Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 87
Nominalism/Meixner: the thesis that all entities are individuals.
I 88
These words must then be concrete sound events or concrete inscriptions for the nominalist. The word "word" in turn must not denote a type object (also called "ontological individualism").
Radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: That all entities are actual individuals.
Most radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: All entities are actual physical individuals.
Materialism/Meixner: Materialism would like to represent the most radical nominalism, but it turns out that only a restricted nominalism can be represented.
Reconstructive nominalism: thesis: all entities are individuals and the basic individuals (BI) are physical, but at the same time:
1. most individuals (including BI) are non-actual
2. all sets over BI are also individuals (honorific "physical").
Then universals can be regarded as individual-like entities.
a) Variant of Carnap: basic individuals taken as individuals.
b) David Lewis: BI on the contrary equated with maximally consistent individuals. (Sets of properties).
>Actualism, >Possibilism, >D. Lewis.
I 94
Nominalism: Thesis: There are no true-making entities.
>Universals, >Truthmakers.
Extreme nominalism: must change the language.
>Everyday language, >Ontology.