Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Chalmers I 63
Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979):
Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: e.g. "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. in relation to the actual world (the world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980). It may turn out that the reference is different. (i.e. that it was different all the time).
Definition "deep need"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations.
These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds.
Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary, > secondary intension/Chalmers).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22