Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Body Barthes Röttger-Denker I 35
Body/Barthes: These are the preferred places where the body writes itself: Haiku, Bunraku, also the Japanese food sequence, which abolishes the Kantian conceptions of space and time. Likewise the "Kreisleriana" by Schumann.
I 35
Text/Body: Geno-Text: the text body: the spots, scratches, splashes on the images of Cy Twombly.
I 39
Body/Barthes: according to his own words, the body becomes more and more important to him; it is the "man's word." His companions: "Roughness of the Voice," "Geno-Text," "signifiance."
I 46
Body/Barthes: The body is identical with itself, the entity that laughs at the ego.
I 48
Body/Barthes: Voice, Geno-Text E.g. Panzéras E.g. Pheno-Text: Dietrich Fischer Dieskau. Roughness of the voice: Geno singing. "The roughness is the body in the singing voice, in the writing hand, in the executive body part."
Significance/Music: Friction of music with something that is language and not the message. Music: Articulation is an enemy of "Prononciation." Panzéra's voice expresses "the truth" of language, not its functionality. Space of pleasure.
Articulation: Pheno-singing. Fisher Dieskau. Everything in the service of communication, representation, expression, what shapes the cultural values. ("Subjectivity").

Barthes I
R. Barthes
Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013


Röttger I
Gabriele Röttger-Denker
Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997
Communitarianism Freeden Gaus I 10
Communitarianism/Freeden: As a rule, though, the core of twentieth-century liberalism constituted an appeal for the release of a flow of free, vital and spontaneous activity emanating from individuals, one that would spread across the globe not through an internal rational logic but through a successful appeal to the intellects and emotions of the oppressed and underprivileged (Hobhouse, 1911(1); Freeden, 2001b: 21–2)(2). However, the otherwise strong liberal origins of that argument have been obscured because recent political philosophers have erroneously modelled liberalism as highly individualistic. One consequence is the false exclusion of ‘communitarians’ from the plural camp of liberalisms, under the impact of a philosophical dichotomy between liberals and communitarians that is not borne out by the complexity of liberal ideology (Taylor, 1989(3); Simhony and Weinstein, 2001(4)) [see also Chapter 30]. That ideology has developed strong appeals to mutual support and collective well-being at the heart of twentieth-century welfare state thinking (...).


1. Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. Liberalism. London: Williams and Norgate.
2.. Freeden, M. 2001b. ‘Twentieth-century liberal thought: development or transformation?’ In M. Evans, ed., The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 21-2
3. Taylor, C. 1989. ‘Cross-purposes: the liberal– communitarian debate’. In N. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4. Simhony, A. and D. Weinstein, eds. 2001. The New Liberalism: Reconciling Liberty and Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Compassion Nietzsche Danto III 225
Compassion/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche has (at least) two objections against compassion. 1. that the compassionate person actually suffers vicariously with someone, and is brought to the same level as the subject of compassion - which in turn makes him "sick and melancholic" (F. Nietzsche: Morgenröthe, KGW V. 1, p. 124). Danto: This is also how it is to be understood when Zarathustra says that God dies of compassion after suffering, as one should assume, from the suffering of those in whom he has empathized. To demand compassion from the strong means (in this peculiar way) to demand from them to become weak.
Christian ethics/Nietzsche: here Nietzsche observes that compassion is elevated to the "basic principle of society". For Nietzsche, it proves to be what it is: a will to negate life (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 217).
DantoVsNietzsche: this is a central discrepancy in Nietzsche's thinking: by definition, the noble person stands above his companions. In addition, he/she is healthy, powerful and full of vitality. The opposite of noble is common. Unlike the noble personality, the ordinary are sick, exhausted and weak. Consequently, the herd consists of the sick, the weak and the powerless.
---
Danto III 226
It is hardly possible to draw a more misleading conclusion, but it cannot be denied that Nietzsche has drawn it: Nietzsche: There is a surplus of miscarriages, illnesses, degenerates, infirmities, necessary sufferers in humans as in any other animal species; the successful cases are always the exception in humans as well. (above, p. 79).
Danto: correspondingly, the extraordinary human being is not only regarded as statistically deviating, but as a splendid example of his species, which stands out from a mass of miscasts and inferiority. Only if we take the lowest ones as yardsticks, can we believe otherwise. But this belief, as Nietzsche could oppose, would be anything but justified.
Danto: According to Nietzsche, the average applicant is therefore rejected because one expects to fill the position with the best person.
DantoVsNietzsche: that most people are not healthy is simply wrong. In epidemics, on the other hand, strong ones are taken away just like the weak ones.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Conservatism Quinton Gaus I 421
Conservatism/Quinton/Weinstein: According to Anthony Quinton (1993)(1), conservatism is a continuous tradition stretching back to Burke and culminating in Michael Oakeshott, whom Quinton considers the only philosophically interesting twentieth-century English conservative. For Quinton, three doctrines characterize this tradi-tion. >Society/Oakeshott.
1) (...) conservatives fear precipitous change, preferring continuity in existing political practices
and institutions.
2) (...) they are deeply sceptical about the possibilities of political knowledge, preferring the purported political wisdom accumulated in established laws, institutions and moral conventions. 3) (...) conservatives view individuals as organically constituted by the societies in which they live. Universal human nature does not exist, making systematic political theory illusory and
self-defeating (1993(1): 244-5, 252).


1. Quinton, Anthony ( 1993) ' Conservatism'. In Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 244-68.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Content Jackson Schwarz I 171
"Naturalization of content"/representation/Schwarz: the naturalization of content is, thesis: that mental representations are so far as to be clause-like, so that one can explain their content compositionally. (See Fodor 1990)(1). LewisVsFodor: fundamentally missed: only the causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if the desire for e.g. mushroom soup is beautifully composed of desire for soup and desire for mushroom. Because on the opposite it is a mushroom soup desire, if it plays exactly this causal role, no matter what it is composed of. (1994b(2), 320f)
One can equally well imagine beings who do not represent clause-like (see Armstrong 1973(3), Chap. 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996(4), chapter 10f).
Lewis's theory is also intended to be valid for these worlds, as well as to explain what determines the content.


1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays,
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136
2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Counterpart Relation Bigelow I 192
Ramified/branched Time/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we allow the time to be branched, i.e. to every past there are several futures. We should also allow such development to be possible within one. That is, two parts could have the same origin. Likewise, fusion and temporary joining together of parts. Problem: it is surprising that such parts would then have at least a temporal part in common.
Suppose we meet Jane from another part of the same possible world. Let us look at this:
Counterfactual conditional: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed.
BigelowVsLewis: according to him, that must be true.
Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us, it is clearly wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world in which Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world must contain us all and Jane, although there is no connection between us.
LewisVsVs: he would then have to assume any other connection and a corresponding counterfactual conditional: "... an ancestor or descendant of us could have met an ancestor or descendant of her," etc.
BigelowVsLewis: that is still wrong in the questionable world and less plausible than the above counterfactual conditional. This shows the fallacy of the temporal theory.
BigelowVsLewis: he is in a dilemma: either he takes the world-companions-relation as a primitive basic concept or he allows modal basic concepts.
---
I 193
Counterpart Relation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: However, Lewis still relies on a more important relation, the counter-relation: it is also not a good candidate for an unanalyzed basic concept, but nevertheless it also needs modal basic concepts. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity because it presupposes modal concepts. That is, it cannot justify modal logic.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Democracy Aristotle Höffe I 67
Democracy/Aristoteles/Höffe: Depending on the circle of citizens admitted to rule and the
Höffe I 68
scope of their authority to rule, Aristotle distinguishes five forms of democracy. In this way he tacitly introduces a comparative concept, a concept of more-or-less democracy(1). The first three forms are still bound by the law. In the fourth, extreme form, all citizens are capable of ruling, which we consider positive today. However, according to the negative side, they are allowed to exempt themselves from all legal requirements, even to commit blatant violations of the law.
Radical democracy: Because they do not aim at the common good but at their own good, radical democracy, as Mill will repeat, appears as a tyranny of the majority.(2)
Constitution: "where there is no law, there is no constitution (politeia).
Laws: (...) the law must rule the whole, but those who govern must rule the individual cases".(3)
Rule of law: Here Aristotle pleads for a core element of the modern understanding of democracy, for a constitutional state.
Since [Aristotle] (...) favours a mixed constitution that combines oligarchic with democratic elements, commits them to the common good and allows the People's Assembly to make the important decisions, Aristotle can be considered largely democratic in the modern sense of the word. ((s) But see >Inequality/Aristotle.)


