|Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: assertibility instead of truth: because of probability - however assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus sincerity condition - Adams: the other way around: truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent - "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent - Lewis pro - (>Adams conditional) - LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls indicative conditional what Lewis calls a probability conditional - Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth - AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability - solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws - then indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions - i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not truth functional) - ((S)> Adams conditional?).
Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: it should correspond the subjective probability - (Lewis pro Grice) - "the assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true - that leads to conditional probability - from this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991