Dictionary of Arguments

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Essence, philosophy: the essence of an object is understood to mean one or more properties without which the object is inconceivable. Critics argue that such necessary properties can only be attributed to concepts, but not to empirical objects. See also features, essentialism, ultimate justification, properties, metaphysics, concepts, necessity de re, substance.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 35
Definition Essence/Lewis: the totality of the being is the average of the key attributes, of those attributes that a thing shares with all and only its own counterparts (CP) - Definition counterpart/Lewis: of something is everything that has (singular, because coextensive) the essential attribute of it - that does not mean that the attribute is the essence of the counterpart! - It does not even have to be an essential attribute of the counterpart - (s) Essence not transitive about worlds.
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V 247
Event/Essence: events have their essence built in: the necessary conditions for their occurrence.
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V 248
E.g. An event is necessarily a change if it is necessary that the event happens in the region when something changes throughout the region - E.g. An event is necessarily a death if it is necessary that the event only occurs in the region when something dies everywhere in the region, and not everywhere in a larger region.
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V 254
Event/Essence/Lewis: E.g. Nero singing while Rome burns. - Fire accidental. - But the singing is necessarily singing. - Conclusion: we cannot find the the essential properties of events through description - they may be accidental.
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V 264
Event/Essence/Lewis: There are no events that significantly involve Socrates. - I.e. which cannot happen in a region that does not contain Socrates or a counterpart of him. - ((s) Counterpart is the solution to the problem: the death of Socrates? - Lewis: counterpart relation: is more of an extrinsic matter. - counterparts are held together by similarity. - It is usually extrinsic. - LewisVsKripke: origin and role are not intrinsical.
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V 265
E.g. Death of Socrates: Being involved in the same region is not sufficient (goblins might also be that), because the counterpart relation is not the same for parts as for the whole - a counterpart of a part is not necessarily a counterpart! - ((s) in a different possible world I could be missing an arm).
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V 266
Lewis: E.g. Death of Socrates: assuming we have a death which involves a particular segment of individuals (whether accidental or essential, if we have one that involves it accidentally, then we have another one that it involves it essentially) - Assuming the segment is in fact part of Socrates, namely accidental. Not all counterparts are parts. - ((s) Socrates might as well have died later). - So now we finally have Socrates involved in his own death in a way that we have bypassed unseemly extrinsic events.
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Schwarz I 54
Possible world/Essential qualities/Kripke/Schwarz: origin is an essential property. - Also biological species.
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Schwarz I 227
Essence/Possibility/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: thesis: what possibilities there are is not contingent. - You can also not acquire any information about it. - Lewis: for every way how things may be, there must be a possible world - (s) will S5 always automatically apply to them?.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-19
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