I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (>
redundancy theory).
Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation.
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations.
Tarski: disquotation is sufficient.
Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have
nothing in common.
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate.
>
Goldbach's conjecture.
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g.
"Everything he said is true".
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
I 47 ff
Inflationism:
a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard.
b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity.
But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
---
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property. - Disquotation is enough. - "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. The content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use.
Thesis: the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative.
I 33ff
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility.
>
Assertibility.
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", >
"minimalism".
---
I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally. - Then the disquotation scheme can play no central role. -
>
Tarski-scheme, >
Disquotation.
Therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>
realism/Wright).
---
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely determined.