1. Arist. Politika IV 4
2. IV 4, 1292a15 ff.).
3. 1292a32–34


Gaus I 314
Democracy/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle is more favourable to democracy than Plato, and in his famous 'summation' argument, which applies his favoured standard for distributing political power to men taken collectively as well as individually (Pol. Ill. I l), he even offers an 'aristocratic' justification (for which see Keyt, 1991a(1): 270—2; Waldron, 1995(2)). >Governance/Aristotle, >Constitution/Aristotle, >Tyranny/Aristotle, >Nomos/Aristotle, >Politics/Aristotle; Cf. >Family/Aristotle, >Equal rights/Aristotle.
Pol: Aristotle Politics


1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Waldron, Jeremy (1995) 'The wisdom of the multitude: some reflections on Book 3, Chapter Il of Aristotle's Politics'. Political Theory, 23: 563-84.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Distributive Justice Aristotle Gaus I 313
Distributive Justice/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: [Aristotle’s] theory of distributive justice consists in the combination of his justice-of-nature principle with the Platonic principle of proportional equality. By this theory a just constitution is one under which political power is distributed in proportion to worth, where worth is assessed according to the standard of nature - the standard of a polis with a completely natural social and political structure. Aristotle describes such a polis in Politics VII-VIII, and virtue, rather than wealth or freedom, turns out to be nature's standard (for details see Keyt, 1991a(1)). >Justice/Aristotle, >Nature/Aristotle, >Stasis/Aristotle, >Nomos/Aristotle.

1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Existence Lewis Schwarz I 30
Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there. ((s)"there are"/existence: no difference). But:

Lewis IV 24
Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is".
IV 40
Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics). This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers).

Schwarz I 20
Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables.
Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited.
Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view.
Schwarz I 30
Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(2),80f,1986e(3),212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree".
Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist.
Schwarz I 42
Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them.
Schwarz I 232
Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b(4),291). Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations. (>"Distribution").


1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press
2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell
3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431.


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Friendship Developmental Psychology Upton I 105
Friendship/Developmental psychology/Upton: Middle childhood brings clear changes in the understanding of friendship. Early childhood: here, friendships are transient in nature and are often related to the availability of the other person. A friend is defined as someone you play with or with whom you share some other activity. In middle childhood, children’s relationships still tend to be with others who are similar to themselves; this is partly because children are more likely to come into proximity because of similarities in age, socio-economic status, ethnicity, etc. However, there is also evidence that children also become increasingly similar to their friends as they interact (Hartup, 1996)(1).
Middle childhood: children begin to identify the special features of friendship that supersede mere proximity. During this period of development, children begin to recognise that friendships provide companionship, help, protection and support (Azmitia et aL, 1998)(2), are reciprocal (Selman, 1980)(3), demand trust and loyalty (Bigelow, 1977)(4) and last over time (Parker and Seal. 1996)(5).
That is not to say that friendships made in middle childhood endure for long periods. School-age children often have what have been called ‘fair-weather friends’, because friendships at this age are often unable to survive periods of conflict or disagreement (Rubin et al.. 1998)(6).
Upton I 106
Gender differences: There also appear to be gender differences in the time it takes to mend broken friendships. Azmitia et al. (1998)(2) observed that, following friendship conflict, boys would typically work it through and renew the friendship in one day, whereas girls would take about two weeks. This may be because triads are more common in the friendships of school-age girls than in those of boys, causing one member of the group to feel left out. By the end of middle childhood, friendships are becoming intimate, and are characterised by an enduring sense of trust in each other.
The ability to engage in mutual role-taking and collaborative negotiation develops throughout this period, leading to greater loyalty, trust and social support. For example, Azmitia et al. (1998)(2) found that girls’ expectations that friends would keep secrets rose from 25 per cent in eight to nine year olds, to 72 per cent in 11 to 12 year olds. However, this expectation developed slightly later in boys. Thus, the ability to form close, intimate friendships becomes increasingly important as children move towards early adolescence (Buhrmester, 1990)(7).



1. Hartup. WW (1996) The company they keep: friendships and their developmental signifi
cance. Child Development, 67: 1-13.
2. Azmitia, M, Kamprath, N and Linnet, J (1998) Intimacy and conflict: on the dynamics of boys’ and gir1s friendships during middle childhood and adolescence, in Meyer, L, Grenot-Scheyer, M, Harry, B, Park, H and Schwartz, I (eds) Understanding the Social Lives of Children and Youth. Baltimore, MD: PH Brookes.
3. Selman, RL (1980) The Growth of Interpersonal Understanding. New York: Academic Press.
4. Bigelow, BJ (1977) Children’s friendship expectations: a cognitive-developmental study.
Child Development, 48: 246-53.
5. Parker, JG and Seal, J (1996) Forming, losing, renewing and replacing friendships: applying temporal parameters to the assessment of children’s friendship experiences. Child Development, 67(5): 2248-68.
6. Rubin, KH, Bukowski, W and Parker, JG (1998) Peer interactions, relationships, and groups,
in Eisenberg, N (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development (6th edn). New York: Wiley.
7. Buhrmester, D (1990) Intimacy of friendship, interpersonal competence, and adjustment
During preadolescence and adolescence. Child Development, 61: 1101-11.



Upton I 120
Friendship/adolescence/Developmental psychology/Upton: Friendships are (…) gradually becoming more stable during [adolescence] (Epstein, 1986)(1), although they may be disrupted by transitions such as changing class or school (Wargo Aikins et al., 2005)(2). >Peer relationships/Developmental psychology.
Upton I 121
However, high-quality friendships, which are marked by intimacy, openness and warmth, are more likely to be maintained despite such transitions (Wargo Aikins et al., 2005)(2). Indeed, there is an increased emphasis on intimacy and self-disclosure throughout adolescence (Zarbatany et al., 2000)(3), although there is some evidence to suggest that greater levels of intimacy are reported by girls than by boys (Buhrmester, 1996)(4). This increasing intimacy and self-disclosure has been suggested to be fundamentally important for the adolescent’s developing sense of self, as well as for the understanding of relationships (Parker and Gottman, 1989)(5). >Self/Developmental psychology, >Youth culture/Developmental psychology.



1. Epstein, JL (1986) Friendship selection: developmental and environmental influences, in Meuller, E and Cooper, C (eds) Process and Outcome in Peer Relationship. New York: Academic Press.
2. Wargo Aitkins, J, Bierman, K and Parker, JG (2005) Navigating the transition to junior high school: the influence of pre-transition friendship and self-system characteristics. Social Development, 14:42-60.
3. Zarbatany, L, McDougall, P and Hymel, S (2000) Gender-differentiated experience in the peer culture: links to intimacy in preadolescence. Social Development, 9(1): 6 2-79.
4. Buhrmester, D (1996) Need fulfillment, interpersonal competence, and the developmental contexts of early adolescent friendship, in Bukowski, W, Newcomb, A and Hartup, W (eds) The Company They Keep. New York: Cambridge University Press.
5. Parker, J and Gottman, 1(1989) Social and emotional development in a relational context, in Bernat, T and Ladd, G (eds) Peer Relationships in Child Development. New York: Wiley and Sons.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Governance Aristotle Gaus I 314
Governance/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: The antithesis between rulers and subjects is a major topic in the Politics. Aristotle articulates a principle tacitly assumed in most of Greek political thought - that political communities must divide into rulers and ruled (Pol. VII.14.1332b12-13). This principle of rulership is an instance of a broader Aristotelian principle applicable to all of nature - that in every unified entity there is ruler and ruled (Pol. I.5.1254a28-33). What this broader principle denies is that order ever arises spontaneously by an 'invisible hand' (as in a free economy) without some governing power. (For discussion see Miller, 1995(1): 366-73.) The difference of political rule from regal and despotic rule, the key question of the Politics introduced in its opening chapter, is part of the same topic. Political rule is rule over people who are free and
equal where each one rules and is ruled in turn (Pol. I.7.1255b20, III.6.1279a8-lO). Such rule is characteristic of democracy (Pol. VI.2.1317a40-bl 7). Aristotle is more favourable to democracy than Plato, and in his famous 'summation' argument, which applies his favoured standard for distributing political power to men taken collectively as well as individually (Pol. Ill. I l), he even offers an 'aristocratic' justification (for which see Keyt, 1991a(2): 270—2; Waldron, 1995(3)).>Constitution/Aristotle, >Tyranny/Aristotle, >Nomos/Aristotle, >Politics/Aristotle; Cf. >Family/Aristotle.

