Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
II 154
Rigidity/make rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977
(1) , 259f): normal description/logical form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in every possible world w iff the thing (unambiguous) which is F in w, is also G in W .
Rigid description/logical form: here, that is true in w iff the thing that is in the actual world F, is w in G, no matter if it is there F in w or not. - Which world is the actual one, is relative to the respective possible world.
>
Actuality , >
Cross world identity , >
Modal properties .
Solution: double indexing: two possible worlds: "The F is G" is true in w2 seen from w1, iff the thing that is F is in w1 G w2.
>
Twodimensional Semantics .
Make rigid: Makes that a sentence like "The F is G" can also stand alone.
>
Free-standing content .
Instead: truth conditions/Cresswell: if one sees the principle advantage of truth conditions over truth values in that, that the truth conditions provide the right input conditions for further embedding, then the make rigid is not so important.
>
Truth values , >
Truth conditions .
II 155
Rigid/non-rigid/belief/modal logic/Cresswell: In contrast to modal contexts, the description is interpreted as non-rigid in belief contexts.
Modal Context: is rigid.
>
Modal logic .
1. Saul A. Kripke 1977. Speker's Reference and Semantic Reference. Midwest Studies In Philosophy
Volume 2, Issue 1 p. 255-276 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00045.x