Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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I 136 ~
Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive.
>Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes.
Representation/Descartes:
1st A belief represents things.
2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism).
>Beliefs, >Realism.
Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content.
Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions.
>Jerry Fodor.
I 144ff
Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation?
>Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics.
VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head.
>Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head.

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