Pol: Aristotle Politics


1. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon.
2. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
3. Waldron, Jeremy (1995) 'The wisdom of the multitude: some reflections on Book 3, Chapter Il of Aristotle's Politics'. Political Theory, 23: 563-84.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Human Nature Conservatism Gaus I 134
Human Nature/Conservatism/Kekes: [Pluralism] regards some political arrangements as necessary for good lives, but it allows for a generous plurality of possible political arrangements beyond the necessary minimum. The
standard operates in the realm of moral necessity, and it leaves open what happens in the realm of moral possibility. The standard thus accommodates part of the universal values of absolutism and part of the context-dependent values of relativism. >Values/Relativism.
Absolutism prevails in the realm of moral necessity; relativism in the realm of moral possibility. >Absolutism/Kekes.
Human Nature: The source of this standard is human nature. (For a general account of the political significance of human nature for politics, see Berry, 1986(1). For the specific connection between human nature and conservatism, see Berry, 1983(2).) To understand human nature sufficiently for the purposes of this standard does not require plumbing the depths of the soul, unravelling the obscure springs of human motivation, or conducting scientific research. It does not call for any metaphysical commitment and it can be
Gaus I 135
held without subscribing to the existence of a natural law. It is enoug tor it to concentrate on n people in a commonsensical way. It will then become obvious that good lives depend on the satis-
faction of basic physiological, psychological, and social needs: for nutrition, shelter, and rest; for companionship, self-respect, and the hope for a good or better life; for the division of labour, justice, and predictability in human affairs; and so forth.
Absolutism: Society: Absolutists go beyond the minimum and think that their universal and objective standard applies all the way up to the achievement of good lives.
Relativism: Relativists deny that there is such a standard. Values/Relativism.
Pluralism: In this respect, pluralists side with relativists and oppose absolutists. Pluralists think that beyond the minimum level there is a plurality of values, of ways of ranking them, and of good lives that embody these values and rankings. According to pluralists, then, the political arrangements of a society ought to protect the minimum requirements of good lives and
ought to foster a plurality of good lives beyond the minimum. >Values/Pluralism, >Conserevatism/Kekes.


1. Berry, Christopher J. (1986) Human Nature. London: Macmillan.
2. Berry, Christopher J. (1983) 'Conservatism and human nature'. In Ian Forbes and Steve Smith, eds, Politics and Human Nature. London: Pinter.


Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice Aristotle Höffe I 55
Justice/Aristoteles/Höffe: Characteristic of justice is the property of being
Höffe I 56
owed. Aristotle hints at it where he speaks of the allotrion agathon, of the "foreign good", a good to which the other has a claim. In doing so, he anticipates the modern separation of law and morality: Justice differs from generosity and magnanimity in that it alone is owed and only in it may the coercive law intervene. Sub-areas within justice: According to the subject area, he distinguishes justice in so far as it constitutes the entire virtue that
"general justice" (iustitia generalis), by the
"special justice" (iustitia particularis). This deals with external goods such as offices and dignity, income or money and health or security.
Social goods: For these "basic social goods" Aristotle, in contrast to the modern welfare state, did not envisage any redistribution.
In contrast to Plato(1), both [forms of justice] are directed only at others, not also at themselves. For an injustice against oneself can only be spoken of in a metaphorical sense.


1 Plato, Nomoi, I 631c-d



Gaus I 313
Justice/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's account of justice and injustice is one expression of his naturalism. The prime justificatory principle in the Politics is that everything within the sphere of social conduct that is (un)natural is (unjust (Pol. I.3.1253b20-3, 5.1254al 7-20, 1255a1-3, 10.1258a40-b2; III.16.1287a8-18, 17.1287b37-9; VII.3.1325b7-lO, 9.1329a13-17). >Nature/Aristotle.
Ethics: in the Ethics Aristotle distinguishes universal justice (or lawfulness) from particular justice (or fairness) and divides the latter into distributive and corrective justice (EN V .1-4). His theory of distributive justice consists in the combination of his justice-of-nature principle with the Platonic principle of proportional equality. By this theory a just constitution is one under which political power is distributed in proportion to worth, where worth is assessed according to the standard of nature - the standard of a polis with a completely natural social and political structure. Aristotle describes such a polis in Politics VII-VIII, and virtue, rather than wealth or freedom, turns out to be nature's standard (for details see Keyt, 1991a(1)). >Nature/Aristotle, >Stasis/Aristotle.

Pol: Aristotle Politics
EN: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics


1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice Antiphon the Sophist Gaus I 309
Justice/obedience/Antiphon/Keyt/Miller: [in Plato’s Republic] on Glaucon's view of justice as a necessary evil and a shackle of natural desires, no one is just willingly: people practise justice 'as something necessary, not as something good' (Rep. II.358c16-17). Gyges‘ ring: this is the point of the story of Gyges' ring, the ring that makes its possessor 'equal to a god among men' (Rep. II.360c3) by giving him the power of invisibility. Glaucon claims that the possessor of such a ring would exploit its power to satisfy his natural desires unrestrained by justice.
Antiphon: Antiphon in On Truth makes a similar point: if justice consists of obeying the laws of one's polis, 'a person would best use justice to his own advantage if he considered the laws [nomoi] important when witnesses are present, but the consequences of nature [physis] important in the absence of witnesses' (DK 44 col. l; see also Caizz, 1999)(1). >Gyges/Ancient philosophy.


1. Caizz, Fernanda Decleva (1999) 'Protagoras and Antiphon: Sophistic debates on justice'. In A. A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberalism Freeden Gaus I 9
Liberalism/Freeden: the much-trumpeted neutrality of liberalism among different conceptions of the good is both chimerical and palpably undesirable in a political society where practices have to be put into effect, unless – as some political philosophers do – one believes in the possibility as well as the desirability of a fundamental social consensus on values. >Ideology/Freeden; ((s) especially on the implications of ideologies on language). >Political Philosophy/Freeden.
Gaus I 10
As a rule, though, the core of twentieth-century liberalism constituted an appeal for the release of a flow of free, vital and spontaneous activity emanating from individuals, one that would spread across the globe not through an internal rational logic but through a successful appeal to the intellects and emotions of the oppressed and underprivileged (Hobhouse, 1911(1); Freeden, 2001b: 21–2)(2). >Communitarianism/Freeden.

1. Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. Liberalism. London: Williams and Norgate.
2.. Freeden, M. 2001b. ‘Twentieth-century liberal thought: development or transformation?’ In M. Evans, ed., The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 21-2


Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Metaphysics Bubner I 19
Metaphysics/Bubner: its climax in Hegel (after Kant's rejection) proclaimed the resumption of the ancient project. Renewal of metaphysics. Provocation: that it is not opposed to science, but as a necessary perfection.
---
I 134
Metaphysics/Heidegger: Where does it come from? (HeideggerVsMetaphysics). BubnerVsHeidegger: the question contradicts a philosophia perennis, which manages the eternal questions.
       Where does the need to deal with so obviously empty questions like those about being come from?
Metaphysics/Bubner: 1. Thesis: it was by no means an eternal companion of mankind, but has developed as a task of philosophy in the face of special experiences.
The oldest documents of philosophy, on the one hand, are so profound, on the other, so unspecific that the metaphysics label does not fit.
Metaphysics/Ancient: first mentioned by Plato. The pre-Socratics, in his opinion, fail before the task of real understanding. So metaphysics arises.
Metaphysics/Bubner: Crisis in Descartes and Kant.
---
I 136
Skepticism/antiquity/Bubner: originally meant only accurate examination and judgment abstention (> Epoché)! Metaphysics/Bubner: as the supreme knowledge of the powers of pure reason, it cannot proceed otherwise than dogmatically.
       Thus skepticism is the natural enemy of metaphysics.
---
I 144
Metaphysics/Bubner: 3. Thesis: The Transcendental Revolution of Kant does not arise from a genius idea, but from the experience of the failure of metaphysics in its history so far. It serves the elimination of this lack and the insight into the efficiency of reason itself. ---
I 149
Metaphysics/Bubner: 4. Thesis: also the beginning of metaphysics is lead by an experience that brings the new discipline on the way. This is certainly not an experience with metaphysics, but an original experience, which involves knowledge when it is in pursuit of its intention diagnosing its lacks. Thus, metaphysics realizes a primal interest of all knowledge.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Nature Aristotle Gaus I 312
Nature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras: >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth.
Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist.
Gaus I 313
Nature makes its first appearance in three basic theorems that stand as the portal to the Politics: (1) the polis exists by nature, (2) man is by nature a political animal, and (3) the polis is prior by nature to the individual (Pol. 1.2). These statements are referred to as theorems because they are not simply asserted but argued for.
Problems: nothing concerning them or the arguments supporting them is uncontroversial. The very content of the theorems is contested, for it is unclear what 'nature' means in each of them. Aristotle distinguishes several senses of 'nature' (Phys. II.1; Metaph. V .4), the most important of which correspond to his four causes (final, formal, efficient, and material); but he usually relies on the context to indicate the intended sense of a particular occurrence of the term. It has even been suggested that 'nature' has an entirely different sense in the Politics than it has in the physical and metaphysical treatises.
Questions: what is Aristotle tacitly assuming? Are the arguments valid or invalid? How plausible are his premises? The tenability of Aristotle's naturalism depends upon the answer to these questions. (For the controversy see Ambler, 1985(1); Keyt, 1991b(2); Depew, 1995(3);
Miller, 1995(4): 27-66; and Saunders, 1995(5): 59-71.)
Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and
nomos. >Nomos/Aristotle.

