Formalism/Proxy/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or a sign of something. Then this is what they represent, their meaning. Wittgenstein: false alternative. - E.g. Pieces: represented nothing. Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something. ((s) use is more than mere blackening and less than representation of an object - Wittgenstein: Formalism is not entirely unjustified.
Hintikka I 52
Terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Tractatus: thing: particular, name, linguistic proxy for particulars. (Very suitable proxy).
I 138 et seqq.
Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences.
Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic proxies.
Thinking/Substitute/Wittgenstein: is there not a proxy "in mind"? This thought is errorneous and causes a lot of damage; it divides thinking into two separate parts, the organic (essential) and the non-organic.
There is no mental process that cannot be symbolized. We are only interested in what can be symbolized.
Thinking/Thought/Wittgenstein: the thought is autonomous. Example "Schmidt is sitting on the bench". You would think three things are in his mind, as a proxy. There's something true about that, too. But what guarantee would we have that they represent anything at all? What is given in my thinking is present and essential! Everything else (which is represented) is irrelevant.
That is why thinking is complete in itself. And what is not given in my thinking cannot be essential for it! The thought does not point beyond itself, we believe that only because of the way in which we use symbols.
Meaning/Wittgenstein: is defined within the language by explanations.
The expression "the meaning of" is misleading, as it suggests "proxy for" or "substitute"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989