Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments

Stuhlmann-Laeisz I 99
corresponds to the belief that something is necessary - not to the belief that something is possible.
, >Necessity, >Beliefs.
I 102
Logic of belief/epistemic logic/Stuhlmann-Laeisz: knowledge logic: unlike belief logic: Model: additional relation S (reflexive, transitive, symmetric).
>Knowledge, >Epistemic logic, >Modal logic.
U = is a Model, if
(i) U" = is a SGL-Modell.
(ii) S is a reflexive relation pon K and
(iii) for all j,k from K: if jRk then jSk - corresponds to S5.
Epistemic logic: every statement of GAL is also a statement of GAL + W.
>Systems S4/S5, >Models.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

Stuhlmann II
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27
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