Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Endurantism: Endurantism is an expression for the conception that objects exist at all times in total to which they exist at all. They gain and lose properties, however, as an object which simply acquires or loses these properties - e.g. a certain age. The counterposition is the Perdurantism, which assumes that objects consist of temporal parts, each of which is identical with the whole object and must be described as these, that is, as objects-to-a-point of time. See also change, movement, time, person, identity, temporal identity, four-dimensionalism, naked individuals, intrinsic, extrinsic, world lines.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Black I 32
Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals).
LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory).
Black I 31
Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts.
Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points.
EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him.
LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd.
Black I 32
Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f, Jackson 1994b, 142f, van Inwagen 1990a, 116).
Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times.
Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night.
Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specification (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night.
LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things.
Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away.
Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change.
Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change.
Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

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> Counter arguments in relation to Endurantism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-17