Phys.: Aristotle Physics
Pol: Aristotle Politics
Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics

1. Ambler, Wayne (1985) 'Aristotle's understanding of the naturalness of the city'. Review of Politics, 47: 163—85.
2. Keyt, David (1991b) 'Three basic theorems in Aristotle's Politics'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
3. Depew, David J. (1995) 'Humans and other political animals in Aristotle's History of Animals'. Phronesis, 40: 159-81.
4. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon.
5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and 11. Oxford: Clarendon.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Necessity Jackson Schwarz I 226
A posteriori NotwendigkeitenJackson /Schwarz: folgen a priori aus kontingenten Wahrheiten über die aktuelle Situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). ---
Stalnaker I 18
Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality.
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context.
---
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space.

1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Neoteny Gould I 99ff
Neoteny/Gould: for example, Mickey Mouse: Gould examines the development of the drawn figure over the course of decades from generation of illustrator to generation of illustrator. Among other things, he observes eye size, head size, cranial arch. The three factors rise sharply, the eye size and cranial arch stagnate after some time.
I 106
For example, we cannot help but think of a camel as reserved, because the head is lifted in a characteristic movement so that the nose is higher than the eyes. We consider dolphins to be friendly companions, because their corners of the mouth have grown upwards.
I 107
Gould: we have evolved evolutionary by maintaining the original youthful features of our ancestors into adulthood. For example, the brain grows much more slowly after birth than the jaw. However, this characteristic is much stronger in chimpanzees than in us. That is why we also retain youthful features as adults. Some characters from Disney are markedly grown-up: not only bad guys, but also Goofy.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Nomos Aristotle Gadamer I 435
Nomos/Convention/Aristotle/Gadamer: The agreement on the linguistic use of sounds and signs is only one expression of that fundamental agreement on what is considered good and right. Cf. >Language and Thought/Aristotle. Now, it is true that the Greeks liked to understand what is considered good and right, that is, what they called the nomoi, as the statute and achievement of divine men.
Gadamer I 436
But for Aristotle this origin of the Nomos also characterizes more its validity than its actual creation. This is not to say that Aristotle no longer recognizes the religious tradition, but rather that this, like any question of origin, is for him a way to recognize being and being valid. The agreement of which Aristotle speaks with regard to language thus characterizes the mode of being of language and says nothing about its origin. Concepts/Aristotle: This can also be proved by the memory of the epagoge analysis,(1) where Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. We can now see that he is thus taking into account the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. >Concepts/Aristotle.


1. An. Post. B 19.


Gaus I 313
Nomos/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and nomos. Nomos: Nomos (law) is 'a kind of order' in that it organizes human conduct through its commands
and prohibitions (Pol. V 11.4.1326a29—30). The legal is a product of human reason (legislative
science) and is thus opposed to the 'natural' in the sense of what has a natural efficient cause (see EN V .7.1134b18-1135a4). But Aristotle implies that law can (and should) be 'natural' in the sense of having a natural final cause, that is, of promoting natural human ends (see Pol. I.2.1253a29-39). It is only in the Rhetoric that Aristotle explicitly discusses natural law (I.10.1368b7-9, 13.1373b2-18,
and 15.1375a25-b26). How this discussion relates to his discussion of natural justice in the Ethics and Politics is unclear, and this has generated controversy over whether Aristotle is 'the father of natural law' (for the controversy see: Shellens, 1959(1); Miller, 1991(2); Burns, 1998(3)). >Coercion/Aristotle; cf. >Persuasion/Aristotle, >Nature/Aristotle, >Natural laws/Aristotle, >Natural laws.

Pol: Aristotle Politics
EN: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics


1. Shellens, M. Salomon (1959) 'Aristotle on natural law'. Natural Law Forum, 4: 72-100.
2. Miller, Fred D. (1991) 'Aristotle on natural law and justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds,
A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
3. Burns, Tony (1998) 'Aristotle and natural law'. History of Political Thought, 19: 142-66.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Papal Power William of Ockham Gaus I 345
Papal power/fullness of power/Ockham/Kilcullen: Ockham (see McGrade, 1974(1); Knysh, 1996(2)) disagreed with Marsilius at many points, though he seems to have taken over from him the idea that the doctrine of fullness of power (or a certain version of it) was the root of much of the trouble in the Church. Ockham's earliest political writing was the Work of Ninety Days (c. 1332), in which he defends the Franciscan theory of voluntary poverty as a religious ideal against Pope John XXII's thesis that no one can justly consume without owning (William of Ockham, 2001(3)).
Gaus I 346
Fullness of power: In his Contra benedictum (c. 1335) Ockham began his preoccupation with the Marsilian theme of fullness of power, which he continued in other works written in the later part of his life. William of OckhamVsMarsilius: Ockham rejects two versions of the doctrine of fullness of power.
A) He denies that the pope has power from Christ to do whatever is not contrary to divine or natural law: against this he argues that a pope must respect not only rights and liberties under natural law, but also rights and liberties existing under human law, including those conferred on rulers by the law of nations and the civil law and custom, and that he must refrain from imposing excessive burdens (1992(4): 23-4, 51-8).*
B) He also rejects a weaker version of the doctrine of fullness of power, according to which the pope has all power necessary to secure the good government of the Christian people. Against this he maintains that securing good government in temporal matters is the concern of the laity, not of the clergy (1974(1): 70—1). However, there is some sense in which Ockham agrees that the pope has fullness of power: in spiritual matters (i.e. matters relating to eternal salvation and peculiar to the Christian religion) that are of necessity (not just useful), the pope regularly has full authority over believers (not unbelievers); in temporal matters he regularly has no authority, but on occasion, in a situation of necessity, the pope may do, even in temporal matters, whatever is necessary if it is not being done by whoever is normally responsible to do it (1992: 62-3; Kilcullen, 1999(5): 313-14). (Note the distinction between what is regularly or ordinarily true and what is true on occasion or extraordinarily; see Bayley, 1949(6).)
OckhamVsMarsilius: If Marsilius was the first exponent of the doctrine, later held by many others, notably Hobbes, that in any well-ordered community there must be a single locus of coercive power, Ockham was its first opponent. Ockham argues, as Locke would argue later, that if the community were subjected to one supreme judge in every case, then the supreme judge could do wrong with impunity. To prevent tyranny, it must on occasion be possible for the regularly supreme judge to be coerced by others. At the same time, it does no harm if there are some (for example pope and clergy, or cities or princes) who are regularly exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme judge provided they can be coerced on occasion, and it does no harm if there are some who have coercive power that they have not received from the supreme judge — again, provided they can be coerced when they do wrong.
Secular and spiritual power/Ockham: An emperor coercing a pope for temporal wrongdoing would be exercising his ordinary power, whereas a pope coercing an emperor for temporal wrongdoing would be acting extraordinarily (William of Ockham, 1995(7): 310-31)

*As Tierney points out (1997(8): 1 19—20), Ockham did not address the distinction between the subjective sense and other senses of 'right', but like many of his contemporaries he sometimes used the term in its subjective sense (the rights of a person), without confusion with other senses. John of Paris does not use the term, but he uses the concept (1971(9): 102, 213), also to say that the pope must respect the rights of lay people.


