Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Relation | Schiffer | I 102 Causal relation/Schiffer/(s): Problem: There is no physical relation that connects general terms with the corresponding entities. >General terms, >Correspondence. Otherwise: it would have to be a functional relation (multiple realization): problem: it should take "true of" or "refers" as basic concepts. >Basic concepts/Schiffer. A causal theory (for a theory of mental representations) (e.g. reliability theory) needs no semantic terms (true of, referenced) as basic concepts. >Reliability theory. Instead: substitutional quantification or translation of M-sentences into the metalanguage of the theory. >Substitutional quantification, >Metalanguage. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Functionalism | Pauen | Pauen I 67 Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split Brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. >Identity theory, >Materialism, >Brain states. I 130 Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: semantic functionalism reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary. >Everyday language, >Everyday psychology, >Explanation, >Behavior. I 132 Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists. >D. Lewis. I 135f Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron. Representative: Dennett. Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation. >Simulation, >D. Dennett, >Psycho-functionalism. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Information | Dennett | I 268 Information/code/Dennett: the fact that a one-dimensional code can represent a three-dimensional structure is a gain of information. Actually, "value" is added! (Contribution to the functioning). >Functions, >Functional explanation, >Code. II 35 Information/action/virus/Dennett: The virus must "make sure" of the proliferation of its information. in order to achieve its objectives, it produces an enzyme which is shown a "password", and then it leaves the other molecules "untouched". II 94f Information/Life/Dennett: long before there were nervous systems in organisms, they used a primitive. postal service: the circulation and metabolism for transmitting information. Information processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). Embodied Information/Dennett: evolution causes information to become physical in every part of every living creature. E.g. the baleen of the whale embodies information about the food. E.g. The bird's wings contain information about the medium air. E.g. The skin of the chameleon carries information about the environment. This information need not go to the brain as copies. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Lewis Vs Carnap, R. | Field II 196 Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972). Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x). Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x). multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism/Lewis, >Turing machine). It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).) Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x). LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one. Field II 197 Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey: (E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity. LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled. LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization. Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time. Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer". Lewis IV 88 Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences. Def Extended Postulation/Lewis: the postulate of T that we get by replacing the TT by descriptions (O sentence). It says that the theory T is realized by the n tuple of the first, second...component of the only realization of T. The extended postulate is equivalent in definition to the postulate. It says that the theory is uniquely realized. It is logically equivalent to a shorter O phrase, which says the same in a shorter form. This is what we call the "sentence of the only realization of T": IV 89 Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn LewisVsCarnap: then the postulate is true if and only if the theory is realized once. Problem: the expanded postulate is an O phrase that is stronger than the Ramsey phrase that merely says that there is at least one realization. Nevertheless, if the definition sentences are part of T, then the extended postulate is a theorem of T. Then the definitions give us theorems that could not have been derived without them. This means that the definitions themselves, unlike the Carnap theorem, are not logically implied by the postulate. Therefore, if we want to say that the definition sets of T are correct definitions, we must abandon the idea that the theorems are all and only the logical consequences of T's postulate. And we like to give that up. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Functionalism | Dennett Vs Functionalism | II 87 Functionalism/Dennett: widely spread in everyday life. Basic idea: E.g. "noble is who does nobly", "Not what it is made of makes a mind (or a belief, a pain, a fear), but what it can do." In common linguistic use of functionalism, such entities defined by their function allow multiple realizations. Why can an artificial mind not be made like an artificial heart with almost any material? II 88 DennettVsFunctionalism: he deliberately abstracts from the inscrutable details of performance and focuses on the work that is actually done. But he simplifies too much. II 95 Information Processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). E.g. To receive light something light-sensitive is needed. E.g. Controls for ships or factories are media-neutral, as long as they fulfill their task in the time available. But to the nervous system applies that much less time is available. The realization of the nervous system is not a media-neutral. And that is not because it would need to have a certain aura of a particular material or of living being, but because it originated in evolution as the central control system of living beings who’ve been abundantly equipped with very decentralized control systems. The new systems had to be set up above them, but in very close collaboration with them. There was an astronomical number of conversion points. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identity Theory | Pauen Vs Identity Theory | Pauen I 109 Identity Theory/Pauen: simple explanation of the origin of consciousness: simply as neuronal processes. E.g. Buddenbrooks is not just a novel, but also Mann's first work. VsIdentity Theory/Pauen: this makes it counterintuitive how neuronal processes are supposed to explain the origin of the work. I 110 Multiple RealizabilityVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: the identity theory cannot explain how different neural patterns can bring about the same state of consciousness. Explanation GapVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: ("Explanatory Gap Argument"): (Joseph Levine): in view of the multiple realization the two levels (mental, neuronal) gape but too far apart. In addition, experience is considered with regard to the mental state. Identity/Wittgenstein/Pauen: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say it of one thing is meaningless. I 113 Identity/Pauen: identity assertions which go beyond the trivial, are always hypotheses. I 77 Def Identity Theory/Pauen: first and third person are equal ranking, precursor: Spinoza, parallelism. Def Type Identity Theory: all mental states of a certain mental type are at the same time states of a particular neuronal type and vice versa. Highlight: 50s, then decline. VsTyp Identity: cannot explain multiple realizability. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multiple Realisation | Lewis, D. | IV 89 Lewis: Thesis: I do not see why we could not live with multiple realizations of theories. |
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| Antidualism | Schiffer, St. | I 20 Anti-dualism: (40 years ago): behaviorism: the mental properties are identical with dispositions. (20 years ago): physicalism: mental properties are physical properties, resp. mental Z types are physical Z-types (type-type identity thesis). VsType-type identity: problem of multiple realization: I 21 We can not chauvinistically exclude machines. |
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