|Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information.|
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Identification/individuation/knowledge-what/logical form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s)> one-class, monotony).
E.g. knowing that "such a person did it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who is such a person. ((s) but that means that one knows y!
Solution/Hintikka/(s): the solution is the set of worlds compatible with this knowledge > Relevance!). (> Semantics of possible worlds).
Identity/object/thing/object/semantics of possible worlds/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must be assumed as a basic concept.
HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well-founded. Perhaps one must, however, presuppose the criteria of identification and of identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that does not mean that the problem of identification is not a permanent problem for philosophers.
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: thesis: cross-world identity is connected with the problem of re-identification.
It is about different moments in the same story, the other is about different worlds. However, this is always about interrelations and characteristics of individuals.
Individuation/Hintikka: Thesis: Identification cannot be treated independently of individuation.
Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: Space-time is still just a means of identification.
What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h.
This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation.
Matter/Hintikka: Identification and individuation are based on material reality.
I/Hintikka: Descartes' cogito directs our attention to the doubling of the pronoun of the first person singular.
"I" can depend on one of the two ways of identification (perspective(/public)).
E.g. "I, Hintikka, swear ..." is not a tautology!
Public identification/Quine/Hintikka: "Bringing a face together with a name".
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996