Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Theory Ramsey III 72
Correspondence/Correspondence Theory/Fact/Ramsey: which fact corresponds to e.g. Jones thinks that Smith is either a liar or an idiot if reality does not contain any such either or. >Disjunction, cf.>Disjunctive predicates.
If we believe that reality contains no such "either or," we must change our approach.
>Objects of belief, >Objects of thought.
But that does not necessarily speak against Correspondence Theory.
We have given a truth definition without any correspondence.
((s) >Tarski per correspondence (explicitely))
>Correspondence theory/Tarski.
Ramsey: we can rewrite the truth definition with correspondence, though.
>Truth definition.
Fact/Ramsey: if A is B, then by common usage we can say that it is a fact that A is B and then say that it corresponds to the belief that A is B.
>Facts.
Fact/falsity/Ramsey: if A is not b, there is no fact corresponding to it. ((s) RamseyVsNegative Fact).
>Negative fact.
Problem: we cannot describe the nature of this correspondence unless we know the analysis of the propositional reference of "believe that A is B".
>Reference, >Propositional attitude, >Thought content.

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Definitions Rorty Frank I 590
Theory / Rorty when "mental" is only "unknown", then "immaterial" makes no sense - even as a definition of "a or b" it is meaningless - e.g. "mental" = "either physically or mentally". >Disjunctive Predicates, >Levels/Order, >Paradoxes.

Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Disjunction Armstrong III 15
Disjunction of prop > disjunctive predicates/Armstrong: a single predicate "M" could be used for "A or B or C" > "grue"/Armstrong: simplified form: green becomes blue and at the same time blue becomes green - new pair of pred: bleen/grue: nothing changes relative to the pair: green> blue: remains bleen, blue> green. Remains grue - but: a thing that remains blue changes relative to the new pair bleen/grue - Question: what kind of predicates priority?
III 68
Disjunction/Disjunctive Properties/System/Order/F.o.Th./Armstrong: Example, a natural system contains three fundamental laws: Fs are Gs, Hs are Js, Ks are Ls - these are united as follows: we define M: "an F or an H or a K" N: "a G or a J or an L" - then we have a single "fundamental law": "Ms are Ns" - then "F is an N": less informative but apparent improvement: G = J = L: no more information than "F is G v J v L". But if "N" is a true property, then "G", "J", "L" are merely artificial subdivisions (Armstrong pro) (f.o.th disjunction, identity) (>grue) - (s) otherwise we would always have to say "yellow or black Banana").
III 151
Disjunctive properties: being G or H": ArmstrongVs - Problem: disj. laws: does not the unrealized alternative need to be missing first? - disjunctional predicates always possible, but no real relation

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Disjunction Davidson I (e) 102
Disjunctive Predicate/state of mind/brain state/Davidson/(s): there is no physical difference between the state e.g. to mean that there is a "short-beaked Echidna" or a "short-beaked echidna or porcupine" - is a psychological difference. >Disjunctive predicates.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Disjunction Fraassen I 127
Contrast-class/Bromberger/Explanation/Fraassen: E.g. why (it is the case that) P in contrast to (other elements of) X? X: Contrast-Class:set of alternatives.
P may belong to X or not - e.g. why this temperature instead of another? - ((s)> disjunctive predicates).

E.g. Why is this person suffering from paresis - because previously Syphilis.
Why from this syphilis patient: here there is no answer.
Individual/Fraassen: is never explained - only qua event of a certain type. >Individual causation.
VsContrast class: dos not exclude irrelevance.
Still a problem: asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow. >Asymmetry.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Disjunction Putnam III 125
Disjunction/definition/science/Putnam: e.g. different color combinations can produce the same perceived color. Any non-disjunctive predicate can be converted into a disjunctive predicate through conversion (by switching the current basic concepts terms in each case, and vice versa). Therefore disjunctivity is not a refutation that no >universal exists. ---
V 122
Disjunction/property/Putnam: the disjunction of properties is itself a third property: neither A nor B is a sensation state, but only their disjunction. >Properties/Putnam.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Disjunction Searle I 66
Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness and intentionality (SearleVs). Searle: meanings are in your head (intentionality). Intentionality is biologically teleological.
I 67
SearleVs: when there is a confusion, words like "horse or cow" are required. > Disjunctive predicates.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Disjunction Sellars I 50
Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of ​​being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! SeallarsVsLocke: Locke thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided".
>Idea/Locke, >Disjunctive predicates, >Generalization, >Generality, >Ideas.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Natural Kinds Dennett I 574
Natural kind/natural type/indeterminacy/twin earth/reference/Putnam: E.g. is it simply a cat/ or a siamese cat: solution: we refer to natural kinds, whether we know it or not. DennettVs: but which types are natural?
Perhaps one discovers later that one must make a distinction? Which undermines the argument of the twin earth. >Twin earth.
Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then?
E.g. natural type for frogs: Fly or beads.
((s) > disjunctive predicates.)

