Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Predication, philosophy: predication is the attribution of a property to an object. See also attribution.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 52
Two Names Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false alignment of predication and denotation (naming): as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat". - E.g. (s) "the person-who-stabbed-Caesar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus" - Geach: in addition, a binding member would be needed - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" shall be true because this thing is named. - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher".
I 70
Contradictory predications like "Fa" and "~Fa" refer to a common subject - there are no "contradictory subjects".
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-clause or in an or-clause, a term P can be predicated from a thing without naming the thing with "P" - E.g. "If that what the police officer has said, is true, then he was driving faster than 60". This does not name the police officer's sentence as true. - (> Conditional) - Predication/naming: century-old error: the predicate is predicated from the thing - Frege: Difference assertion/predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicated in a non-asserting sub-clause (subset) - therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa.
I 290
Predication/Geach: wrong: to read "SiP" as "a thing is a predicate" - (origin: "Two-Names-Theory, Aristotle) a subject cannot be negated - sentence negation: negation of the predicate.
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Names-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to the named with relation of the predicate to what it is stated from -> false doctrine of the Trinity.
I 295
Prediction/Theology/Thomas Aquinas: the expression after "as" is predicative: e.g., "Christ inasmuch as he is human" - distinction between subject and predicate, VsTwo-Name-Theory - false: Two-Name-Theory: E.g.: "His godly nature is immortal, his human nature is mortal" Aquinas: can distinguish "Christ as human is God": false - Two-name-theory: cannot do this because "human" and "God" are merely two names. - VsOckham: E.g. for him, "humanitas" is not more than "majesty": a disguised name for a concrete thing. - Problem: for Ockham, humanity is no longer human when viewed as the Son of God. - VsOckham: because it is not genuinely abstract, e.g. the mayor's office becomes the mayor.
I 300
Predication/Thomas Aquinas/Geach: Subject: refers to a suppositum (an "accepted") predicate: refers to a form or nature. - Predication: unequal naming: E.g. "The Prime Minister became Prime Minister" - Nonsense: "which Prime Minister?".

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-24