Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Vagueness, philosophy: there are descriptions of objects or situations that are necessarily not fully determined. For example, the indication whether a given hue is still red or already orange is not always decidable. It is a property of the language to provide vague predicates. Whether vagueness is a property of the world is controversial. See also sorites, indeterminacy, under-determinateness, intensification, penumbra._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Vagueness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 226 Vagueness: can be useful - it leaves the truth value untouched. I 84 It is known that color words are grouped very differently in different languages, the color boundaries are vague in both languages. "Red" is a good translation of a native sentence, for example, if it resembles vagueness. >Language acquisition. I 156 ff Learning/vagueness/Quine: Vagueness plays an important role in the first learning phase. Distribution around central norm values. "More or less red" can be more fundamental for learning than the "red norm". I 228f Ambiguity/Quine: is something other than vagueness. >Ambiguity. I 334 Vagueness, ambiguity and transience of the designation are characteristics of linguistic expressions and do not extend to the designated objects. - - - VII (b) 27 Replaceability/Leibniz: replaceability salva seritate should provide synonymy. Quine: this does not save the synonyms conceived in this way from vagueness. - - - II 48 Bivalence/Divalence/Vagueness/Quine: I do not care very much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. Besides the undecidable facts of the realists regarding physical objects, the vagueness of the terms has to be taken into account. Also here there are problems caused by bivalence: Sorites: For example, if after removing a single grain from a heap of sand, there is always a heap left, then complete induction is used to ensure that a heap remains after removing all the grains. II 128ff Insufficient individuation has nothing to do with vagueness of demarcation. We are used to tolerating the vagueness of boundaries. (>Fine structure of a table). What the vagueness of boundaries on physical objects boils down to is that there are almost identical objects that are almost the same circumference and only differ in the inclusion or exclusion of several peripheral molecules. Any of these almost circumferential objects could serve as the table, without anyone being smarter about it. That is the vagueness of the table. - - - VI 24/25 Science/verification/Quine: much of science is shielded by excuses such as vagueness from unreal conditional sentences or dispositions from simple tests of experience. >Verification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |