Davidson II 112
SearleVsDavidson: Davidson suggests to distinguish two types of intentions:
a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action".
Intentional acts only occur when the first, causes the second.
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Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". (see below)
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Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: definition derived intentionality is a limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. E.g. a shopping list, whether written or memorized, likewise, mental pictures, something internal - these things are still an art product.
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Searle I 67
Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary.
Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality are intrinsic. The Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
I 178
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned.
>
Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >
Aspect/Searle.
I 266f
Intentional phenomena: regulating consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality only arises through interest-based descriptions here. Rules are no cause of action.
>
Rule following.
Objects of intentionality need not to exist: hope, belief, fear, wishes - there is no record of them, one just has them.
>
Object/Searle.
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II 208
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production ->
speech act. - Double level of intentionality:
a) mental state
b) level of intention.
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III 156
As-if intentionality/Searle: the as-if intentionality explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude".
>
Intentionality/Dennett.
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Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional. Derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves.
>
Speech act.
