Bubner I 118
Knowledge/Aristotle: the knowledge available outside of scientific evidence establishes the connection of science theory with general ontology.
>
Ontology/Aristotle, >
Science/Aristotle.
Bubner I 119
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and Epagogé (nowadays controversial whether to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
>
Practical Syllogism/Aristotle.
Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantifications and individual cases.
In Aristotle, no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
>
Prior knowledge/Today's discussion.
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
Bubner I 149
Knowledge/Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: to know truly and definitively requires the certainty that the knowledge has come to its full extent, by even recognizing that which explains already existing knowledge. Such certainty cannot be determined from outside, it must be found in knowledge itself.
>
Metaphysics/Aristotle.
- - -
Gadamer I 317
Knowledge/Aristotle/Gadamer: Human morality is essentially different from nature in that it is not simply the result of abilities or powers, but that the human only becomes such a being through what he or she does and how he or she behaves,
Gadamer I 318
i.e. but: being so, behaves in a certain way. How can there be a theoretical knowledge of the moral being of humans (...) and what role does knowledge (i.e. "logos") play for the moral being of humans (...)?
General/special: If the good for humans meets in each case in the concreteness of the practical situation in which he or she finds him- or herself, then moral knowledge must do just that, as it were to look at the concrete situation and see what it demands of that person. In other words, the actor must see the concrete situation in the light of what is generally demanded of him or her. But this means negatively that knowledge in general, which does not know how to apply itself to the concrete situation, remains meaningless, and even threatens to obscure the concrete demands that emanate from the situation. This fact, which expresses the essence of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives moral relevance to the problem of method. >
Ethics/Aristotle.
Gadamer I 319
Aristotle remains a Socratic in so far as he records knowledge as an essential moment of moral being (...).
Gadamer: Moral knowledge, as described by Aristotle, is obviously not objective knowledge. The knower is not confronted with a fact which he or she only ascertains, but the person is directly affected by what he or she recognizes.
Science/Knowledge/Gadamer: That this is not the knowledge of science is clear. In this respect, the distinction that Aristotle makes between the moral knowledge of the "Phronesis" and the theoretical knowledge of the "Episteme" is simple, especially when one considers that for the Greeks, science, represented by the example of mathematics, is a knowledge of the unchangeable, a knowledge based on proof, and that therefore everyone can learn it. On the other hand: See >
Techne/Aristotle.
