Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 322 ff
PhenomenalismVsSubstance, Vs "higher unity" in the object -> sense-data theory.

I 321ff
We do not have a "pure" vocabulary of sensations. We can indicate our sensations only by mentioning ordinary objects, including people.
I 322
A goalpost is permanent, while sensations are fleeting. It is a unity, while sensations are a multiplicity, so there is a tendency to say that "behind" the sensations there is a higher unity of the goalpost; important features, namely, that it is a continuing substance, a thing in itself a source of causality, an objective unity...
Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of theory but does not recognize the disease.
RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less laudable motive: he assumed that having a sensation is itself a determining of something, or that something is "revealed" in the sensation. >Sense data theory.
It seemed to follow that we can't really observe things and therefore can't find out by observation those things that we know very well about goalposts.
I 323
RyleVsPhenomenalism: The truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is also meaningless.
>Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mentalism.

RyleVsPhenomenalism: it is false to see sensation as something to explore (Vs "sense objects"). "Indirect monitoring": sensation is not describable without reference to objects.