Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Index Words | Perry | Frank I 22 PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality. Frank I 393f Index words/Perry: without pointing component. Demonstratives: with pointing component. >Demonstratives. Meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object. >Roles, >Verification, >Identification, >Individuation. I 394f Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Understanding, cf. >Truth conditions, >Understanding/Dummett. Perry: the role (determination process) changes, the meaning is constant. - Then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. >Meaning, >Thoughts. What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. >Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 419 Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. ((s) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight.) Perry:There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess (sugar trail). No Professor, who does not feel guilty (because he does not know what time it is). What people have in common here is not what they believe. >Wanderers example, >Sugar trail example. I 394 ff Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term. - Then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term? >Singular terms, >General terms. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Map Example | Peacocke | I 76 Map/Peacocke: in order to use a map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. ((s)> e.g. Two lost wanderers/J. Perry). ((s) e.g. GPS: intensional (tells you "who you are"). Map: (extensional) will not help you. It does not tell you who you are.) >Propositional knowledge, >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Spatial localization. ((s) Explanation/(s): E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance, they have the same hiking book. Then, with the help of this book alone, they will not find out their localization. Reason: in the printed book the hikers are not identified, e.g. as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: modern navigation system: registers the path and identifies by it the user who holds the device in his hand. Distinction: propositional/non-propositional knowledge). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Perry | Frank I 404f Lewis: Two omniscient Gods/Gods-Example/example of the Gods/wanderer-example: E.g. Perry: two lost wanderers need more than just the same travel guide to even detect differences with the situation and each other. - They would call all the same sentences as true. See also sugar trail at the grocery store. >Supermarket-example . (Frank I 402ff). >Two omniscient Gods. See also >Identification, >Individuation, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >essential Indexicals. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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