Dictionary of Arguments

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Analytic/synthetic: achieved by decomposition or by composition. In philosophy analytically true = true according to the meaning of the components - synthetic insight = substantial expansion of knowledge.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 120
Lasting sentences: meaning of the stimulus is more sparse -accordingly: synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity.
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I 339
Material implication "p impl q" not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) - "implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms.
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V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences e.g. - "A dog is an animal" oneself later. - Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. - Analyticity is as social as language. - Random first examples should not have any special status - Definition analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. - That’s bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. - Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs.
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VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity.
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VII (b) 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: limits them to subject-predicate form - reformulated: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts" - VsEssentialism: creature arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational - This is relative.
VII (b) 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried: problem: based on unclear synonymy.
Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent - not with e.g. bachelor/unmarried.
VII (b) 28ff
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning - A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be a unempirical dogma.
VII (b) 37
Verification theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning - then "analytically" borderline case: method does not matter - synonymous: method of refutation and confirmation are the same.
VII (b) 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement.
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VII (i) 161ff
Analyticity/Quine: approximate truth because of meaning - that says nothing about existence.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-15
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