1. McGrade, Arthur Stephen (1974) The Political Thought of William of Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Knysh, George (1996) Political Ockhamism. Winmpeg: WCU Council of Learned Societies.
3. William of Ockham (2001) Work of Ninety Days, trans. John Kilcullen and John Scott. Lewiston: Mellen.
4. William of Ockham (1992) A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government Usurped by Some Who Are Called Highest Pontiffs, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Kilcullen, John (1999) 'The political writings'. In Paul Vincent Spade, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Bayley, C. C. (1949) 'Pivotal concepts in the political philosophy of William of Ockham'. Journal of the History ofldeas, 10: 199-218.
7. William of Ockham (1995) A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. and trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Tierney, Brian (1997) The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Chumh Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars.
9. John of Paris (1971) On Royal and Papal Power, trans. John Watt. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.

Kilcullen, John 2004. „Medieval Politial Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Philosopher King Popper Gaus I 311
Philosopher King/Popper/Keyt/Miller: Plato's advocacy of intellectual aristocracy and caustic criticism of democracy were vigorously attacked in Popper (1971)(1), the most provocative book published on Plato in the twentieth century. Though the intense controversy that erupted when the book was originally published in 1945 has abated, the issue is by no means dead. Monoson (2000)(2), for example, disputes the canonical view of Plato as virulent antidemocrat. The controversy turns to some extent on one's interpretation of Plato's utopianism. Is the ideally just polis in Plato's view a revolutionary goal, a guide for reform, a standard for evaluating existing constitutions, or something else entirely? A case can be made for each of these alternatives. The fact that the standard for being a true philosopher is set so high that even Socrates, by his own admission (Rep. VI.506b2-e5), fails to qualify strongly suggests that the ideal polis is not intended as an attainable ideal. Literature: (New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964(3); Annas, 1981(4); White, 1979(5); and Reeve, 1988(6). Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999(7): vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b(8); and Höffe, 1997(9).)

1. Popper, Karl Raimund (1971) The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), 5th rev. edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. Monoson, S. Sara (2000) Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of
Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's.
4. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon.
5. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett.
6. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
7. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
9. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie.


Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Plato Political Philosophy Gaus I 309
Plato/Political philosophy/Keyt/Miller: after 2,400 years there is still no settled interpretive strategy for reading Plato. Since he writes dialogues rather than treatises, the extent to which his characters speak for their author is bound to remain problematic. The major divide is between interpreters who respect Platonic anonymity and those who do not (see D.L. III.50-1). A. Plato as anonymous author:
[These interpreters of Plato] are impressed by the literary 'distancing' that Plato creates between himself and his readers. (The ideas attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, for example, are thrice removed from Plato: they are expressed by Socrates, whose speeches are read in turn by Euclides, the narrator of the dialogue.)
Characterology: Interpreters who take such distancing seriously might be called characterologists' since they hold that the characters in the dialogues are literary characters who speak for themselves, not for Plato. Characterologists take the dialogues to be 'sceptical', or aporetic, rather than 'dogmatic', or doctrinal, and emphasize their dramatic and literary elements.
Leo Strauss: Thus, Leo Strauss, a particularly fervent characterologist, claims that the dialogues must be read as dramas: 'We cannot,' he says, 'ascribe to Plato any utterance of any of his characters without having taken great precautions' (1964(1): 59) (...) .
B. Platonic persons as speaking for themselves:
The opposing group of interpreters suppose that in each dialogue Plato has an identifiable spokesman: Socrates in the Gorgias and the Republic, the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman, and the Athenian Stranger in the Laws (D.L. III.52). Such interpreters fall into three camps
(1) Unitarians suppose that Plato's spokesmen present a consistent doctrine in all four dialogues.
(2) Developmentalists believe that the doctrine expressed by Plato's spokesmen evolves from
one dialogue to the next. They believe, of course, that the order of composition of our four dialogues can be established, the order usually favoured being, from earliest to latest, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman, Laws.
(3) Particularists interpret each dialogue on its own. Though they allow that there may be thematic links among the four dialogues,
Gaus I 310
they do not worry overly much about the relation of one dialogue in the group to the others. Griswold (1988)(2) and Smith (1998(3): vol. I) are two useful collections of essays on interpretive strategies, and Tarrant (2000)(4) is a major new work on Platonic interpretation. Dialogues:
Nomoi: in the Laws the Athenian Stranger enumerates seven claims to rule - the claim of the wellborn to rule the base-born, the strong to rule the weak, and so forth - and concludes that the greatest claim of all is that of the wise to rule the ignorant (Laws III.690a-d). This conclusion is the animating idea of the four political dialogues.
Gorgias: in the Gorgias Socrates maintains that true statesmanship (politiké) differs from public speaking (rhetoriké) in being an art (techné) rather than an empirical knack (empeiria) - where an art, unlike an empirical knack, has a rational principle (logos) and can give the cause (aitia) of each thing (Gorg. 465a). He argues that none of the men reputed to be great Athenian statesmen practised true statesmanship (Gorg. 503b-c, 517a), and claims to be himself the only true statesman in Athens (Gorg. 521d6-9).
Republic: in the Republic the role of reason and knowledge in politics is neatly encapsulated in the simile of the ship of state: just as a steersman must pay attention to sky, stars and wind if he is to be really qualified to rule a ship, so a statesman must have knowledge of the realm of Forms, a realm of incorporeal paradigms that exist beyond space and time, if he is to be really qualified to rule a polis (Rep. VI.488a7-489a6).
Politikos: in the Statesman the Eleatic Stranger asserts that the only correct constitution is the one in which the rulers possess true statesmanship, all other constitutions being better or worse imitations of this one (Plt. 293c-294a, 296e4-297a5); and in the Laws the Athenian Stranger affirms the same principle (IX.875c3-d5). (The relations among these dialogues are discussed by Owen, 1953(5); Klosko, 1986(6); Laks, 1990(7); Gill, 1995(8); Kahn, 1995(9); and Kahn, 1996(10).) >Justice/Plato.
Gaus I 311
Republic:/today’s discussion: the Republic is the most controversial work in Greek philosophy. There is no settled interpretation of the dialogue as a whole, of any of its parts, or even of its characters. Of the current controversies surrounding its political ideas the most notable concern its communism, its view of women, its hostility toward Athenian democracy, and its utopianism. Aristotle/VsPlato: Plato's rejection of private, or separate, families and of private property (at least for the rulers and warriors of his ideal polis) is usually examined through the lens of Aristotle's critique of Platonic communism in Politics II.1-5.
Literature: T. H. Irwin (1991)(11) and Robert Mayhew (1997)(12) reach opposite conclusions about the cogency of Aristotle's critique.
Feminism: Whether Plato was a feminist and whether he masculinized women are hotly debated issues, especially among feminist philosophers. Tuana (1994)(13) is a collection of diverse essays on this topic.
(New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964(14); Annas, 1981(15); White, 1979(16); and Reeve, 1988(17). Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999(18): vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b(19); and Höffe, 1997(20).)
Statesman/Politikos: (After long neglect the Statesman has recently come into the spotlight. Lane, 1998(21), is a study of its political philosophy; and Rowe, 1995(22), is an extensive collection of papers on all aspects of the dialogue.)


1. Strauss, Leo (1964) The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally.
2. Griswold, Charles L. (1988) Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. New York: Routledge.
3. Smith, Nicholas D., ed. (1998) Plato: Critical Assessments. Vol. l, General Issues of Interpetation. London: Routledge.
4. Tarrant, Harold (2000) Plato 's First Interpreters. London: Duckworth.
5. Owen, G. E. L. (1953) 'The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues'. Classical Quarterly, 3: 79-95.
6. Klosko, George (1986) The Development of Plato 's Political Theory. New York: Methuen.
7. Laks, André (1990) 'Legislation and demiurgy: on the relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws'. Classical Antiquity, 9: 209-29.
8. Gill, Christopher (1995) 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Statesman 291—303'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.
9. Kahn, Charles H. (1995) 'The place of the Statesman in Plato's later work'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.
10. Kahn, Charles H. (1996) Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Irwin, T. H. (1991) 'Aristotle's defense of private property'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
12. Mayhew, Robert (1997) Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
14. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's.
15. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon.
16. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett.
17. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
20. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie.
21. Lane, M. S. (1998) Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Rowe, C. J. (1995) Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Political Philosophy Freeden Gaus I 10
Political Philosophy/Freeden: The ends of Anglo-American political philosophy are those at the heart of the liberal tradition: the enhancing of a particular understanding of liberty as autonomy, coupled with a conviction in the possibility and necessity of individual self-development guaranteed through fundamental human rights, and a growing emphasis on equality. This bundle has been predominantly couched in the language of moral universalism; in Brian Barry’s phrase, ‘there is no distinctive liberal theory of political boundaries at the level of principle’ (2001(1): 137). These ends have not changed over time, though the preconditions for their attainment have been variously understood even with the liberal camp and promoted also by those who should go under the label of libertarians, even individualist anarchists. As a rule, though, the core of twentieth-century liberalism constituted an appeal for the release of a flow of free, vital and spontaneous activity emanating from individuals, one that would spread across the globe not through an internal rational logic but through a successful appeal to the intellects and emotions of the oppressed and underprivileged (Hobhouse, 1911(2); Freeden, 2001b(3): 21–2). >Liberalism/Freeden, >Ideology/Freeden.

