Cavell I 37
Norman Malcolm: Thesis: Attempt to reject the idea of a private pain, according to which it is impossible for two people to have the same pain.
Malcolm: Let us first agree that "equal" here means equality of description, and not "equality of place", so we see that it is very possible to share the same pain.
CavellVsMalcolm: the argument is questionable, the skeptic can rightly assume here that our knowledge of the other is not enough.
Knowledge is more than the presence of criteria.
Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same!
E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two.
Why not in pain then? Because "equals" here means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not!
Why should the skeptics not have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined?
For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors the question is also answered: it is one! But in pain?
Pain/Malcolm: Danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas.
It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places.
Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors are different from headaches.
But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, they are not identical!