Lexicon of Arguments

 

IV 15
Rationality/rationality/law/Fodor/Lepore: nothing that would comply with a law of precise science will decide what is rational or irrational.
IV 117
Rationality/Fodor/Lepore: rationality restricts believe attribution: one cannot believe that p and at the same time believe that not-p, but not for content: you can have contradictory content even contradictory propositional attitudes are possible. Meaning is not rationalistically limited either: one sentence can express p and not-p at the same time. Wishes can be contradictory.
IV 130
Intentional attribution is not limited by rationality, because representations may be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic.
Fodor/LeporeVs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states.
Constitutive of belief: rationality is not at the same time p and not-p, but objects of intentional states may be contradictory. >Contradictions, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental states, >Propositional attitudes.