Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution | Field | II 44 Behavior/attribution/ascription/Field: a claim about behavior is not simply a statement about behavior, but how behavior is caused. >Behaviorism. Belief ascription/Martians/Field: to alien beings, we cannot attribute sentences. Problem: we cannot decide whether a functional theory of their beliefs requires internal representations as well. >Other minds, >Representation, >Inner states, >Mental states, >Causation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Evidence | Loar | Avr I106 Def "normal evidence"/Loar: only non-verbal behavior. - This is not sufficient for attribution of beliefs about Martians - but we have more. >Belief attribution, >Beliefs, >Behavior. Solution: knowledge of the internal organization of the Martians - which claims a deep epistemic asymmetry. >Mental states, >Other minds. Normal level of evidence: superficial epistemic symmetry: strong dependence on belief and meaning. >Language behavior, >Language community. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Intentionality | Dennett | Rorty VI 27 Rorty: "Intentional stance"/intentional position/Dennett: The "intentional stance" is made possible through the detection of a Davidsonian pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth. >Rationality, >Language and Thought, >Truth/Davidson. Dennett I 316f SearleVsDennett: This is only an "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. Def intentional stance/Dennett: An attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind. Dennett II 46 It often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism: The fact that it was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium! E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance. E.g. Could archaeopteryx fly? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did it get up there ...? I 321 Def design standpoint/Dennett: e.g. an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later. But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that. Intentional stance/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either. >Cf. >Chess programs. Brandom I 109 Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately. I 591ff E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The example imitates the whole evolution. Dennett I 592ff Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: the robot that takes care of you must be able to act independently. - It must believe in reward, but develops self-interest. - Question: is this kind of intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs. Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes. I 596 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: No machine, no vending machine either has intentionality. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: At some point intentionality is no longer derived, but real! >As-if-intentionality/Searle. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Pain | Lewis | Frank I 129 Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 --- Lewis I 39f Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently. --- I (c) 41 Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed. I (c) 42 Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state. I (b) 33 ff Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ... --- I (c) 40 Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role. I (c) 42 Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization. But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (> concepts,> identity). I (c) 42 The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different. Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator! I (c) 52 Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states. If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain. --- Schwarz I 146 Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:> theory of reference. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Representation | Putnam | Rorty VI 63 PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: parts of what we call "language" or "mind", penetrate so deeply into the so-called "reality" that "pictures" of something "language independent" must fail. --- Putnam III 38 Representation/PutnamVsDavidson: that the word "cat" refers to cats is not simply due to the causal relationship. The word stands in many causal relationships. It is just the case that I would not use the word, if there were no cats. Instead of representation one might assume fundamentally an evolutionary role. >Roles. --- V 17/18 Representation/reference/Putnam: mental images arise as little as normal pictures in a necessary connection with the represented (otherwise no mistake would be possible). E.g. Martians (who know no trees) are faced with a tree image. The internal mental images are then no representations. One who recites unfamiliar words, for him they refer to nothing. Thoughts have no intrinsic connection to something outside - but they possibly have connections. >Reference/Putnam. --- I (h) 209ff Representation/Putnam: a representation is not a magic connection between a phenomenological character and denoted objects - there is no intrinsic connection. >Intrinsic. Problem: brains in a vat: without intrinsic connection, one could say that the word "vat" with inhabitants of vats that come up with the idea, "we are in the vat!" refers to phenomenological manifestations of vats and not to real vats (and also in the case of "brain" and "in"). Problem: if a real vat were to collapse, the people could not use their "vat" word anymore. But that would be a connection between a vat and every word they use and no distinctive connection between real vats and the use of the word vat. Putnam: the truth conditions of the inhabitants of vats would be something like that they are in the vat in the image. And that is what is wrong if they think it (although they are in the vat, (s) because they have not learned the use in their environment.) >Brains in a vat/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Roles | Lewis | V 253 Role: non-rigid: whatever has the role of x is an x in the context - whatever produces such and such manifestation. - >Role: "whatever it may be"; see also the distinction >referential/attributive. --- Schwarz I 105 Role/Lewis: only serves to fasten the property in the actual world. - Roles of properties can be exchanged, but not: different-digit relations - not even the roles of mereologically complex or mereologically atomic: they are intrinsic. --- Schwarz I 151f Role: playing such and such role is a contingent property of an event - Martians’ pain/(s) same role, other state. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Use Theory | Dummett | I 31 DummettVsuse theory: The disadvantage is that this is substantially non-systematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, it is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness but is not everything. The use theory is likely to assume that a significant part of the language is already understood. I 31 Use gives meaning - sence gives reference (Frege). - Meaning is not the same as reference: E.g. Unicorn. Use theory of meaning >speech act theory. I 29 Use/Truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. >meaning before truth. III (a) 10 Use theory/Dummett: Circumstances not sufficient - we need the purpose of why we use a word - even with classification valid/invalid always of interest (purpose). III (e) 196 Use theory/Dummett: sentences, not words have use. III (e) 200 E.g. use of money: here one must understand the whole institution. I Schiffer 223f Use theory/Understanding/Meaning/Manifestation/Dummett/SchifferVsDummett: behavioristically - (also othersVsDummett) - from it does not follow anti-realism - Dummett himself uses psychological vocabulary - why should one have to be able to show understanding? - Own use should be sufficient. I 225 McDowellVsDummett: Martians still cannot understand us, because the intentional (content-determining) cannot be reduced to the non-intentional. I 227 Knowing whether something counts as verification, could depend on extra-linguistic knowledge and not on the understanding of the sentence - QuineVsDummett: direct Verific. cond. cannot exist for every sentence - ((s)> Quine: ~ theories are not verifiable sentence by sentence). - Sure there are meaningful sentences that have no discernible conditions which would prove the sentence to be true or false. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett cites Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behavior can be refuted - SchifferVsDummett: then the meaning theory needs both contestable criteria and contestable conditions - problem: this is true for most empirical judgments. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Dennett, D. | Peacocke Vs Dennett, D. | I 204/205 PeacockeVsDennett: the causal role of beliefs and other propositional attitudes cannot be detected in this derived way (via attribution rules), namely as consequence of an instrumentalist view. VsInternal Instrumentalism/VsInstrumentalism: Dennett's instrumentalist conditions are not sufficient for the attribution of mental states. E.g. Suppose there is a "body" which exactly resembles a human body, except that it has no brain. It is controlled from Mars and the Martians fully understand the human neurophysiology. Their computer can predict nerve stimuli for any given stimulation and past situation. The computer has a specification of the past of the "body", but only a finite set of conditionals that dictate how the "body" should behave. So it can make the "body" to behave in every situation like a human. This behavior is now just as predictable if it is assumed to have intentions. But it is just a puppet. Therefore, Dennett's conditions are insufficient. Peacocke: what have the conditions omitted? Wrong solution: propose that a system would have to be built by another intentional system. That would be too strict. Solution: what is missing is that the belief and the others are not causally caused! E.g. if someone remembers, then there is a state in which he once was... I 206 The computer does not have such states. There will certainly be a history of previous stimulations. But that can hardly be identified with a memory track. PeacockeVsVs: back then, an intention may have formed at the same time that has survived. Then we cannot say that this intention also has the description of this encounter in the past as categorical grounds. The computer explained as folk psychology, conceives beliefs, experience, memory, intention as interrelated. Peacocke: this suggests that having intentions is more than a complex and cohesive family of dispositions (even together with a categorical foundation). The case of the computer shows that Dennett's causal interactions are not always there when the instrumentalist conditions for the attribution of belief are fulfilled. Therefore, Dennett brings so-called "core elements" along. These are not present in the computer case. Peacocke: we can say that the computer does not have any experiences, then it has no propositional attitudes either. Peacocke: this makes it necessary to take a middle position. If it were not for this, it would force us to the side of Mentalese! |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Functionalism | Field Vs Functionalism | II 43 Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations. II 44 Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82). Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations. 1) We have not observed the entire behavior. 2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused. FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief. Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior. II 49 Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions. The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago. II 50 Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence. Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald". FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow? FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.) Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said: "A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism." II 51 Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it). And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property. Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general). Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3). N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Identity Theory | Functionalism Vs Identity Theory | Lanz I 287 Identity Theory/Lanz: identity theory identifies types of mental states with physically characterized types of brain states. According to this, a certain type of mental state (e.g. "having pain") must always be realized in the same neural structure. FunctionalismVsIdentity Theory/Lanz: this is empirically implausible: 1. The brain has the ability to compensate for damage to its parts by other parts taking over the failed functions. (Split-Brain). 2. Two beings could be realized physiologically very differently (robots, Martians) and still have the same beliefs, wishes and expectations. Horwich I 423 FunctionalismVsIdentity Thesis/PutnamVsIdentity Theory/Harman: must be rejected because of cases of e.g. reversed spectra. (Harman: elsewhere ("Conceputal role semantics", Notre dame Journal.of.Formal Logic, XXIII,2 April 1982, 242ff) Vs). Facts/Values/Rationality/Harman: the philosophical tradition assumes that morality and evaluation seem to depend in a different way on one or other set of standards (principles) than rationality does. Rationality/Harman: their principles are different from those of logic. (Not that I know which they are). They are also not explicitly accepted by anyone. We basically assume that humans are thinking in the same way. (reason the same way). Principles: their existence allows us to understand the considerations of others. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Fodor Vs Lewis, D. | Block I 163 Pain/FodorVsLewis: if you say that pain in humans and Martians is different, you are not stating on the basis of which properties both of them perceive pain. Any disjunction of physical conditions which used to mean pain in the history of the universe, is not a solution. Because that does not cover what the individuals have in common. I 215 Pain/FodorVsLewis: since the property of having the state is a functional one - and not only a functionally characterized property, Lewis is still bound by the functionalism discussed here. Pain/VsLewis: the functionalism presented here asserts a state Z that is defined as a state with such and such a causal role, and the functionalist assertion becomes: "Pain = Z". Here, Z itself is not a functional state (> Ramsey-functional Correlate). I 217 FodorVsLewis: the contrast to Lewis (functional characterization of a state rather than a functional state) can be made clearer: e.g. assuming, a condition type is a specific type of property. Namely, the property which each token of this condition has because it is a token of this type. Then, the pain condition would be identified with the property of being a pain (not of being in pain). I.e. in terms of the pain and not of the organism. Lewis: defines pain as the state that has a certain causal role ("ix"). Functionalism/Block: pain as the property of playing a certain causal role ("lx"). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 107 Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: the radical interpretation is governed by fundamental principles that tell us how belief and meanings are usually related to each other, as well as to behavior and sensory input. IV 108 These fundamental principles are nothing but a lot of platitudes of common sense. E.g. that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. But that can only be true if the speaker has several propositional attitudes. Holism/Fodor/Lepore: then holism can be derived from the conditions for the intentional attribution! Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: (he might perhaps agree): it is not clear that anything metaphysically interesting follows from the fulfillment of conditions for the intentional attribution. IV 114 Meaning Holism/MH/belief/Fodor/Lepore: if according to Lewis’ thesis belief has primacy over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, for example, the following would have to be assumed: Def Thesis of the "Primacy of Belief"/PT/Lewis: thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions of belief attribution. Therefore: if the former is holistic, so must be the latter." Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that semantic holism might follow from this thesis (belief holism seems plausible). Primacy of Belief/Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: the thesis is so strong that semantic holism emerges even without the principle of charity. Even without any theory of interpretation! But we do not believe that the thesis is true. RI/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: his version of radical interpretation does not endorse the thesis of the primacy of belief (PT) and we do not say that he accepts it at all. We believe that the PT is not true. Holism/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: but if Lewis does not represent the primacy thesis, his arguments in favor of holism are limited. They can show that belief qua belief is holistic, but not that they are holistic qua intentional. IV 121 VsLewis: the primacy thesis is implausible. IV 131 Fodor/LeporeVsDavison/VsLewis: it could be said: because the semantics of representations is atomistic, it follows that intentional attribution as such is not determined by constitutive principles like the principle of rationality! Allowing the attribution of irrational propositional attitudes would simply be a "change of subject". That would be no intentional states! I.e if we attribute irrational things to the speaker, we change our opinion on the content of his mental states. Vs: 1) It could be made stronger, not only epistemically, by saying that even God would change the content of his attribution, before violating rationality. IV 132 2) Assuming the point was metaphysical and not only epistemic: nevertheless it does not follow from the atomistic approach to mental semantics that the principle of rationality could be ignored in the attribution. You cannot believe simultaneously that p and that not p. These principles are constitutive of belief, and also for wishes, etc. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Putnam, H. | Nozick Vs Putnam, H. | II 339 Functionalism/NozickVsPutnam: f in addition we need the biological function of the physical states as realization of functional connections. Putnam: is right in that the defined material base is not important. But it does not follow that nothing is essential about the material basis! E.g. a marble rolling up and down in the head of a Martian would have the same functional connections as joke has for us. It does not follow that the Martian is in pain during this process! VsPutnam: two additional conditions: 1) the respective states under the functional isomorphism must have isomorphic internal structures themselves. 2) (which gives content to the first): these states have to play their role in a way that depends on its (isomorphic) internal structure. Mental State/Pain/Martian/Nozick: for the mental states to be the same as for us, the physical states must not only play the same role, but also be configured the same as ours (internally). (FN 47). If the internal configurations of the Martians are different from ours, although they should explain the same roles, then they are in other mental states. Nozick: nevertheless even Martians for whom all of this applies II 340 are still not in the same mental states if they do not have the same biological function as ours: to identify or bring about the abstract rational relations. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naturalism | Pro | Avramides I 107 Loar: per deep epistemic asymmetry: Martians beliefs are attributable by neurophysiological investigation - per naturalism - per physicalism. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Physicalism | Pro | Avramides I 107 Loar: per deep epistemic asymmetry: Martians beliefs attributable by neurophysiological investigation - per naturalism - per physicalism. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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