Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 52
Naming/Denotation/Two-Name Theory/ZNT/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat" - E.g. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Additionally, Geach would use a link - Two-name theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named - Vs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher".
I 153f
Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise) - E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline" - on the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - present is not necessary. - Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? - Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. - Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." - GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. - Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. - Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her" - Similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it.
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". - E.g.: "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional) - predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. - Frege: Difference assertion/Predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). - Therefore, naming by predication must be explained, not vice versa.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26