Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 297
Panpsychism/Chalmers: if we admit a thermostat experience (flashy information state changes), then perhaps there is consciousness or conscious states everywhere? Perhaps in a stone? But a stone does not correspond to a thermostat. We can say that the stone contains subsystems that are conscious.
I 298
Consciousness/Chalmers: if we assume that very simple systems have very simple phenomenology, it makes it less unintelligible to accept consciousness as a unified property of the universe.
Experience/Chalmers: can experiences arise in a static state? Intuitively, it seems necessary that a change of state is necessary for a system to have an experience.
Proto-phanomenal: we can call the "experiences" of a thermostat proto-phenomenal.
>Proto-phenomenal.
I 299
Panpsychism/Chalmers: The reason why I am not referring to my thesis as panpsychism is that it is misleadingly suggested that proto-phanomenal experiences are somehow basic and complex experiences are composed of them, which I do not believe. But I call my thesis of naturalistic dualism a variant of panpsychism.
>Dualism, >Dualism/Chalmers, >Property dualism, cf. >Monism.