## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Omniscience: the ability to know all statements. - Logical problem even the understanding of a logically true statement could could cause the requirement, that all logical consequences are known. E.g. Knowing the calculation rules would logically require that all the results are known. | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Books on Amazon |
I XV Logical omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has been solved long ago. --- I 21 Omniscience/Solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. --- I 23 Logical omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: Problem: Suppose (S1> S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true. Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies: (3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2. That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge. This has led some to reject model theory. Model theory/HintikkaVsVs: this follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it. Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies. (i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument). Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument. Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this. |
Hin I Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W I J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 |

> Counter arguments against **Hintikka**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Omniscience**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30