1. Barry, B. 2001. Culture and Equality. Cambridge: Polity. Canovan, M. (1992) Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. Liberalism. London: Williams and Norgate.
3. Freeden, M. 2001b. ‘Twentieth-century liberal thought: development or transformation?’ In M. Evans, ed., The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 21-2


Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Politics Aristotle Bubner I 176
Politics/Aristotle: as long as man lives together with others, he cannot concentrate on the idle show, but must choose the "second best way" of the political actor.
I 179
Practice/Aristotle: must perform an ordering performance within the contingency. The objective is never given, but must be actively introduced into the practical situation.
      The possibilities for action must be structured.
Def Prohairesis/Aristotle: the selection of the most appropriate means.
Politics/Aristotle: Politics only means realizing on a large scale what every concrete process of action already performs in the small scale.
I 188
Politics/Zoon Politikon/Aristotle: this property is attributed to man because of his speech! Political institutions are to be understood from an ethics point of view.
Politics is not simply a ruling order, (VsPlato) with a good ruler like in Hobbes or Max Weber.
The ruler is not a large-scale housekeeper.
A common goal is to be investigated.
Politics/Aristotle: Starting point: village, which does not only exist due to everyday life needs.
      In the polis, the character of "self-sufficiency" replaces the elementary natural conditionality.
Objective: Eudaimonia, the "good life", in this highest of all objectives, the practice structure returns, as it were, reflexively to itself.
Problem: Contradictory towards the natural: on the one hand, the essence of practice as a goal has been politically entered into its own telos, and this legitimates talk of man as a political entity by nature.
On the other hand, the natural conditions have been overcome thanks to a self-sufficient practice.
Nothing but practice itself, no nature defines the good. This self-determination means freedom.



Gaus I 314
Politics/literature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: (After 100 years Newman, 1887-1902(1), is still the most important work on Aristotle's Politics. Two recent commentaries are the unfinished series
Schütrumpf, 1991a(2); 1991 b(3); Schütrumpf and Gehrke, 1996(4); and the four volumes of the Clarendon Aristotle Series: Saunders, 1995(5); Robinson, 1995(6); Kraut, 1997a(7); and Keyt, 1999(8).
Miller, 1995(9), and Kraut, 2002(10), are major studies of Aristotle's political philosophy. Lord, 1982(11), and Curren, 2000(12), are studies of Aristotle's views on education.
Six collections of essays should be noted: Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji, 1977(13); Patzig, 1990(14); Keyt and Miller, 1991(15); Lord, O'Connor and Bodéüs, 1991(16).
Neo-Aristotelianism: Aubenque, 1993(17); Höffe, 2001(18). Galston, 1980,(19) is an example of neo-Aristotelianism.)


1. Newman, W. L. (1887-1902) The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.
2. Schütrumpf, Eckart (1991a) Aristoteles Politik, Buch I. Berlin: Akademie.
3. Schütrumpf, Eckart (1991b) Aristoteles Politik, Bücher Il und Ill. Berlin: Akademie.
4: Schütrumpf, Eckart and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (1996) Aristoteles Politik, Bücher IV—VI. Berlin: Akademie.
5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon.
6. Robinson, Richard (1995) Aristotle Politics Books III and IV with a Supplementary Essay by David Keyt (1st edn 1962). Oxford: Clarendon.
7. Kraut, Richard (1997a) Aristotle Politics Books VII and VIII. Oxford: Clarendon.
8. Keyt, David (1999) Aristotle Politics Books V and VI. Oxford: Clarendon.
9. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon.
10. Kraut, Richard (2002) Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Lord, Carnes (1982) Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
12. Curren, Randall R. (2000) Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
13. Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji, eds (1977) Articles on Aristotle. Vol. Il, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth.
14. Patzig, Günther, ed. (1990) Aristoteles ' 'Politik ': Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
15. Keyt, David and Fred D. Miller, eds (1991) A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
16. Lord, Carnes, David K. O'Connor and Richard Bodéüs, eds (1991) Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley, CA: University of Califorma Press.
17. Aubenque, Pierre, ed. (1993) Aristote Politique: Études sur la Politique d 'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
18. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (2001) Aristoteles Politik. Berlin: Akademie.
19. Galston, William A. (1980) Justice and the Human Good. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications



Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Propositions Chalmers Schwarz I 207 (Note)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f).
Newer Terminology:
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions
Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.


1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a]
2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy
and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a]
3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a]
4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277
6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13
7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of
Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272
8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]

---
Chalmers I 64
Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. (> Two-dimensional semantics,> Kaplan's distinction >content / >character).

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Propositions Jackson Schwarz I 207 (Note)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f).
Newer Terminology:
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions
Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.


1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a]
2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy
and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a]
3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a]
4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277
6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13
7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of
Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272
8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Relativism Putnam VII 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Williams II 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards.
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I (i) 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language.
I (i) 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Slavery Aristotle Höffe I 70
Slavery/Aristotle/Höffe: Slaves working in mines and handicraft enterprises, in private households and on agricultural goods are legally even worse off than the Helots ("serfs") who are important for the economy of Sparta. Helots: Although they are excluded from land and political rights and are obliged to pay tribute to their masters, they live in a fixed place. Slaves, however, bought or captured in war, can be resold. In addition to their even lower legal status, they are not settled, i.e. they are homeless.
AristotleVsAlkidamas: Aristotle [claims] that there are people who deserve the slave status(1).
Master/Slave/Dominion/Slavery: For the relationship between master and slave is to be based on mutual advantage, that is, on justice: by nature (physei), that is, with good reason, master is he who is capable of foresighted thinking, by nature slave is he who lacks this ability, which is why he needs someone who thinks for him and, in return, has a body that is suitable for the "procurement of the necessary.(2)
Höffe I 71
Character weakness as an argument for slavery: lack of courage.(3) Höfe: [This] reminds me of a famous thought by Hegel:
Master/Slave/Hegel: According to the chapter "Master and Slave" from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the question of whether one becomes a master or a servant is not decided by the ability to think ahead, but by the willingness to fight to the death.


1. Politika I 4–7
2. I 5, 1254b22 ff
3. VII 7, 1327b27 f.


Gaus I 314
Slavery/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's treatment of slavery and its antithesis is also rooted in his naturalism. Aristotle's defence of natural slavery in Politics I.3-7 is the most notorious passage in ancient philosophy. Aristotle argues that any person whose deliberative capacity is too enfeebled to provide for his own preservation is by nature a slave and, hence, can be justly enslaved. But who are these people? Are any of them Greeks? How strong is Aristotle's argument and are its premises consistent with Aristotle's own principles (see Newman, 1887-1902(1): vol. Il, 146)? Polis/Aristotle: In Aristotle's ideal polis the farmers are slaves (Pol. VII.9.1329a26, 10.1330a25-8). Are they slaves by nature or slaves by law only? Aristotle's idea that freedom should be held out to them as a reward (Pol. VII.lO.1330a32-3) seems inconsistent with their being natural slaves (and hence in need of a master); but if they are slaves by law only, his ideal polis, supposedly a paradigm of justice, rests on a grave injustice. (For discussion of some of these issues see Charles, 1990(2) 191, 196; Smith, 1991(3).)
The idea of slavery is not exhausted by Aristotle' s much pilloried defence of natural slavery; it enters his analysis of constitutions, and runs as an undercurrent through the entire Politics. >Tyranny/Aristotle.

