Hintikka I 106
Object/Acquaintance/Deception/Error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: Thesis: because one can be mistaken, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects ("illusion argument"). >
Deceptions.
I 335
Primary Language Games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: e.g. physiognomic language games - here doubts about certainty are useless. In primary language games, epistemological terms such as knowledge/belief/truth/error etc. do not occur. >
Language games.
I 339
Pain/Sensation/Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot be systematically mistaken in identifying my feelings. The connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical.
II 59
Sense/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: what enables us to judge the world correctly also enables us to judge it wrongly. >
Sense.
II 62
Machine/Deception/Error/Mistake/Wittgenstein: the machine itself contains nothing that can be right or wrong - it runs as it does.
II 103
Memory/Criteria/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: if you do not remember correctly, there must be another criterion besides memory. Then the memory itself is not tested. If one further asks: "how do you know?" You cannot help but say, "It seems to me."
VI 188
Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Schulte: only if error is possible we can say that we are right. Therefore, we cannot be wrong about our own pain. Therefore, however, it is pointless to talk about "absolute safety". (No criteria!). >
Criteria.
VI 189
But I can be as wrong about the contents of my bag as anyone.
VI 220/221
Error/Wittgenstein/Schulte: can one say: an error has not only a cause, but a reason? I.e. approximately, it can be classified into the correct knowledge of the one erring. (Wittgenstein, On Certainty § 74).
Only those who have further knowledge can make a mistake in the relevant field.
VII 152
Skepticism/Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Late: the words "error", "doubt", etc. were also learned by philosophers from everyday language; they were not invented for the purpose of philosophy.
VII 153
Deception/Wittgenstein/Late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything ((s) "If everything were different..." >
Skepticism/Davidson) then he uses the words in a way he would never use them in everyday life.
VII 154
Wittgenstein: For example, one cannot say that one is wrong about something in one's joy.
