|Rigidity, philosophy: Rigidity is an expression for the property of names to stand for the same object in all possible worlds, as opposed to descriptions that are not rigid and can change their reference. E.g. it is pointless to ask whether Napoleon might have been someone else but Napoleon in a possible world, but it is not meaningless to say that there is a possible world in which Napoleon is not the winner of Austerlitz. See also descriptions, names, possible worlds, range, necessity, possibility, reference, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Hans Kamp on Rigidity - Dictionary of Arguments
Cresswell II 154
Making rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977, 259f)(1):
Normal description/Logical Form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in any possible world w iff. the thing that is (unambiguously) F in w is also G in w.
Rigid description/logical form: here is this true in w iff. the thing that is in the actual world F is G in w, whether or not it is F there in w.
Current world: which world is the actual one, is again relative to the standpoint: every world is for itself the actual one.
Rigid description/logical form: the rigid description must therefore involve two worlds: for we must say
"The F is G" is true in w2 as seen from w1, iff. the thing that is F in w1 is G in w2.
Double indexing/multiple indexing/terminology/Cresswell: it is called like this in Kamp (1971)(2), but it is almost not quite used in Lewis (1970. 185f)(3). Explicitly in Stalnaker (1978, 320)(4) as the formalization of Kripke's approach about names. It seems to be accepted in Kaplan (1979)(5).
(1) Kripke, S. (1977): Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In: Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Vol. 2(1), pp. 255 - 276.
(2) Kamp, H. (1971): To the memory of Arthur Prior Formal properties of ‘now’. In: Theoria, Vol. 37(3), pp. 227-273.
(4) Stalnaker, R. (1978): Assertion. In: Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press), Vol. 9, pp. 315-332.
(5) Kaplan, D. (1979): On the Logic of Demonstratives, Journal of Philosophical Logic, VIII 1978: 81–98; and reprinted in French et al. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979): 401–412._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984