II 31
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence.
II 139
Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >
Existence, >
Existence statements, >
Facts, >
Sense.
II 167/168
Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >
Experience, >
Necessity.
The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility".
II 228
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >
Picture.
II 229
For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another.
II 235
Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense.
II 359
Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >
Logical possibility.
II 362
Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment.
- - -
IV 19
Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible.
3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >
Conceivability/Chalmers.
IV 20
3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space.
IV 20
Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected.
IV 21
So the possibility of the projected, not this itself.
The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.
IV 81
Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >
Contradictions.
- - -
VI 113
Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate.
Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense?
Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >
Use, >
Convention.
