Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mereology | Simons | I 23 Mereology/Simons: mereology has operators instead of quantifiers (of PL). Operators take a Term N and form a new term N (a noun), e.g "ov" overlapper of "pt" "part-of", "ex" outsider of-complex terms: e.g. instead PL: "binary product of () and ()", the following is easier: "(Bpr (,))". Mereology: "Sm" "sum-of", "Pr": "Product-of". Plural Designation/mereology: "Sum of the squares" instead PL: "Sum of x such that x is a square. >Parts, >Part-of-relation. I 176f Mereological Consistency: e.g. wine in a specific bottle stops being this when poured. Mereological variability: e.g. water in the river Salzach: is "the same water with differences in its entirety". Mass Terms: mass terms tend to consistency because we are referring with terms of constancy to change. Material things are mereological variable: they can gain and lose parts. Pro: Aristotle, Locke, >Aristotle, >J. Locke, Vs: Leibniz, Hume, Reid, Chisholm. >Th. Reid, >G.W. Leibniz, >D. Hume, >R. Chisholm. >Essentialism, >Essence. I 190 Mereological Consistency/succession/Chisholm: mereological variable objects are only logical structures made of mereological constant objects (entia per se). The relation of succession depends on the type of object (e.g. table or cat). I 209 Continuity/Simons: continuity is stricter than mereological consistency: the hair must exist continuously, so that the old hairstyle can be restored. >Continuity, >Consistency. I 278 Mereology/science/practice/Simons: most of the objects of the natural sciences e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole and at the same time mereological variable. This corresponds to a middle path between essentialism and arbitrary or conventional parts. >Essentialism, >Conventions, >Necessary part. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Parts | Simons | I 26f Real part/mereology: there must be at least a second real part. BrentanoVs: e.g. a man is a real part of the event "sitting human" but here there is no second real part. Otherwise: Thatcher qua Prime Minister: is not part of Thatcher. >Qua-objects. Solution: supplement principles: there must be at least two real parts (if at all). There must be the possibility of separate parts and not only overlapping. >Overlapping. I 135 Predicate/part/whole/mereology/Simons: certain predicates are true of their objects because other predicates are true of their parts: e.g. Socrates was snub-nosed, because his nose was blunt, e.g. a table mountain is flat, because its upper part is flat. Predication of the whole is inherited by predication of the parts (local predication). For continuants this is even the only kind of predication. >Predicates, >Predication. Variation/continuants/mereology/McTaggart/Simons: e.g. the poker which is hot at the front and cool at the back: that is a variation on the object, but no change of the properties. It is a complex condition. On the other hand: e.g. when the entire poker gets hot, we have to say that the point in time is not the same.> >Change, >Temporal identity, >Properties. I 210 Part/whole/Simons: thesis: we reject the antisymmetry between part and whole. Then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time. >Superposition. I 229 Part/Simons: the wit of this expression is that without it, we have no concept of space restrictions or perhaps of the space at all. I 235 Part/plural designation/multiplicity/Simons: (1): b is part of a: here b is a mass term (e.g. dough) or individual term (e.g. an apple) (2): b is part of a: here b must be an individual term (e.g. an apple) (3): b are parts of a: here b must be a plural term (e.g. wolves, e.g. blueberries are part of the cake, they are not "a part" of the cake. "Are part of": is the plural of "is part of". "Are parts of": is the plural of "is part of". (4): b are parts of a: here any b must be part of a, e.g. crankshaft and transmission are parts of the car, e.g. "the front" is part of the car, but not a part of the car. Whatever is a part of something, is also part of it but not vice versa. "A part of" has extra sense opposed to "part of". Component ("a part of") exists before installation and survived replacement. I 334 Part/fragment/relation/function/mereology/Simons: an arbitrary conceptual cut, e.g. "northern part of the house" is typically not closed under the relation, under which the whole is closed. >Mereology. I 337 Part/pure mereology/Simons: a mere relation of co-parts could not distinguish which objects are more unified (integrated). >Part-of-relation. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Simons Vs Frege, G. | I 102 Class/FregeVsSchröder: you have to distinguish between: a) "logical" classes: = value process and I 103 b) "specific" classes: a calculation of collective classes is only a calculation of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: this turned ironically out to be much more vulnerable than Schröder's "manifolds". Lesniewski: Lesniewski knew Frege's criticism. I 290 Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name is an individual. SimonsVsFrege: of this deefinition one has recovered only lately. But there are also plural names (> Plural Designation, Plural Reference (> Black) see above). See also Empty Names. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Gestalt Theory | Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory | Simons I 290 Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions. Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums). Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not! Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be. Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name. SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also >empty names. Simons I 324 Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme). Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view. Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning. stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. ((s) >Strength of Theories). |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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