Lexicon of Arguments

 

IV 114
Meaning holism/belief/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: if, according to Lewis' thesis, belief prevails over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, the following would have to be assumed:
Def thesis of the primacy of belief/Lewis: the conditions of intentional attribution contain the conditions for belief attribution. Therefore, if the former is holistic, so must also be the latter.
Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that the semantic holism might follow from this thesis ((s) belief holism seems plausible).
IV 117
Belief holism does not lead to content holism, because content can be contradictory.
Belief/Davidson: thesis: centrality of belief: there is no propositional attitude without some beliefs.
Fodor/Lepore Vs: you can wish for this and that without believing this and that. Semantic holism is stronger: only semantically evaluable (true/false) states can be propositional attitudes.
Belief/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: there is no connection between mental images (not true/false) and semantics (true/false). Orthogonal: belief properties: strength, vitality/representation: properties are ultimately geometric, i.e. the truth conditions are completely independent of the causal role.
IV 156
Holism/Davidson: the fact that most beliefs are true implies that they are also coherent.
New: also vice versa! > Holism: New: the interpreter cannot discover that the speaker is wrong in most utterances. He/she can only interpret the sentences that are caused by events and objects of the external world.
IV 157
Beliefs/radical interpretation/Davidson: most of our beliefs are true: if true, causes ipso facto (in the light of the interpreter!).
Fodor/Lepore Vs: truth conditions for a sentence must not be identified with the currently prevailing truth conditions >Radical Interpretation.