Pol: Aristotle Politics


1. Newman, W. L. (1887-1902) The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.
2. Charles, David (1990) 'Comments on M. Nussbaum'. In Günther Patzig, ed., Aristoteles ' 'Politik': Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
3. Smith, Nicholas D. (1991) 'Aristotle's theory of natural slavery'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle 's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Strong Artificial Intelligence Dennett Brockman I 48
Strong Artificial Intelligence/Dennett: [Weizenbaum](1) could never decide which of two theses he wanted to defend: AI is impossible! or AI is possible but evil! He wanted to argue, with John Searle and Roger Penrose, that “Strong AI” is impossible, but there are no good arguments for that conclusion Dennett: As one might expect, the defensible thesis is a hybrid: AI (Strong AI) is possible in principle but not desirable. The AI that’s practically possible is not necessarily evil - unless it is mistaken for Strong AI!
E.g. IBM’s Watson: Its victory in Jeopardy! was a genuine triumph, made possible by the formulaic restrictions of the Jeopardy! rules, but in order for it to compete, even these rules had to be revised (…).Watson is not good company, in spite of misleading ads from IBM that suggest a general conversational ability, and turning Watson into a plausibly multidimensional agent would be like turning a hand calculator into Watson. Watson could be a useful core faculty for such an agent, but more like a cerebellum or an amygdala than a mind—at best, a special-purpose subsystem that could play a big supporting role (…).
Brockman I 50
One can imagine a sort of inverted Turing Test in which the judge is on trial; until he or she can spot the weaknesses, the overstepped boundaries, the gaps in a system, no license to operate will be issued. The mental training required to achieve certification as a judge will be demanding.
Brockman I 51
We don’t need artificial conscious agents. There is a surfeit of natural conscious agents, enough to handle whatever tasks should be reserved for such special and privileged entities. We need intelligent tools. Tools do not have rights, and should not have feelings that could be hurt, or be able to respond with resentment to “abuses” rained on them by inept users.(2) Rationale/Dennett: [these agents] would not (…) share with us (..) our vulnerability or our mortality. >Robots/Dennett.


1. Weizenbaum, J. Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976
2. Joanna J. Bryson, “Robots Should Be Slaves,» in Close Engci.gement with Artificial Companions,
YorickWilks, ed. (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins, 2010), 63—74; http:/I
www.cs .bath.ac.uk/ —jjb/ftp/Bryson-Slaves-BookO9 .html; Joanna J. Bryson, “Patiency Is Not
a Virtue: AI and the Design of Ethical Systems,” https://www.cs.bath.ac.ulc/-jjb/ftp/Bryson
Patiency-AAAISS i 6.pdf [inactive].


Dennett, D. “What can we do?”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Superhuman Nietzsche Ries II 60/61
Superhuman/Nietzsche: turns the night of the darkness of God into the sun. The doctrine of the superhuman is the prerequisite for the doctrine of eternal return, because only the human who has overcome himself can want the eternal return of all who exist! The superman is the great justification of existence. Karl Löwith: Overcoming Nihilism. ---
Danto III 238
Superhuman/Nietzsche/Danto: The historical Zoroaster regarded the world as the scene of a violent conflict between the cosmic powers of good and evil. Because Nietzsche was 'beyond good and evil', he did not believe in this cosmology of Zend-Awesta. But since Nietzsche's Zarathustra was the first to mistakenly understand moral values as objective characteristics of the world, he should also be the first to correct the error and speak out in favour of the new philosophy. (F. Nietzsche: Ecce homo, KGW VI. 3, p. 236). Consequently, Nietzsche chose him as his 'son' and as the literary persona through which his philosophy should be articulated.
Zarathustra proclaimed the relativity of all values and morals, claiming that so far each people has given themselves their own tabular chart of goods according to their own living conditions.
Zarathustra: "I teach you the superhuman! The superhuman is the sense of the earth." (F. Nietzsche: Zarathustra, I, KGW VI, 1, p. 8).
---
Danto III 239
With the exception of the Zarathustra, the idea of superhumans is rarely found in Nietzsche. Not even in the Zarathustra is a more detailed description offered. Superhuman: is opposed to what Nietzsche calls the 'last human', who should and wants to be as much as possible like everyone else, and if he is happy, then only for the sake of being happy: We have invented happiness, say the last people and blink. (ibid., p. 13).
Zarathustra: opposes the notion of the alleged immutability of human nature. The human is something that must be overcome.
---
Danto III 240
Danto: Nietzsche's sister, ((s) Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche) assured Hitler that he was what her brother had in mind as a superhuman. ---
Danto III 241
Superhuman/Nietzsche: it is pointless to look for examples in the past. ---
Danto III 242
Danto: his hints say nothing else but that we should control our affective as well as our intellectual life and not deny one thing for the sake of the other, and that we should not be petty and 'merely' human. It is not without irony that Nietzsche proves least originality where he was most influential. Superhuman/Nietzsche/Danto: is not the blonde giant who dominates his inferior companions. He is merely a joyful, innocent and unbound human being who has his instinctive, not overwhelming instincts in his power. In addition, from Nietzsche can seldomly be heard concrete words. When he writes in Ecce homo, he would rather be found in Cesare Borgia than in Parsifal (F. Nietzsche: Ecce homo, KGW VI. 3, p. 298), then he does not say that Cesare Borgia was a superhuman. There is also something of Nietzsche's critique of Wagner (NietzscheVsWagner).
---
Danto III 243
Superhuman/Darwinismus/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche seems to have believed that the ideal of superhumanity is not achieved or realized by itself, through the natural course of events. In this respect, his doctrine is anything but Darwinian.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Time Bigelow I 192
Branched Time/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we allow the time to be branched, i. e. there are several futures for each past. We should also allow something like this to be possible for development within one. That is, two parts could have the same origin. Also fusion and temporary joining of parts. Problem: it is surprising that such parts would have to have at least one temporal part in common.
For example, suppose we meet Jane from another part of the same possible world. Let's consider the
Counterfactual conditional: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed.
BigelowVsLewis: according to him it must be true
Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us it is obviously wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world in which Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world must then contain all Janes and us, even though there is no connection between us.
LewisVsVs: he would then have to accept any other connection and corresponding counterfactual conditional: "... an ancestor or descendant of ours could have met an ancestor or descendant of her" etc.
BigelowVsLewis: this is still wrong in the world in question and less plausible than the above mentioned counterfactual conditional. This shows the falseness of temporal theory.
BigelowVsLewis: he is in a dilemma: either he takes the world companion relation as a primitive basic concept or he allows modal basic concepts.
---
I 193
Counterpart relation/GR/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis still counts on a more important relation, the counterpart relation: it is not a good candidate either for an unanalysed basic concept, and yet it also needs modal basic terms. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity because it requires modal concepts. This means that it cannot justify the modal logic.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr. VII 435
"Companions in guilt"-Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). ((s) "Companions in guilt"-Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend.
Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties? >Irreducibility.
PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question.
Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago,
VII 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if >moral realism has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains moral realist): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman)
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Counterpart Theory Bigelow Vs Counterpart Theory I 168
VsCounterpart theory/cth/Bigelow/Pargetter: can also be avoided differently. By conceiving properties as relations. Because properties are subject to change, we can consider them as a relation between an individual and a point in time. I 193 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity, because it presupposes modal concepts. That means it cannot justify modal logic. I 195 Counterpart theory/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his cth has two components that must fulfil the counterparts (CP): 1) sufficient similarity with an original in the actual world, i.e. there is a "threshold" value. 2) the world companions have to resemble the actual thing at least in the same way as the cp. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory: Problem: the threshold value again conatains presupposed modal concepts ((s) option to deviate from the real world). Ad 2) That excludes options that we do not want to exclude.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Davidson, D. Lewis Vs Davidson, D. Schwarz I 176
Wide content/xxternalism/Davidson/Schwarz: externalist theories often imply that humans with no proper relations to external objects, e.g. Davidson's "swampman" (1987)(1), have no wishes or opinions, even though they are built the same way like we are, they can converse with us, and their actions can be rationally explained by us. LewisVsDavidson: this seems unbelievable. (1994b(2), 315).
Cf. >Narrow content, >externalism, >internalism.


1. D. Davidson [1987]: “Knowing One’s Own Mind". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–458
2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Fodor, J. Lewis Vs Fodor, J. Block I 215
Pain/Lewis (VsFodor) can be analytically understood as a condition with a certain >causal role. (>Functionalism). Functionally uncharacterized condition, not a functional state. For example, a functionally uncharacterized brain state. "Pain" can then pick out a neurophysiological state. So he is committed to the assertion that to have pain = the state of this certain causal role.


