Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Quidditism, philosophy: comprises the thesis that the relationship between the roles of physical objects such as inertia and the properties such as mass, which realize inertia, is contingent. In other words, quidditism is about the thesis that there is no necessary connection between properties. (See D. T. Locke, Quidditism, 2009). See also causal roles, causal explanation, causality, explanation, best explanation.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Schw I 104
Quidditism/Black: Thesis: fundamental properties exist regardless of their causal-nomological role. Nomological-structural identical worlds may differ in what role charge 1 plays in them - if quidditism was wrong, laws of nature would be absolutely necessary - Lewis: but they could be different> haecceitism.
Sw I 226
Quidditism/Black: Thesis: physics describes only relations of things and properties and do not explain the intrinsic nature. -> Panpsychism: thesis, that nature is mental.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Quidditism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-22