Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 155
Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement.
170
Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity.
>Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions.
I 167f
Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge.
Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection.
David Lewis: only actions are coordinated.
BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning
I 189
Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression.
>Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle,
>Meaning/Searle.
I 191
Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning.
>Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold".
>Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein.
SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention.
Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance.
>Circumstances.