Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
III 161
Def conceptual relativism/term relativity/Searle: representation systems such as vocabularies are human creations and thus arbitrary. Some philosophers believe that this is a problem for realism.
>Conceptual relativism.
---
I 15
Vocabulary/Searle: in the conflict of dualism and monism both sides are caught in a serious error. The vocabulary and assumptions of both are wrong.
>Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism.
I 20
Spirit/intentionality/materialism//Dennett/Searle: the thesis of materialism: our vocabulary of the spiritual does not actually stand for something intrinsically spiritual.
Dennett: it is merely a vocabulary suitable for predicting and explaining behaviour.
>Materialism.
I 43
Smart (1959)(1) had tried to find a "topic-neutral" vocabulary and to avoid the so-called nomological appendages.
I 443/44
SearleVsSmart: SearleVs"topic neutral": note that nobody has the impression that digestion must be described in a "topic neutral" vocabulary.
I 189
Example pain/unconscious: could there be "unconscious pain"? Searle: this is not a dispute with a factual content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact.
>Pain, >Fact.


1. J.J.Smart Sensations and Brain Processes. In: Philosophical Review. Band 68, 1959

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.