Rorty VI 151
Major Property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself."
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless.
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Existence/Quine
I 218
Mass Term/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-1929))) - Properties: a) Is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps?
I 217
Features: are usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains.
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back to abstract objects - one can faithfully distinguished concrete objects by use of "-ness".
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Object/Quine
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun.
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Variables/Quine
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: there are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - there are only more or less important properties.
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions).
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46).
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
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General Term/Quine
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables.
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties.
II 129f
Properties: are hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things.
Properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties are identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property is identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties are not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
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Classes/Quine
Properties as last classes are every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) are interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": is prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief is de re (essential property).
Modal Logic/Quine: the entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
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de re/Quine
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.