Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 15
Definition/Frege: you cannot define: "The number one is a thing" because there is a definite on the one side of the equation and an indefinite article on the other.
>Equations, >Articles, >Definability.
I 78
Definition/Frege: specifying a mode of operation is not a definition.
I 99
Definition/Object/Introduction/Frege: the way in which an object was introduced is not a property of the object. >Introduction.
The definition of an object only specifies the use of a sign, it says nothing about the object. ((s) Here: introduction of an object in the speech = definition)
Introduction/Frege: after the introduction, the definition turns into a judgment about the object.
I 130
FregeVsFormalism: formalism only gives instructions for definitions, not definitions as such. >Formalism.
I 131
E.g. Number i/Frege: you have to re-explain the meaning of "sum".
FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert: it is not enough to demand only one meaning. >Foundation.
- - -
IV 100ff
Definition/Object/Frege: the definite article must be on both sides here. Defining an object only specifying the use of a sign. More interesting are definitions of properties.
IV 100ff
Indefinable/Frege: truth and identity are indefinable as simple basic concepts. Other AuthorsVs. > truth theories, > theories of meaning.
>Truth theories, >Meaning theories.