if it says in the end: "perform experiments as carefully as possible, then conclude the best explanation, eliminate theories that can be falsified by experimenta crucis" then it can no longer be seen, what cannot be verified through such a vaguely described method. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Popper, K. | Quine Vs Popper, K. | Quine XI 32 HolismVsPopper/Quine/Lauener: holism prevents extreme falsificationism. XI 106 QuineVsPopper/Lauener: less extreme attitude: allows the psychological moment of acquiring conditioned reflexes, i.e. to live up to habituation and learning. XI 125 Observation Sentence/Convention/QuineVsPopper/Lauener: observation sentences are not temporarily fixed by conventions, but they are maintained by a conservative strategy, as long as nothing speaks against it. Quine pro Popper: all sentences are in principle revisable. Standards/Quine/Lauener: should belong to the inventory of nature, but not to science. XI 126 LauenerVsQuine: Problem: how do you explain to the step from "being" to "ought". (>Naturalistic fallacy). XII 95 Falsification//Holism/QuineVsPopper: only shows that one or more statements of a network are false, but not which. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Popper, K. | Martin Vs Popper, K. | Arm II 81 Verificationism/Martin: ironically, the weak verficationism itself is verification transcendent: any finite set of confirmations is consistent with the falsity of the confirmed! The incompleteness is further underlined by the fact that typically the execution of one set of verifications excludes another set. VsPopper: the reference to falsification does not change anything. "Ideal observer": doesn't help either II 82 because the "ideality" is just as incompletely verified. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Popper, K. | Hempel. Vs Popper, K. | II 111 Def Empiricist Criterion of Meaning/Hempel: (2.1) provisionally: demand for principally complete falsifiability: (instead of verifiability): A statement has an empirical meaning iff. its negation is not analytical and follows logically from a finite logically consistent class of observation statements. (>Popper, demarcation criterion, empirical science Vs mathematics, logic). HempelVs: 1) that excludes pure existence assertions like "There is at least one unicorn", etc. Also mixed statements (existence and all-quantification). Because none of these can be falsified conclusively by a finite set of observations. (HempelVsPopper) 2) E.g. a conjunction of a completely falsifiable statement S and a not completely falsifiable statement N is absurdly completely falsifiable. Reason: if the negation of S is the result of a class of observation statements, then the negation of S and N, a fortiori, is the consequence of the same class. E.g. "All swans are white and the absolute is perfect". 3)Observation predicate: the assertion: "All things have the property p" is then significant. |
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| Popper, K. | Dray Vs Popper, K. | Danto II 320 Dray/DrayVsRegularity Theory/DrayVsPopper: you can also formulate a law very vaguely: For example "if an archduke is murdered in Sarajevo, if the world is on the brink of war, and if a sudden murder will start this war, then a world war will break out". Such a law would be absolutely meaningless and useless. Alternative: one formulated the law always more exactly, until it applies at the end only to a single case! (> Law/Natural Laws). Law/Lübke: Trilemma: 1. The law is too simple, methodologically useful, but in reality too easy to falsify. 2. The law is much too vague and ontological and therefore methodologically uninteresting. 3. The law is extremely specific and may have only one example. Explanation/Lübke: not all explanations provide an answer to the question: "Why did this event necessarily occur? Instead, historians often give explanations that are more likely to answer the question: "How was a particular event possible?" It should be noted that "How is it possible - explanations", as opposed to "Why is it inevitable - explanations", do not allow predictions of events. |
Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Popper, K. | Genz Vs Popper, K. | Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 30/31 PopperVsBohr: has inadmissibly invoked a theory (General Relativity Theory) which could not be refuted by the arguments based on the Special Relativity Theory. GenzVsPopper: confuses mention and use of thought experiments. In addition, one must not forbid using arguments from other areas of physics to draw on contradictions in sub-areas when they serve the unity of physics. For example, in black holes there are contradictions between thermodynamics and the General Relativity Theory, which can be resolved by quantum mechanics. VIII 176 GenzVsPopper: contrary to his prohibition, we added the quantum mechanics to an "apologetic" experiment and thus restored the unity of physics. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Popper, K. | Rescher Vs Popper, K. | I 229 Correspondence is fundamental to definition - coherence is fundamental to criteria. Proposition: can be true or false. Judgement/Rescher: can be correct, incorrect or undecided. I 340 According to this distinction there is a correspondence theory of truth and falsity of propositions and a coherence theory of correctness, incorrectness or indecision of judgements. Criterion/Popper: all criterion-related truth theories must be classified as subjective. I 380f VsPopper: the epistemic criterion of conditions of acceptability does not raise questions about a way to truth about a "particular state of mind or disposition or belief". A criterion-based approach to accepting does not need to refer to any psychological beliefs or subjective conditions of acceptance. For example, the rule-based calculation test does not depend on psychological mechanisms. I 341 Rescher: this is not about what is true or false, but about what is justifiably considered to be true. Definitions and criteria are very close here. With some things there is no difference at all. For example, what is a chair? For others, there is a difference: for example, what is an unsolvable problem? Difference guaranteeing criterion - qualifying (authorizing) criterion. The problem arises with the question: "what is the relationship between corresponds to the criterion for X and is actually an X? Def guaranteeing criterion: logically excludes the absence of the required characteristics. Decides completely about the characteristics. Example triangularity is a guarantee of the criterion for triangularity. Def qualifying criterion: if the fulfillment of the criterion represents at best a rational justification. Presumed confirmation. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Popper, K. | Schurz Vs Popper, K. | I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities must agree with them when the objective probabilities are known. Lewis: (1980): singular principal principle: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear which property a singular propensity should correspond to at all. Solution/de Finetti: you can also accept the objective probability concept at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on any experience date E(b1...bn) about other individuals b1,...bn it is important to derive two further versions of the principal principle: 1. Principal Principle for random samples used for the subjective justification of statistical likelihood intuition 2. The conditional principal principle, for the principle of narrowest reference class and the inductive statistical specialization conclusion is subject. Principal Principle: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r Principal Principle for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk mal (1 r)n-k. Conditional Principal Principle: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,…bn)) = r. Principal Principle: is only useful for subjective a priori probabilities. I.e. belief degrees of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual Belief Degree/Belief Degree: the principle does not apply generally for it: for example if the coin is already showing head (=Fa) the belief degree of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. Apriori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedens of a conditional probability statement w( - I W). actual: = personalistic. apriori probability: connection with updated probability function: Strict Conditionalization/Schurz: w0 is the a priori probability or probability to t0 and w1 the current probability. I 116 Wt is the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A applies: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Narrowest reference class/n.r.c./Principle/Schurz: can be justified as follows: for a given event Fa, the individual can belong to a great many reference classes that assign very different probabilities to Fx. Then we got contradictory predictions. Question: but why should the appropriate reference class be the narrowest? Because one can prove that it maximizes the frequency value of true predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Popper, K. | Vollmer Vs Popper, K. | II 84 VsInteractionism/VsEccles: where does the interaction take place? Eccles: in the "liaison areas" VollmerVsEccles: this is of course only a shift: where are the "liaison areas" located? How does the interaction come about? Eccles/Popper: (monism) Thesis: the self-confident mind is active in reading from the multitude of active centers at the highest level of brain activity...directing its attention to these centers and integrating its selection so that even the most fleeting experiences are brought together into one unit. The self-confident mind also works by changing the spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal processes ...the searchlight offers an analogy. A scanning device, a probe... II 85 VollmerVsEccles/VollmerVsPopper: nothing is gained by vague analogies. Nor does he make any suggestion as to how his hypotheses should be tested. What he thinks is new is the independent activity of the mind, the search for uniform interpretation. But that is exactly what we want to explain! This is reminiscent of the e.g. explanation of the telegraph principle: "It's like a dachshund: if you pinch at the back, it barks at the front". "And what about wireless telegraphy?" "Just like that, but without the dachshund." I 74 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: does not describe the evolution of knowledge (like Popper) but our abilities. I 75 VollmerVsPopper: his theory of world 3 and his body soul dualism are not compatible with the evolutionary epistemology. I 278 LewontinVsPopper: a theory that does not make forecasts can be testable, and thus empirical! VollmerVsPopper: it could be shown that selection theory makes verifiable predictions! Popper has long since withdrawn his criticism of the theory of evolution! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Popper, K. | Wessel Vs Popper, K. | I 149 Follow-up relationship/logic/sciences/methodology/Wessel: for the scientist it is not decisive whether his theories are consistent! It turns out that successful work with contradictory theories is possible within a certain framework. Frege's life's work is not meaningless either, although Russell revealed its contradictions. Contradiction/relation/conclusion/ex falso quodlibet/EFQ/Popper: one can construct a system in which contradictory statements do not result in any arbitrary statement. But such a system is very weak! Not even the modus ponens remains. I 150 Such a system is useless for drawing conclusions... WesselVsPopper: this is true for his system, but with the systems of the strict follow-up relationship there are systems that are complete and ex falso quodlibet do not apply. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Propensity Theory | Kyburg Vs Propensity Theory | Fraassen I 189 KyburgVsPropensity/KyburgVsPopper/Fraassen: (Henry Kyburg, FN 25): reductio ad absurdum/raa: wie man Propensity interpretations präzise machen könnte: Popper würde vielleicht von einer "hypothetical frequency interpretation" zufriedengestellt: Bsp Angenommen, ich messe die Länge eines Tischbeins drei Mal: 1. 100 cm, 2. 100,3 cm, 3. 100,5 cm. Dann behaupte ich, dass die reale Länge 100,3 cm + 0,3 cm ist. Damit drücke ich mein Vertrauen (> confidence) aus, dass bei wiederholter Messung, die Ergebnisse in diesem Intervall liegen werden. Das heißt nicht zu behaupten, dass es keine außerhalb des Intervalls geben würde, sie würde aber eine zu vernachlässigende Rolle spielen. nicht-aktuale Experimente/Kyburg/Fraassen: Bsp ich werfe eine Münze 100 Mal und 49 Mal kommt Kopf. Dann drücke ich das vertrauen (confidence) aus, dass wenn andere Leute die Münze werfen, ein ähnliches Ergebnis herauskommt. D.h. wir sprechen auf einmal von "möglichen Situationen". (>Modality). I 190 Kyburg: in diesem Ansatz - einem "Kyburg model" - ist (oder hat) jede possible world (p.w.) eine Ereignisfolge in einem Ereignis-Raum. Die meisten oder alle sind endlich. Def maximale poss.w./Kyburg/Fraassen: ist eine, die nicht Teil einer anderen ist, oder die unendlich ist. Hier entspricht die Wahrscheinlichkeit (prblty) eines Ereignisses E r iff in jeder maximalen p.w. im Modell die relative frequency (r.f.) von E = r ist. Prblty: ist manchmal nicht definiert, nämlich dann, wenn es keine Zahl r gibt. VsPopper: diese Sichtweise unterscheidet sich von Poppers darin, dass es hier nicht eine einzige virtuelle Folge gibt, sondern viele. Und die prblty eines Ereignis ist = r iff die r.f. in allen maximal erweiterten Folgen = r ist. Modality/Prblty/Propensity/Frequency/Kyburg/Fraassen: dieser Begriff ist natürlich nicht der der logischen Möglichkeit. Es werden stattdessen empirische Tatsachen reflektiert. Von einem logischen Standpunkt aus ist es nicht so, dass eine wiederholte Messung ähnliche Ergebnisse liefern muss. Popper/Kyburg/Fraassen: wir können Popper’s Sicht als Spezialfall der Situation von Kyburg sehen: bei Popper hat die Menge der p.w. nur ein maximales Element. FraassenVsPropensity: beide Ansätze haben dieselben Probleme, die auch der Ansatz der strikten Häufigkeit (FraassenVsReichenbach) hat: es gibt Modelle, die nur eine einzige MöWe enthalten, nämlich eine einzelne lange Folge. Problem: dann kann es sein, dass der Bereich, der durch die prblty-function definiert ist, kein Borel-Feld ist, und vielleicht überhaupt gar kein Feld. Oder, selbst wenn, dann nicht abzählbar additiv. Lösung: einige Theoretiker der propensity können diese Schwierigkeiten überwinden, indem sie leugnen, dass es überhaupt irgendwelche logischen Verbindungen zwischen prblty und r.f. gibt. |
Kybu I H. E. Kyburg Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning New York 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Various Authors | Popper Vs Various Authors | Mayr V 92 Popper: basically Vsdefinitions V 364 Truth/Popper: Popper states a contrast between meaning and truth. Exploration of the meanings leads to nothing, science has only to do with truth. > Meaning Theory. - MayrVsPopper. Stegmüller I 400 ff PopperVsProbability of Hypotheses: it is nonsensical to credit a hypothesis where every second sentence is false 50% probability. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theory/Observation | Kuhn, Th. | Hacking I 22 Kuhn: no sharp distinction between observation and theory. Non-deductive terms are not precise - KuhnVsPopper: the context of justification can not be separated from discovery. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Vs Induction | Popper, K. | Schurz I 15 PopperVsInduction / Anti-inductivism / Popper: Science can live entirely without induction. (Many authors VsPopper). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Propensity | Popper, K. | Fraassen I 159 Def Propensity/Popper/Fraassen: Thesis: according to this, probability itself is a physical quantity, the strength or intensity of the real chance of an occurrence or event that cannot be reduced by reference to actual classes of actual occurrences. Fraass I 187 Def Propensity/Probability/Popper: Thesis: is not a property of the actual course of events (such as experimental results) but of the conditions under which these results occur in the experimental setup or chance set-up. I 188 GiereVsPopper: Thesis: propensity is probably an objective property that is different from actual frequency, but even an infinite sequence of experiments would not cause frequency and probability to coincide. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frequ/Prblty | Giere, R. | Fraassen I 188 GiereVsPopper: Thesis: propensity is indeed an objective characteristic which is different from actual frequency, but even an infinite sequence of experiments would not let the frequency and probability coincide. I 189 Probability/ frequency / Giere: must be kept separate (even if belief about probabilities rationally leads to expectations of frequencies). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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