VI 392
Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: concepts could be mental particulars, i.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign.
>
Regress.
PutnamVsOckham: problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW or another sign, with REFERS.
VI 393
On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head", Putnam pro).
>
Use, >
Sign, >
Particulars, >
Reference, >
Relation.
But:
problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects" ((s) "concept": here means "way of using characters"). If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains.
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Putnam V 40ff
Concepts/Putnam: concepts cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public. They are (partially) skills, not incidents.
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I (b) 63
Cluster concept/Putnam: e.g."human" as a list of properties.
PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means".
>
Convention, >
Meaning(Intending).
- - -
I (g) 190
Concept/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts, e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? Possible worlds deliver too many objects.
PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it.
>
Ontology, >
Possible world/Kripke, >
Possible world/Lewis, >
Possible world/Putnam, >
Essentialism.
Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties.
Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted the essential characteristics to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world (e.g. a liquid other than H
20 is water). This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. We just say water should be nothing else (intention). That is simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) (Kripke ditto).
VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference (materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationships).
>
Reference, >
intrinsic, >
Materialism.