Schwarz I 171
"Naturalization of the content"//Representation/Schwarz: Thesis: Mental representations are insofar alike sentences that their content can be explained by compositionality. (cf. Fodor 1990(1)). LewisVsFodor: principally misguided: only causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if, e.g. the wish to eat mushroom soup, is the beautiful addition of the wish for soup and the wish for mushroom. Because if it is reversely a wish for mushroom soup if the wish plays the exact causal role, regardless of how the wish is constituted. (1994b(2),320f)
We can imagine creatures which do not represent like sentences. (vcf. Armstrong 1973(3), chap 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996(4), chap. 10f).
Lewis' theory shall also be valid for this possible word, and shall also explain what determines the content.


1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays,
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136
2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Harman, G. Putnam Vs Harman, G. Harman II 421
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world.
Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world.
Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues.
PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions:
1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented)
2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic).
Harmans II 428
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as >consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
Harman II 434
Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance.
Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of ​​mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation".
Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd.
Harman II 435
Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago,
Harman II 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman).
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism.
Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order.
Harman II 437
PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*?
Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words.
David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ...

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Kripke, S. A. Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. V 251/252
Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description.
Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent).
What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world).
You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event.
1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r".
2. partly by cause or effect
3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check
4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above).
5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later
6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted.
7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls.
8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army.
V 253
Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke):
Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth.
Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement.
Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow.

Schwarz I 55
Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it?
Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa:
Schwarz I 56
For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay.
Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for
Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world.
Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246)
I 57
KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42).
The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world?
Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence.
Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions.
Schwarz I 223
Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily.
Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22).
((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless.
Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light.
If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out.
This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world.
I 224
Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f)
I 225
A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties.
A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation,
Schwarz I 226
which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2)


1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65:
113–126.
2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193
7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342
10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D. Bigelow Vs Lewis, D. I 91
Perfectly natural property/PNP/BigelowVsLewis: even that is black magic, if such classes are compared with heterogeneous classes; our theory of universals avoids it.
I 192
Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/BigelowVsLewis: Problem: it is surprising that such parts would then at least have to have a temporal part together. (see above) E.g. assuming we meet Jane from a different part of the same possible world Let’s consider the counterfactual conditional/Co.co.: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed. BigelowVsLewis: according to him, this must be true Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us, it is clearly wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world where Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world would have to contain all of us and Jane, even though there is no connection between us.
I 197
Representation/Bigelow VsLewis: E.g. assuming there are twins in the real world (actual world), Dum and Dee, who are absolutely identical, but could have been different. That means that in other possible worlds there are twins, Tee Dum and Tee Dee, who differ more from one another, but are sufficiently similar to ours to be accepted as a counterpart. Then it is possible that a counter part,e.g. Tee Dum is more similar to Dum, than Tee Dee Dee is to Dee. Lewis: his theory implies that of the non-actual twins Tee Dee is more similar, and so he is Dees’s counterpart, which we also hope. Problem: Tee Dee is also closer to Dum than any of his world companions, so that he is also a counterpart of Dum. Tee Dee is the counterpart of both Dee and Dum, and Tee Dum is cp of neither of them! And the fact that Tee Dum cannot be a c.p. is due to the properties of his brother and has nothing to do with its own intrinsic properties. BigelowVsLewis: nevertheless, it is not plausible to say that, because that is equivalent to the modal statement that one of the twins could not have been different if the other one had not been different as well. This is unacceptable.
I 199
Rivals theory/VsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: the rival theory asserts, thesis: that the counterparts are in fact numerically identical to the corresponding individual in the actual world. The rival theory uses the relation of numerical identity.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Reductionism Physicalism Vs Reductionism Schwarz I 156
Physicalism/Vs Reductionism/VsLewis. other authors: Physicalism is not at all fixed on the a priori derivability of mental from physical truths, only on supervenience of mental on physical facts. But this does not have to be a priori. It can be a posteriori necessity. For example, the relationship between H2O-truths and water truths. (This is non-reductive physicalism). LewisVs: this is a misunderstanding about a posteriori necessity: e.g. Assuming that "water is H2O" is necessary a posteriori: this is not because there is a modal fact, a necessity that we can only discover a posteriori, but rather because the meaning of certain words depends on contingent, empirical factors: according to our conventions, in all possible worlds "water" picks out the substance that fills our lakes and streams.
"Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because you first have to find out that the material that fills streams and lakes in our country is H2O. This is a contingent fact that usually requires chemical analysis, no excursions into modal space. The H2O-truths therefore a priori imply the water truths.
If pain a posteriori is identical with a physical state, then this must also be due to the fact that the reference to "pain" depends on contingent facts, on what kind of state plays the and the role with us ((s) not what kind of linguistic convention we have). (see 1994b(1),296f).


1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Stalnaker, R. Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. Read III 101/102
Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102)
According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability.
III 108
Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian.
and
If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian.
Stalnaker: one or the other must be true.
Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality.

Lewis IV 149
Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se.
Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones.
Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability.
Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions.
Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation.
Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world).
Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world!
For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or
b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs.
The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities:
The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world.
In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.)
V 145
Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision).
Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive.
The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals.
LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently.
V 148
Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs,
2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency
3. decide if the consequence is true.
Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping.
V 148/149
LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed.
Schwarz I 60
Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world.
LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World).
Schwarz I 62
Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured).
Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent.
Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent.
Schwarz I 63
Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36).
Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge).
Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers).
Schwarz I 207
"Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions.
Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary).
Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community.
Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar.
Note:
Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.).
Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions
Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f).
Newer terminology:
Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions
Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions
Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65)
Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions.
Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention".
Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions.
Schwarz I 227
A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined).
LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist.


1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies
in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112
2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003]
3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a]
4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P.
Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003]
5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University
Press
7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a]
8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy
and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a]
9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]
10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277
12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press
14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Stich, St. Lewis Vs Stich, St. Schwarz I 171
Representation/Lewis/Schwarz: if we ourselves belong to those beings whose representation is more like a card than a sentence, individual opinions do not correspond to isolated states, each with its own causal role. For example, you cannot cut out a part of a map that only represents that Berlin is east of Bielefeld (and nothing else). Then there is also no corresponding isolated state in the brain. >Brain state.
Schwarz I 172
In extreme cases we then only have a single state of opinion ((s) in which everything is networked) that is always causally relevant as a whole. (1994b(1),311). LewisVsStich: ((Stich 1996(2),Kap 2): this is quite compatible with everyday psychology. For example, my going into the kitchen has little to do with my opinion that Frege was born in 1848, but the two opinions are not necessarily different biological states, each with its own causal role. It is enough if they correspond to different characteristics of my holistic state of opinion, to which we refer in causal statements. >Causal role.


1. David Lewis — [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]
2. Stephen P. Stich [1996]: Deconstructing the Mind. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Truth Criterion Russell Vs Truth Criterion Horwich I 3
Truth criterion/criteria/truth/Russell: when we ask what constitutes the truth or falsity of a belief (constitutes), I do not ask for a criterion. Criterion: is a quality (property), which is itself different from the truth that belongs to all, whatever is true, and nothing else, but at the same time is not identical with truth. It is a hallmark (trademark, characteristic), a relatively obvious characteristic which ensures the authenticity.
((s) Criteria: always there, never absent, never at something else, but unidentical:> Carnap "companion". Many authors:. Unequal definition ((s) E.g. Definition being-an-even-number. Divisibility by 2 (definition against: Criterion: last digit 0,2,4,6 or 8) If it says "all and only... have ...". then it is not yet clear whether the criterion or the essential is mentioned).
Truth/Truth criterion/Russell: But when we say that this and this company has made the product, we do not mean that the product has the right stamp. ("To mean", mean):
I 4
Therefore, there is a difference between truth and truth criterion, and just this distinction is helpful. RussellVsTruth Criterion: I do not believe that truth has such a hallmark. But that is not what I want, I do not want to know which external characteristics truth has, with which we can recognize them but what truth itself is.
Truth/mind/judgment/Russell: what relation has truth to mind? Always on judgments. Thus, truth is mind dependent. ((s) So here truth not as the basic concept).
Nevertheless, it does not depend on the manner in which a single individual judges.
So truth and falsity of judgments has any objective reason. And it is quite natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods as objects of judgments (judgment object).
Russell: that is plausible in the case of truth, but not in falsehood. (1)


1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
extrinsic Kim, J. Lewis "extrinsic Properties" (1983)
  extrinsic properties / Kim / Lewis: Kim thesis: an extrinsic property requires a companion: a property that could not belong to a thing, if not another distinct thing also exists. (> Holism).
  Lewis: I give counter-examples.