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Natural Kinds Sellars I 50
Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of ​​being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! SeallarsVsLocke: Locke thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided".
>Idea/Locke, >Disjunctive predicates, >Generalization, >Generality, >Ideas.
I 51
Disjunction: the idea of a genus is the idea of the disjunction of all its species. So the idea of the triangular is the idea of the inequilateral or equilateral. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it was the idea of the inequilateral and equilateral. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility.
>Contradictions.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Naturalism Searle I 66
Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness/intentionality (SearleVs: Searle is against such a separation). >Consciouness, >Intentionality.
Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head. >Intentionality/Searle.
Putnam: Meanings are not in the head.

There is a thesis: intentionality is biological, teleological:
SearleVs: in a case of confusion we needed words like "horse-or-cow".
((s) > Disjunctive predicates.)

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Operators Stalnaker I 129
Variable binding/Stalnaker: binding of variables can also be done by an abstraction operator instead of a quantifier. >Bound variable, >Quantifiers, >Operators, >Quantification.
Advantage: an advantage is conceptual clarity. Complex predicates can be vague or ambiguous.
>Predicates, >Ambiguity, cf. >Disjunctive Predicates.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Predicates Goodman I 127
Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular. Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.)
>Denotation, >Singular terms, >General terms.
---
II I (preface Putnam)
Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable. >Grueness, >Induction.
II IV Preface
No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive (VsCarnap). >Disjunctive predicates.
II IV
Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary.
II V
More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict: E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable
II IV
Grue/Goodman: if we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t. >Grueness.
II 61
Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations. >Properties, >Dispositions.
II 64
A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. Because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demand too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same class.
II 74
Continuation/predicates: statement: "time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t. Variant: real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects.
II 77
One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous".
II 78
Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself.
II 79
The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and usually go further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction.
II 121
"Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored. >Grueness, >Projectability.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Properties Meixner I 31
Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity. >States of affairs, >That-clause.
"Being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property (property name).
>Properties.
I 42
Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!) Cf. >Semantic Ascent.
I 50
Exemplification/Identity/Meixner: Object X is F, this is not an identity of X and F, of the object with its property, but the property is exemplified by the object. >Exemplification, >Predication.
I 73
Property/Meixner: nothing other than function. This property, when saturated with the individual Hans, again results in the fact that Hans is a human >Saturated/unsaturated.
I 75fff
Property/Meixner 2nd level: Properties of properties: "the property of being a trait of x" - e.g. being egoistic is the property of being a trait. Not 2nd level: e.g. being 2 meters tall.
E.g. the property of being a trait cannot be said of people or cities (this is senseless), but it can be (erroneously) said of the property of being 2 meters tall.
>Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 76
Individual properties ("initial properties")/Meixner: exactly expressable about individuals, not something that only individuals can have. - There are cases where properties which cannot be expressed exactly about an individual can still apply to the individual.
I 78
Ontological/Property/Meixner: the distinction between relational and non-relational properties is ontological. Non-ontological: distinction between negative and non-negative or between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties.
>Disjunctive properties, >Disjunctive predicates.
I 150
Properties/Meixner: Identity principle for individual properties: they can be satisfied by exactly the same entities. For all individuals property F and G: F is identical to G if and only if for all individuals x applies:
‹F,x› = ‹G,x›.
For triangles: equiangular and equilateral triangles are satified by the same entities.
>Satisfaction.
I 153ff.
Universal Name: means the property. >Universals.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Putnam Vs Carnap, R. Goodman II Putnam Foreword V
Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48).
Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself,
PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate.


Lewis IV 85
Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts.
IV 85/86
Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there.
They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas".

Putnam V 244
Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private.
PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability.
V 250
Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap).
Putnam I (a) 42
Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful.
There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them).
Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions:
1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions.
I 43
2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language".
Putnam I (a) 46
Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence.
PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"!
(I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term).
I (a) 48
Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem.
I (a) 49
Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say!

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Goodman, N. Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. Introduction Putnam II IV
Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language.
Sainsbury V 129
Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 358
Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher.
((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.)
I 359
Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger:
1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction
2. provisional nature
3. without claim to factuality
4. expediency.
RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed.
I 360
Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95).
Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 406ff
Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery.
It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production.
407
Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura.
(Bolz pro Aura).
Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility.
Putnam I 256
Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it.





Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000